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Thai and South Korean Military Withdrawal and Democratisation

Notes on the Indonesian Military Politics

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Introduction

In modernising society, the role of the state is obvious. In the course of world history, there are three main features of states' strategies or experiences in the efforts to transform their societies into a more advanced condition, economically and politically. First, the focus is given to economic development at the expense of the establishment of democratic regime. Second, the emphasis is given to building democracy at the expense of economic development. Finally, economic development and the development of democracy are designed in such a manner so that they can go hand in hand.

While India might be included in the third category and Indonesia during the so-called Liberal Democracy (1950-1955) in the second category, most developing countries take the first path, that is, concentrating on economic development while postponing the establishment of democratic regimes. The argument behind this is that, first, in transitional society, scores of people live in poverty. The proponents of this strategy argue that what the people need are not politics or democracy, but food. Second, the expansion of mass participation due to modernisation program "often runs counter to efforts to modernise; in fact it is inherently destabilising."¹ Huntington's theory seems to influence this view in that "too much and too early participation is destabilising and unworkable for developing countries."² Thus, "it is necessary to delay or restrict the expansion of political participation until sufficiently strong institutions have been developed."³ Third, certain conditions are needed to secure the establishment of democratic regime. This includes significant welfare and literacy levels, the emergence of sufficient and strong middle class, bourgeoisie, and so on.

With such a "choice" (the first path), the establishment of developmentalist regime is mostly inevitable. In this regime, the state should be autonomous and strong enough to command development programs or to guarantee the implementation of economic policies.⁴ To assure the success of economic development, to achieve a high rate economic growth in particular, the government should establish political stability⁵ or what Huntington called political order.⁶ In most cases, this would render the government, consciously or unconsciously,

¹ Julian M. Boileau, *Golkar: Functional Group Politics in Indonesia* (Jakarta: CSIS, 1983), p. 6.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ See Chung-Si Ahn, "Economic Development and Democratization in South Korea: An Examination on Economic Change and Empowerment of Civil Society," *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. XV, No. 4, Winter 1991, p. 744.

⁵ Julian M. Bilieau, *loc.cit.*

⁶ See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968).

applying authoritarian rule with strong administrative and coercive machinery. Robison, Hewison, and Rodan observed that this is a common phenomenon in the early stage of capitalist development: “some form of authoritarianism was inevitable or perhaps even necessary to the process of development (or underdevelopment).”⁷

In guarding the development process or preserving authoritarian rule, the role of security apparatus, particularly the military, is prominent. In a civilian-dominated government, the civilian politicians employ the military to suppress political dissents, oppositions or other “destabilising factors.” In praetorian regime, the military occupy civilian institutions, dominates political discourse and arena, and even rules the country. Interestingly, in a praetorian state the military not only positions itself as a guardian but also claims as an agent of social change, agent of development, modernisation, and even democratisation.

In practice, while credit maybe goes to the military in maintaining political stability, its reputation in socio-economic development is not convincing and even worse in political development. Valenzuela observed that “studies have shown that the military has in fact not played a very constructive role as moderniser.”⁸ Barber and Rooning concluded that the impact of military’s civic missions is very limited.⁹ Nordlinger’s comparative study suggested that compared to civilian regimes, military regimes provided less contribution on investment, economic growth and social welfare.¹⁰ Rather, “all military regimes are authoritarian in that they eliminate or extensively limit political rights, liberties, and competition, at least until the officers are getting ready to return to the barracks.”¹¹

Owing to such military performance, the demands to establish civilian control or military withdrawal grow significantly. This stems from the notion that military’s specialisation is on defense, not on socio-economic or political spheres. Such demands are aimed mainly at promoting democracy. This is because in a praetorian state, military withdrawal is a *conditio sine qua non* for the transformation of authoritarian state power to a more democratic one. Even though military withdrawal does not automatically establish a democratic state, substantial democratisation will not occur without the decrease of military intervention or interference in politics.

Studies or concerns on military withdrawal from politics were actually as old as the

⁷ Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison, and Gary Rodan, “Political power in industrialising capitalist societies: Theoretical approaches,” in Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison, and Gary Rodan (eds.), *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Capitalism* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 10.

⁸ Arturo Valenzuela, “A Note on the Military and Social Science Theory,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 2, January 1985.

⁹ In Arturo Valenzuela, *ibid.* For reference inquiry, see Willard F Barber and C N Ronning, *International Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1966).

¹⁰ In Arturo Valenzuela. See also Eric A Nordlinger, *Soldier in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1977).

¹¹ Eric A Nordlinger, *ibid.*, p. 25.

phenomenon of military intervention, particularly coup d'état. Coup was usually followed by counter coup, and military intervention in politics was regarded abnormal or temporary. Since coups counter coups occurred frequently and worsened socio-economic and political conditions, the intention to establish normal politics—civilian control/supremacy—became significant.

The studies have acquired momentum since 1970s when, according to Huntington, the third wave of democratisation began. The wave of democratisation related to the concept of civilian control which has been deeply rooted in Anglo-American countries and has been regarded as an ideal principle of political system. The third wave democratisation occurred due to the spread of “virus” of civilian control from these countries to the rest of the world. The establishment of civilian control in Portugal, Spain and Turkey in 1970s were deemed as the initial stage of such a wave. The replication of their experiences by scores of developing countries in Latin America and Africa during the late of 1970s and 1980s marked the spread of such a “virus” or the snowballing effect of the wave of democratisation. Ecuador, El Salvador, Uruguay, Honduras, Peru, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ghana, Uganda, Gambia, Nigeria were some examples of countries which had or have been successful in establishing civilian control.¹²

The idea of civilian control also spread among population in military-dominated Asian countries. In 1990 the military in Bangladesh was forced to relinquish its power to civilian politicians. In 1992, Pakistani civilians succeeded in forcing the military junta to hand over power to civilian authorities.¹³

Thailand and South Korea are two other Asian countries which have been successful in establishing civilian control of politics as a result of military withdrawal. This study analyses their efforts and experiences in establishing military withdrawal as a foundation of civilian control and democratisation. This research attempts to answer the following questions: What are the similarities and differences between military intervention and military withdrawal in Thailand and South Korea? What crucial factors are working for military intervention and withdrawal? Do they have the same patterns in such withdrawal? Can factors of military intervention be “played back” for military withdrawal? What is the relationship between military withdrawal and civilian control and democratisation?

¹² Civilian control in some of these countries were however short-lived. The military regained power for various reasons. See Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Barlinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 2-25. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 21-26. Harold Blakemore, “Back to the Barracks: the Chilean Case,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1985. Dennis Austin, “The Ghana Armed Forces and Ghanaian Society,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1985. William Gutteridge, “Undoing Military Coups in Africa,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1985. Peter Calvert, “Demilitarisation in Latin America,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1985.

¹³ Pakistani civilian regimes in the period of 1992-1999 were however fragile due to political fragmentation, deterioration of socio-economic conditions and rampant corruption, and this provided an

The success of military withdrawal in Thailand and South Korea is an interesting phenomenon. It has even become a notable references in the struggles for military withdrawal among pro-democracy groups in Asian countries, particularly Indonesia, where the military play dominant or significant role in domestic politics. Struggles for the establishment of military withdrawal, civilian control and democratisation in Indonesia have provided some considerable results. However, the fruits of struggles are not as successful as that of South Korea and Thailand so far. What lessons can be drawn from Thai and South Korean cases in the struggle for military withdrawal, civilian control and democratisation? This is one question to be answered in the last part of this work.

This study actually covered the period until March 2000 when this research project terminated. However, when this study was prepared to be published some crucial developments in the Indonesian military politics occurred afterward (particularly in August and December 2000). As such, crucial parts of the discussion on the Indonesian case were updated until December 2000.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework

This Chapter aims to provide theoretical framework for the ensuing parts of this work. It discusses concepts and factors leading to military intervention and withdrawal as well as civilian control and democratisation.

1. Military Intervention

Almost all nation-states have their own military forces, the important forces for defending the respective states. The military supplies political values such as security, public order and national prestige. It also consumes resources however.¹⁴ As a supplier of political values and a consumer of resources, either economic or political resources, the military is in a critical but strategic position.

The political behaviour of the military differs from one country to another. It is mainly determined by historical, ideological, socio-economic, and political settings. On one case, it plays a trivial role. On the other case, it shares power with civilians, or becomes a military junta. In civil-military relations theory, the later case is called military intervention in politics.

In his outstanding classical work—*The Man on Horseback*—Finer defined military intervention in politics as “the armed forces’ constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities.”¹⁵ Finer argued that the military may intervene by “acts of commission” or by “acts of omission.” The military may “act against the wishes of its government” or decline to “act when called on by its government.” These circumstances, Finer maintained, “bring constrained to bear.”¹⁶ From this concept one could argue that military intervention is a military’s refusal to uphold civilian control. This takes form of intervening civilian affairs or rejecting the orders of civilian authorities.

Meanwhile, Nordlinger argued that the military intervention occurs when its officers “threaten or use force in order to enter or dominate the political arena.”¹⁷ Coup d’etat over civilian government is considered as the most blatant military intervention and the most rapid ways to seize power. Soon the “colonels” successfully stage coup, they will replace civilian rule with military rule.

In the discourse about military politics, there is a long political debate in theorising

¹⁴ Kwang H. Ro, “The Praetorian Military in South Korea: The Study of the Military in Politics”, *Korea Observers*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Autumn 1987, p. 255.

¹⁵ S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, Second, enlarged edition (Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 20.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Eric A Nordlinger, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

military intervention. The first school, represented by Janowitz, argued that the intention and capacity of the military is a main factor of military intervention. The other school, represented by Huntington, claimed that the weakness of the system is the main factor for such an intervention.¹⁸

According to Sundhaussen, the debate seems no longer necessary if political scientists carefully read Finer's arguments in *The Man on Horseback*.¹⁹ In Finer's views, to intervene in politics, the military should have occasion/opportunity as well as disposition. He argued that military intervention is "a product of two sets of forces—the capacity and propensity the military to intervene, and condition in the society in what it operates."²⁰ Thus Finer's arguments incorporated those of Huntington and Janowitz.

Finer defined disposition as "a combination of conscious motives or a will or desire to act."²¹ For "disposition", he referred to "motives" and "moods" disposing the military to intervene. In relation to "motives", Finer classified into four categories. First, the motive of the manifest destiny of the military. In this motive the soldiers regard themselves as the saviours of their countries. Second, the motive of the national interests. The military could claim that it does not belong to specific parties, groups, or sectors but it belongs to the nation. The army could oust a small group of civilian elite, whose acts are regarded contravening the constitution or suppressing civil and political rights, for the sake of national interests. Third, the motive of sectional interest. This consists of motives of class interests, regional interests, corporate self-interests of the armed forces, individual self interests, and the mixed one. In regard to "moods", Finer linked them with, first, the self-important armed forces; second, armies with a morbidly high self-esteem.²²

As for "opportunity", Finer divided it into the increased civilian dependence on the military, the effect of domestic circumstances such as overt crisis and latent crisis, and the popularity of the military.²³

From such disposition and opportunity, four possible situations emerge. First, neither disposition nor opportunity to intervene. In this situation, the intervention will not occur. Second, both disposition and opportunity to intervene. In this case, the intervention will take place. Third, no disposition to intervene but the opportunity for doing so. At this point, the military is invited to intervene but reluctantly to take such a chance. It is also possible that the military accepts such invitation temporarily. Fourth, disposition but no opportunities. In this

¹⁸ See Ulf Sundhaussen, "Penarikan Diri Militer Dari Pemerintahan", *Prisma*, July 1995, p. 57.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

²¹ S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, op. cit., p. 20.

²² *Ibid*, pp. 20-63.

²³ *Ibid*, pp. 64-73.

situation, if the military stages a coup the abortive one will occur.²⁴

Based on Finer's arguments, Ulf Sundhaussen argued that there are two main factors of military intervention. First, exogenous factors, consisting of exogenous-to-the-military factors (such as riots, oppositions) and exogenous-to-the-state factors (external threats such as international communist forces, foreign invasion). Second, endogenous factors, that is the military factors, such as military interests and internal conflicts.²⁵

In the same line, Harold Crouch suggested that factors stimulating military intervention can be grouped into internal and external factors. Internal factors consist of military orientation and military interests whereas external factors deal with socio-economic conditions, political circumstances, and international factors.²⁶ Supaluck also took the same stance by arguing that there are two sets of factors in military intervention. First, internal or endogenous factors, which include factors such as political incompetence of the civilian administrative leaderships, moral decay, corruption, and social inequality of the society. Second, external or ecological factors, which consist of colonialism, low level of economic productivity, and high degree of social cleavages.²⁷

From discussion above, factors leading to military intervention can be distinguished into endogenous factors, exogenous-to-the-military factors, and exogenous-to-the-state factors.

2. Military Withdrawal

One may argue that military intervention in politics is positive in certain condition, particularly in an emergency state, to save the nation. However, since defence and security are the core tasks of security apparatus, coups produce counter coups, power tends to corrupt, and the propensity of the military to establish oppressive and dictatorial administration, struggles for military withdrawal become worldwide movements.

The origin of military withdrawal concept can be traced from the use of terms of "barracks" and "back to the barracks." It was in Western Europe at the end of the eighteenth century the use of term of "barracks" was originated, referring to soldiers' congregation into the barracks. But the outcry of "back to the barracks" was first heard intoned in the newly born US at that time as "an accompaniment of a new national assertiveness."²⁸

The classic analysis on military withdrawal was found in Finer's *The Man on*

²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 74-75.

²⁵ Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Durability of Military Regimes in South-East Asia," in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds), *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).

²⁶ Harold Crouch, "The Military and Politics in South East Asia", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds), *ibid*.

²⁷ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *The Thai Military Coup d' Etat: Origins, Withdrawal/Civilian Control, and Perspectives*, Ph.D. Thesis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Dissertation Service, 1995), p. 8.

Horseback. In this work, Finer referred military withdrawal to “abdication”, “recivilianization”, “return to the barrack”, “military disengagement”, “disengage form active politics”, a fashion of “withdrawing from political arena”, and “the return to civilian rule, and so bring the overt rule of the military to an end.” Thus military withdrawal in Finer’s terminology deals with the termination of military regime and its replacement with civilian regime.²⁹

Another expert, Danopoulos said that military withdrawal or disengagement is “the substitution of praetorian policies and personnel with those advocated by the recognized civilian authorities.” To clarify his definition, he compared with terminology of “de-intervention or civilianization”. According to him, the latter “refers to limited or partial disengagement and denotes a situation in which the military coopts and/or forms coalitions with a selected number of civilians (usually technocrats).” In this situation the military still play a dominant role while the civilians an auxiliary role.³⁰ Thus, the difference between these terms lies in the degree of civilian rule vis-à-vis military rule or the position of military in the government. In “military withdrawal or disengagement” the role of the military is auxiliary, whereas in “de-intervention or civilianization” its role is still dominant in the system.

Another political scientist, Talukder Maniruzzaman, defined military withdrawal from politics as:

the return of the intervening army to the military barracks, with the military playing only an instrumental role, leaving the civilian political leadership in an unfettered position to determine political goals and make all “decisions of decisive consequence” for the state. Under this model, the army does have influence on decisions affecting defense and foreign policies of the state, but in this respect the military performs only staff functions. It provides expert advice but does not challenge the authority of the civilian political leadership even if the decision of the civilian authorities is contrary to the advice submitted by the military.³¹

Thus, even though the military retreats from politics, they could still have influence and role in political life. This influence, however, is minor and the role is instrumental; as a consequence, the military is under the shadow of civilian leadership.

From discussion above, military withdrawal can be divided into “substantial or total withdrawal” in the case of military role is absent or minor/instrumental, and “limited or partial withdrawal” in the case of the military role is still dominant following the “disengagement.”

In many cases, military withdrawals occur involuntarily, namely the militaries are forced to withdraw. In some cases they are established voluntarily in that the militaries consciously withdraw from politics. With this phenomenon, in the explanation of military withdrawal there are terms of “voluntary, conscious, or self-imposed withdrawal” and

²⁸ Peter Lyon, “Introduction: Back to the Barracks?”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1985.

²⁹ S E Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-186, 256-260.

³⁰ Danaopoulos, quoted by Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

³¹ Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-10.

“involuntarily or forced withdrawal.”³²

In the process of withdrawal, one can also find the case of “abrupt withdrawal” for quick withdrawal and “phased withdrawal” for withdrawal in phase. These terminologies are close in meaning with “unplanned withdrawal” or “unplanned breakdown” for undesignated withdrawal and “planned withdrawal” or “planned extrication” for designated withdrawal.³³

Military withdrawal from politics is not always final. The military may wish to regain power for one reason or another. Because of this, in the study of military politics, there are also terms of “short-term withdrawal” and “long-term withdrawal.”³⁴

In regard to factors leading to military withdrawal, Nordlinger argues that there are three factors behind military withdrawal from politics. Firstly, extensive civilian opposition to the military regime. This includes civilian pressures such as demonstrations, strikes, and riots. In world history, this type of opposition has succeeded in forcing the military to surrender power to civilian government. The rise of civilian governments in Sudan (1964),³⁵ Bangladesh (1990), and Pakistan (1992) were prominent examples. Secondly, the overthrow of military government by dissident officers (coup d’etat) followed by the handing over of power to civilian politicians. This occurred in Argentina in 1955, Columbia in 1957, and Venezuela in 1958. The main motive of the military in restoring civilian rule was to eliminate destabilising countercoups. Another motive was to maintain the unity of the military corps.³⁶ Thirdly, voluntary disengagement, brought about by unexpected difficulties the military faces as politicians, a willingness to promote democracy, and/or the desire to create and maintain military reputation and professionalism.³⁷

In his study on military withdrawal in developing worlds between 1945-1984, Talukder Maniruzzaman found that, firstly, 36 percent of military withdrawal took place “through planned elections held under the auspices of the outgoing military regimes.”³⁸ Secondly, 27 percent of the withdrawals were because the military rulers abruptly or suddenly decided to hand power to civilians. Thirdly, foreign intervention or invasion caused 12 percent of withdrawals. Fourthly, 18 percent and 7 percent of such disengagement were due to social revolution and mass uprising respectively.³⁹

Thirteen years after the publication of *The Man on Horseback*, Finer revised his theory on military withdrawal. In his previous theory he simply “played back” the interplay of two

³² See Nordlinger, *op. cit.*, p. 139-147; Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

³³ Claude E Welch, Jr, “Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Process, or Random Events”, *Armed Forced and Society*, Vol. 18, No. 13., Spring 1992, p. 325.

³⁴ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op.cit.* p. 170.

³⁵ Eric. A. Nordlinger, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140-141.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 141-147.

³⁸ Talukder Maniruzamman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics*, p. 206.

factors of military intervention, that is “disposition” and “opportunity or societal condition.” The problem of this, as Ulf Sundhaussen argued,⁴⁰ he did not consider external factors which could force the military to withdraw. Finer recognised:

What applies to military intervention *into* politics can be “played back” to explicate its *extrusion*. This ought to have been perfectly obvious to me; but certainly was not. It was left to Ulf Sundhausen to point out to me and the following analysis derives, with relatively minor modifications, from Sundhausen, and I want to make unequivocally clear my indebtedness to it.⁴¹

In his revised explanation of military withdrawal, Finer argued that there should be “motivation” to military withdrawal in the field of “disposition” and “societal conditions”. Motivations in the field of disposition include belief in civilian supremacy, threat to cohesiveness and lack of self-confidence, while motivation in the latter relates to internal challenge (such as civil opposition) and external factors (such as foreign threat, invasion). It also needs “necessary conditions” to withdraw which consist of necessary conditions in the field of “disposition” and “societal conditions”. The former necessary conditions include internal consensus to withdraw and adequate protection of corporate interests whereas the latter necessary conditions consist of the existence and readiness of civilian organisation to be handed over power. He summarised his revised arguments in the following matrix:

Figure 1
Disposition and Motivation to Military Withdrawal

	Dispositions	Societal Conditions
Motivations	1. Belief in civilian supremacy 2. Threat to cohesiveness 3. Lack of self-confidence	1. Internal challenge 2. External factors
Necessary Conditions	1. Internal consensus to withdraw 2. Adequate protection of corporate interests	Civilian organisation to hand over to

Source: S E Finer, “The Retreat to the Barracks: notes on the practice and the theory of military withdrawal from seats of power”, *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 7, No. 1, January 1985, p. 23.

Based on Finer’s *The Man on Horseback*, Ulf Sundhaussen proposed three factors contributing to military withdrawal. First of all, the endogenous factor, that is the willingness of the military to withdraw. This can happen peacefully (voluntarily withdrawal) or through

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23, 206.

⁴⁰ Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Durability of Military Regimes in South-East Asia.” This work was published in 1985, but written in 1982-83 and commented by S E Finer. See editor’s note on Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds), *op. cit.*, and author’s gratitude to S E Finer. See also Ulf Sundhaussen “*Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility*,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Summer 1984.

⁴¹ S E Finer, “The Retreat to the Barracks: notes on the practice and the theory of military withdrawal from seats of power”, *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 7, No. 1, January 1985, p. 23.

internal military conflict (inner contraction) and even through coups and counter coups (after staging a coup the military may return power to civilians). Secondly, factors exogenous to the military, namely, opposition to the military establishment or military rule. Thirdly, factors exogenous to the state. Foreign pressure, intervention, and even invasion can stimulate or force the military to hand over power to civilians.⁴²

Sundhaussen's classification is thus similar to Finer's revised theory and supersedes that of Nordlinger and Maniruzzaman. Nordlinger's second and third factors (military coups and voluntarily withdrawal) and Maniruzzaman's first and second factors (election under the auspices of the military and sudden military decision to withdraw) can be included amongst the endogenous factors. Nordlinger's first factor (extensive civilian opposition) and Maniruzzaman's fourth factor (social revolution and mass uprising) are factors exogenous to the military. Meanwhile, Maniruzzaman's third factor (foreign intervention or invasion) is included amongst factors exogenous to the state.

Thus factors leading to military withdrawal can be grouped into endogenous factors, exogenous-to-the-military factors, and exogenous-to-the-state factors. These sets of factors are similar to those of military intervention.

One may not satisfy with the above explanation as it does not discuss structural factor. As Yung Myung Kim asserted, structural factor is an important factor in the discourse of military withdrawal which cannot be arbitrarily included in the above category. To distinguish his proposed factor, he grouped the above factors (endogenous, exogenous-to-the military and exogenous-to-the state factors) into motivational factors.⁴³ According to him, structural factor relates to the structure of civil-military relations, that is the position, strength and role of civil society vis-à-vis the military. He argued that if there is a gap between military institution and civilian institution (civil society) in that the civil society is weak, less developed and less organised compared to that of the military, the military would be unchallenged so that it facilitates military intervention. In contrast, if the civil society is strong, solid, well developed and better organised, it would challenge military intervention or domination so that it would be conducive for military withdrawal.⁴⁴

What Yung Myung Kim explained is a domestic structure. Besides, international structure is pertinent. This structure relates to the structure of international order during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The ideological rivalry in the Cold War period had significant effects on domestic politics, including military politics. The rivalry between

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 545-554; Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Durability of Military Regimes in South-East Asia," *op. cit.*, p. 272; Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Inner Contraction of the Suharto Regime: a starting point for a withdrawal to the barracks," in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds), *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s* (Clayton: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), pp. 272-284.

⁴³ Yung Myung Kim, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-121.

⁴⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 119-131.

Communist Soviet Union and Capitalist US could facilitate military intervention since in the name of fighting against communism or communist threat, the military had justified reasons to seize power from civilian government. In contrast, the end of ideological rivalry during the post-Cold War era has changed international configuration. The change of this structure has changed military's perception over threat. This is by all means conducive for military withdrawal.

Ideological factor is of significant as well. This is because ideology could becomes "a catch all vehicle that often serves as a framework for action, analysis, justification and rationalization; as well as a blueprint for the present and the future."⁴⁵ The role of military ideology is with no exception and it provides framework for military's action, including withdrawal.

Ideological factor deals with two issues. First, the mission of the military. This relates to military's mission in dealing with external and internal threats. Second, the position of military institution vis-à-vis civilian institution. More precisely, military's perception, stance or adherence to the concept of civilian control or civilian supremacy. If military's mission is narrowed to defense only (in response to external threat), or at least, it recognises the concept of civilian control of politics, this would be conducive for military withdrawal. Otherwise, military intervention continues.

Thus, structural factors and ideological factors are also of importance for military withdrawal. Interestingly, these sets of factors could also precipitate military intervention (depending on factors' condition).

In sum, factors leading to military withdrawal can be grouped into three broad categories, that is, motivational factors, structural factors, and ideological factors. In the same token, these three sets of factors could also lead to military intervention. As factors leading to military withdrawal are similar to factors precipitating military intervention, the question is, how do they work? Could factors leading to military intervention be "played back" for military withdrawal? These questions will be answered in the case studies.

3. Civilian Control

Civilian supremacy, civilian control, or civilian rule is the most important principle invented by human kinds applying for the system of government. Having been successfully implemented by Anglo-American countries, such a principle is highly appraised and widely recognised as an ideal form of democratic system of government.

The worldwide spread of this principle is certainly a nightmare for the existing military regimes. This is pertinent to the fact that the upholding of civilian control requires military

⁴⁵ Constantine P. Danoupoulus, "Civilian Supremacy in Changing Societies: Comparative Perspectives,"

withdrawal. In other words, civilian control can only be achieved by military withdrawal. Suvarnajata Supaluck asserted:

Civilian control of the military cannot be completely fulfilled its achievement without success of the withdrawal of the military. In other words, if the military elite refuse to withdraw, the likelihood of civilian control is utterly dim. When partial or total withdrawal of the military has started, then, civilian control of the military begins.⁴⁶

According to Supaluck, the key principle of civilian supremacy or civilian control is “the setting which hints the authorities of the military officers accept the rules set up by the civilian government with secure responsibility.” In this principle, “the military officers, and their institution, agree to the rule of military subordination to the civilian political leaders.”⁴⁷

In promoting civilian control Huntington recognised the contradiction between civilian control and military security because to establish civilian control, the military power should be reduced and this could become a threat to security. However, he argued, this can be prevented by institutionalising civilian control. To do so, Huntington proposes subjective civilian control by maximising and securing civilian control through political institutions (e.g. parliament, constitution), and the concept of objective civilian control by maximising professionalism of the military so that it would be depoliticised, sterile and politically neutral.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, Danopoulos argued that civilian control can be achieved by party penetration and use of intelligence, establishing civilian command authority, dividing the military, creating rival organisations, respecting military corporate interests, providing limited bureaucratic bargaining and expert advice (especially input in defense policy, strategy and even decisions regarding resource allocation), and civic action programs.⁴⁹

All means above are not necessarily present at the same time to achieve and secure civilian control. Rather, their presence may vary from one country to another depending on specific condition of the respective countries.

4. Democratization

The struggles for democracy have spread worldwide, especially among people under authoritarian or praetorian regimes. The road to democracy from authoritarian rule or praetorian system is not trivial however. To achieve, a process is needed, and the most crucial one is

op. cit., p. 8-9.

⁴⁶ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.176.

⁴⁸ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusset: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 80-85.

⁴⁹ Constantine P. Danopoulos, “Civilian Supremacy in Changing Society: Comparative Perspectives,” in Constantine P. Danopoulos (ed.), *Civilian Rule in the Developing World: Democracy on the March?* (Boulder, San Fransisco, Oxford: Westview, 1992), pp. 15-20.

democratisation.

The words “democratisation” and “liberalisation” are often confusedly used.⁵⁰ Hence, it is noteworthy to distinguish both terminologies. Qadir, Clapham, and Gills argued that:

Political liberalization implies a process of political change controlled from top down as a means of preserving most of status quo. It is a game elites to play to manage the granting of very carefully selected concessions. It is a cosmetic exercise and does not install the fundamentals of democratization. However, political liberalization may sometimes lead to a deeper process of democratization, if the impetus for change escape from elite control to encompass broader social forces and its purpose is transformed from preservation of interests to genuine reform.⁵¹

To clarify their arguments, Qadir, Clapham, and Gills provided a minimalist and maximalist criteria for democratisation. As to the former, they said that “the criteria of democratization are regular electoral competitions, usually in a multiparty political system, and thus governmental succession by constitutional, electoral procedures, guaranteeing the rule of law.”⁵² For maximalist criteria, “redistributive socio-economic reforms, broaden popular participation, social justice, and human rights” are included.⁵³

Similar tone is expressed by Claude Welch. He argued that liberalisation is mainly run by authoritarian regimes to bolster their legitimacy to rule. It is aimed at “maintaining much of the status quo rather than shifting its basic foundation.” He said that “liberalization involves a mixture of policy and social changes including toleration of political opposition, but may not include a real opportunity for opponents to achieve power peacefully.” Democratisation on the other hand “requires open contestation for control of the government and hence free elections.” In his view, democratisation is a wider and more specifically political concept compared to liberalisation: “Liberalization occurs without democratization, but not the reverse.”⁵⁴

Similarly, Doh Chull Shin stated that liberalisation “encompass the more modest goal of merely loosening restrictions and expanding individual and group rights within an authoritarian regime” while democratisation “goes beyond expanded civil and political rights.” Democratisation, he argued, “involves holding free elections on a regular basis and determining who govern on the basis of these results.”⁵⁵ To support his definition Shin quoted that of Aleksandr Gelman who maintained that the process of democratisation “provides for the distribution of power, rights and freedoms, the creation of a number of independent structures of

⁵⁰ Bruce M. Koppel, “The Prospects for Democratization in Southeast Asia: Local Perspective and International Roles,” *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. XII, No. 3, Fall 1993, p. 16.

⁵¹ Shahid Qadir, Christopher Clapham and Barry Gills, “Sustainable Democracy: Formalism Vs Substance,” *The Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1993, pp. 416-7.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 416.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 416.

⁵⁴ Claude E. Welch, Jr, “Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes, or Random Events,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 18, No. 3, Spring 1992, p. 326.

⁵⁵ Doh Chull Shin, “On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research,” *World Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1994, p. 142.

management and information.” Liberalisation on the other hand, Gelman distinguished, refers to “the conservation of all the foundations of the administrative unclenched fist, but the hand is the same and at any outwardly is liberalization sometimes reminiscent of democratization, but in actual fact is a fundamental and intolerable usurpation.”⁵⁶ Thus Shin and Gelman’s concepts on such terms are in line. The goal of liberalisation is to bolster legitimacy for maintaining control while that of democratisation is to expand political liberties or democratic practices.

Last but not least, in differentiating such tricky terms, Bruce M. Koppel maintained that:

There are often cases of political liberalization (e.g. civil service reforms, electoral reforms, deregulations of political parties and the press) which by themselves do not necessarily alter the fundamental responsiveness or accountability of a political system or a specific government. Democratization, a process, will undoubtedly include processes of political liberalization, but it will also include deepening the democratic content of existing political institutions.⁵⁷

In response to criteria used by many experts in distinguishing those terms, he argued that “many traditional measures of political democratization (e.g. rights of assembly and speech, functioning representative institutions, “rule of law”)” cannot be easily applied to democratisation since these are “static properties and are not readily amenable as indicators of a democratization process—except in the limited and sometimes erroneous sense of being presumed outcome of that process.” He asserted that “the presence of these attributes does not tell us categorically about the process that yields them, or more importantly, whether they are the products of process of democratization or, for example, the consequences of various forms of authoritarian accommodation.”⁵⁸ Thus, according to him, the important elements in democratisation are the deepening of democratic contents of political institution, responsiveness and accountability of the political system.

From discussion above, liberalisation is a process of liberalising politics as a means to increase legitimacy for maintaining control over the population. Democratisation on the other hand is a process of liberalising politics to establish a democratic, accountable and responsive political system. Liberalisation can occur without democratization but democratisation cannot work without liberalisation.

5. Conclusion

Military intervention is a situation in that the military interferes or takes over the position and role of civilian authorities in governing the country. In this situation, the military

⁵⁶ In *ibid.*, p. 142-43.

⁵⁷ Bruce M. Koppel, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

dominates and even directly determines the decision making processes. In the case of intervention in civilian leadership, the control is on the hands of the military, or at least, it significantly influences the decision making process at state level.

Military withdrawal is the reverse or anti-thesis of military intervention. It refers to situation in that the military hands over significant power to civilian leaderships and as a consequence the military is under the control of the civilians (civilian control). Under the circumstances the military can still have a role, but such a role is auxiliary. Military withdrawal can be divided into partial and substantial/total withdrawal, short-term and long-term withdrawal, abrupt and phased withdrawal, planned and unplanned withdrawal, and voluntary and involuntary withdrawal.

There are three similar sets of factors leading to military intervention and military withdrawal. First, motivational factors, consisting of endogenous factors, exogenous-to-the-military factors, and exogenous-to-the-state factors. Second, structural factors, which consist of international structure and domestic structure. International structure deals with the structure of international order in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, while domestic structure relates to the structure of civil institution vis-a-vis military institution. Third, ideological factors, which deal with military mission as well as its perception or adherence to the concept of civilian control or civilian supremacy.

Military withdrawal is a key step in the democratisation process. In a military regime, liberalisation can occur without military withdrawal, but not on the case of democratisation since democratisation requires military withdrawal as its precondition.

Military withdrawal or civilian control is not a secured situation. Military re-intervention may occur. The “security” of civilian control depends on a number of factors such as how civilians securing civilian control in the constitution and political institutions, improving military professionalism, and respecting military corporate interests.

Chapter 2

Thai Military Politics

1. Coups Counter Coups and Pattern of Military Rule

Thai military politics is typical. It was characterised by military intervention in domestic politics through coups counter coups. Military adventure in politics commenced in 1932 when royal Thai armed forces staged bloodless coup, overthrowing absolute monarchy and replacing it with constitutional monarchy.⁵⁹ Since then Thai politics had been “dynamic” which could not be explained by power struggles among politicians, interest groups and pressure groups in electoral process but by conflicts among military elite on one side and between the military and civilian institution on the other.⁶⁰ Interestingly, these conflicts mostly ended with coups d’etat.

The course of coups in Thailand followed a vicious circle. Having succeeded in staging coup, the military junta usually abrogated constitution, abolished parliament, prohibited demonstrations, and suppressed political freedom. The new constitution would be then promulgated and the election date was set up. The political parties were allowed to resume their activities and to compete in the election. In the free election, no single party won a majority of parliamentary seats, and therefore three or four parties would arrange a coalition to form a government. To establish a stable government, military’s support was crucial. Accordingly, the civilians invited or had no choice but to elect military leaders (especially coup makers) as PM and/or ministers in the cabinet and as high ranking officials in the government institutions. The honeymoon period would follow. Shortly afterward, the honeymoon turned into conflicts owing to such various reasons as alleged corruption, the danger of communism, or military’s dignity. Another coup would “settle” such a conflict, and the vicious circle continued.⁶¹

Military adventures in staging coups produced a long list of military coups either failed or successful as shown in Figure 2.

⁵⁹ The seeds of military intervention was however sown very earlier in 1912 when soldiers of royal Thai military planned to stage coup. The coup failed to come into action due to the betrayal of one of the coup plotters. Some of them had significant role either in plotting or in staging the 1932 coup. One of them claimed that “without the 1912 incident, there would be never have been the 1932 coup at all.” Suvarnajata Supaluck, *The Thai Military Coup D’Etat: Origins, Withdrawal/Civilian Control, and Perspectives*, Ph.D. Thesis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Dissertation Service, 1995), p. 112.

⁶⁰ Chai Anan Samudavanija and Suchit Bungbongkarn, “Thailand,” in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds.), *Military Civilian Relations in South-East Asia* (Singapore, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 79.

⁶¹ See Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), pp. 1-2.

Figure 2
Thai Military Coups⁶²

No.	Date	Name	Outcome	Interval		Coup Target
				Year(s)	Month(s)	
1.	June 24, 1932	Khana Ratsadorn (The People's Party)	Successful	-	-	Absolute monarchy
2.	June 20, 1933	Khana Ratapraharn (Military Group Coup)	Successful	1	-	Civilian government (Pya Mano)
3.	October 11-27, 1933	Kabot Boworadet	Failed	-	4	Military regime (Pya Pahol) (Counter coup)
4.	August 3, 1935	Kabot naisib (sergeant attempted coup)	Failed	1	10	Military regime Pya Pahol (Counter coup)
5.	January 29, 1938	Kabot Praya Song Suradet (Song Suradet attempted coup)	Failed	2	5	Military regime (Phibul) (Counter Coup)
6.	November 8, 1947	Kana Taharn Khong Chart (National Military Group Coup)	Successful	9	10	Military-Civilian government (Thawal Thamrongnawasawat)
7.	April 8, 1948	Khana Ratapraharn (Military Group coup)	Successful	-	2	Civilian government (Khuang Aphaiwong)
8.	October 1, 1948	Kabot Senathikarn (general Staff attempted coup)	Failed	-	6	Military regime (Counter coup)
9.	February 26, 1949	Military Group coup	Failed	-	4	Military regime (Phibul) (Counter Coup)
10.	June 29, 1951	Kabot Manhattan (Manhattan attempted coup)	Failed	2	4	Military regime (Phibul) (Counter coup)
11.	November 20, 1951	Khana Ratapraharn (Military Group coup)	Successful	-	5	National Assembly (Phibul's self-imposed coup)
12.	September 16, 1957	Khana Taharn (Military Group Coup)	Successful	2	10	Military regime (Phibul) (Counter coup)
13.	October 20, 1958	Khana Patiwat (Revolutionary Group Coup)	Successful	1	1	Military regime (Thanom) (Counter coup)
14.	November 17, 1971	Khana Patiwat (Revolutionary Group Coup)	Successful	13	1	National Assembly (Thanom's self-imposed coup)
15.	October 6, 1976	Khana Pati-roop Karn Pokb Krong Pan Din (National Administrative Reform Council)	Successful	2	11	Civilian government (Sanya Thammasak)
16.	March 26, 1977	Kabot Yee Sib Hok Meena (March 26 th attempted coup)	Failed	-	6	Civilian government (Thanin)
17.	October 20, 1977	Khana Patiwat (Revolutionary Council)	Successful	-	5	Civilian government (Thanin)
18.	April 1, 1981	Kabot Neung Mea-Sa (April 1, 1981 attempted coup)	Failed	3	8	Military regime (Prem Tinsulanond) (Counter coup)
19.	September 9, 1985	Kabot Kao Ganya (September 9 th attempted coup)	Failed	3	5	Military regime (Prem) (Counter coup)
20.	February 23, 1991	Khana Rak-Sa Kruam Sa-Ngob Reun Roi Hang Chart (National Peace Keeping Council)	Successful	6	5	Military-Civilian government (Chatichai Choonhawan)
				59	8	

⁶² In his study on the Thai Young Turks, Chai-Anan Samudavanija lists 15 coups in the period of 1932-1981; he excludes the August 1935, January 1938, and April 1948 coups. Suvarnajata Suplauck's study on military coup lists 23 coups; he includes civilian opposition/rebellions (February 1948, November 1954) and people's uprising (October 1973) as coups. I here list military coups only. See Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *ibid.*, p. 4 and Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-143.

From the table above, in the period of 1932-1991, there were 20 military coups. Of these, 11 coups were successful and the rest failed. In average, the coup occurred almost every 3 years.

Compared to other coups, the 1932 coup had a special characteristic as it led to a regime change. The coup, staged by royal military leaders who received a significant degree of exposure to Western education and values, succeeded to topple and transform orthodox absolute monarchy into modern political system under constitutional monarchy. Although democracy did not grow thereafter as promised by coup makers, democratic practices had been introduced into a new political system. The subsequent coups launched by coup plotters until at least 1976 had been “simply to provide opportunities for the military leaders to acquire senior political positions” although coup makers raised many issues to justify their actions. The 1947 coup, for instance, was staged due to personal ambition and the intention to re-impose military rule and improve military’s corporate interests, dignity and prestige which had eroded since the World War II. Militarism had been strengthened since Marshal Sarit forcibly took over national leadership through coup in 1958. Sarit’s authoritarian rule provided no chance to political institutions and civil society to develop since he curbed political freedoms and democratic practices harshly.⁶³

The 1977 coup overthrowing military-backed ultra-rightist civilian leadership was distinct in nature. This coup was launched with a concern to establish a more democratic state. Since then limited democracy and open politics had been transformed into a parliamentary semi-democracy before being interrupted by the 1991 coup. Political liberalisation, election of members of House of Representatives and the granting more political freedoms characterised this era.⁶⁴ The 1991 coup was like a blessing in disguise since it led to a substantial military withdrawal. Such a coup contributed to ending the story of “military’s heroism” in domestic politics as well as transforming Thai semi-democracy into a more mature democratic system.

Seen from historical perspective, Thai military rule evolved. The period of 1932 until the end of World War II was the period of the emergence of military rule characterised by the search for military rule identity. Second, the period of 1947-1957 and 1957-1968 were the periods of military oligarchy and dictatorial rule respectively. This strong type of militarism softened in the period of 1969-1973 because of students’ struggles for democracy. Further changes occurred following this period. In the period of 1973-1991, the general nature of the regime was semi-democracy with soft authoritarian military rule. The contribution of the “Thai Young Turks” and “Democratic Soldiers” movement was influential in altering the views of military hardliners and in adjusting military role in a changing environment.⁶⁵

⁶³ See Suchit Bungbongkarn, “The Military and Democracy in Thailand,” in R.J. May and Viberto Selochan (eds.), *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific* (London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 1998) , p. 48, and. Suparnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123.

⁶⁴ Suchit Bunbongkarn, *ibid.*, p. 49.

⁶⁵ See Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Suchit Bungbongkarn, “Thailand,” *op. cit.*, pp. 78-109.

2. Military Intervention

Military intervention refers to military involvement in non-military sectors. Thai military intervention in non-military sectors comprised of its involvement in the political arena, political institutions, and business.

a. Political Arena

Among important political actors in Thailand—the military, legislature, bureaucracy, and monarchy⁶⁶—the military is the most influential actor in Thai politics.⁶⁷ For about sixty years (1932-1991) the military had intervened and dominated political arena.⁶⁸ Its intervention in the political arena can be distinguished into state-level and community-level interventions. At state-level, the most apparent and dramatic military intervention was, as abovementioned, coup d'état.⁶⁹ By coup, the military easily changed the government, abolished legislature, undermined political party establishment, and ignored the monarchy. The coup narrowed the space of maneuver of the existing political actors. The frequent efforts of the military to seize power reflected their endless intervention and strong domination in the political arena.

At the community level, military intervention in the political arena dealt with its efforts to control over people's political life. For many years, the military had determined the direction of people's political discourse, controlled their political activities, and curtailed their political freedoms. The military could arrest pro-democracy groups, students, labour activists, and those who “spoke too much.” This kind of control was made possible because the community, prior to 1973 in particular, was so widely depoliticised and such important political institutions as political parties and parliament were ineffective due to coups counter coups and constraints faced by them after undemocratic new rules (i.e. new constitution) were introduced to the system by the coup makers.⁷⁰ When some sectors of the community, especially students and pro-democracy activists, began to challenge, the military imposed coercive mechanisms to undermine democratic movements. The establishment of the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) was one instance.

⁶⁶ Clark D. Neher, “Thailand in 1986: Prem, Parliament and Political Pragmatism,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, February 1987, p. 226.

⁶⁷ Clark D. Neher, “Thailand in 1987: Semi-Successful Semi-Democracy,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, February 1988, p. 195.

⁶⁸ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁶⁹ Cf. Kwang H. Ro, “The Praetorian Military in South Korea: A Study of the Military in Politics,” *Korea Observer*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Autumn 1987.

⁷⁰ Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

b. Political Institutions

Having successfully launched coup, coup makers would naturally strive to dominate political institutions and to determine state policies. The prime target of political institution was prime ministerial post. In most cases, military officers used “democratic” channel—rubber-stamp parliament—to pursue such a post. In Thai case, nine “men on horseback” had assumed prime ministerial powers as shown in the following figure.

Figure 3
Military Prime Ministers, June 1933-November 1997⁷¹

No.	Name	Tenure as Prime Minister	Duration	
			Year(s)	Month(s)
1)	Colonel Phya Pahol	June 1933 – December 1938	5	6
2)	Field Marshal Phibulsonggram	December 1938 - August 1944	5	8
		April 1947 – September 1957	10	5
3)	Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn	January 1957 – October 1958	1	9
		December 1963 - October 1973	9	10
4)	Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat	February 1959 – December 1963	3	10
5)	General Kriangsak Chommanand	November 1977 - February 1979	1	3
6)	General Prem Tinsulanond	March 1979 – March 1988	9	
7)	General Chatichai Choonhavan	July 1988 – February 1991	2	7
8)	General Suchinda	March 1992 – May 1992	-	2
9)	General Chavalit Yongchaiyut	December 1996 – November 1997	-	11
T o t a l			50	11

Thus, of about 7 decades since 1932, “the men on horseback” had occupied top civilian post for about 6 decades.

In some cases, after staging coup, direct control of government was regarded unnecessary as the military leaders could still control and influence from the sidelines or behind the scenes. In this respect, the military chose civilian figurehead to lead the government. One reason was that the military realised that the establishment of military regime would be against people’s concerns. In addition, the military lacked of legitimacy to rule due to its action in toppling the elected (civilian) government. The appointment of a civilian figurehead was regarded strategic as it could secure its position and easily cooperate with other military cliques. To strengthen their influences and grips, the military further promoted its officers into various

⁷¹ Source: Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks, op. cit.*, p. 73; Clark D. Neher, “Thailand in 1987”, *op. cit.*; Larry A. Niksch, “Thailand in 1988: The Economic Surge,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, February 1989; Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand in 1992: In Search of a Democratic Order,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, February 1992; Daniel E. King, “Thailand in 1996: Economic Slowdown Clouds Year,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, February 1997; Suchitra Punyaratabandhu, “Thailand in 1997: Financial Crisis and Constitutional Reform,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, February 1998.

strategic posts of cabinet and government divisions.⁷² With this arrangement, it was not surprising therefore that Thai bureaucracy “has been controlled by military officers.”⁷³ At the cabinet level for example, during the period of 1932-1969, the military had occupied more than 30 cabinets with the average of 27 per cent military men per cabinet. The highest percentage reached 47 percent in 1951 and the lowest was 3 per cent in 1945.⁷⁴

The military also broadened its control by establishing mechanism of the appointment of military officers in the Upper House of the National Assembly. The appointment had been practiced since the very beginning of military intervention (1932).⁷⁵ As shown in Figure 4 the appointed officers in the Upper House reached the highest figure of 86 per cent in 1979 which was ironic as the military committed to developing Thai democracy in that period. The lowest figure was 8 per cent in 1975 since many active duty officers were disqualified from holding position in the Senate.⁷⁶

Figure 4
Number of Military Officers in the Upper House

No.	Year	Number of officers selected to the Upper House	Proportion of 100 (%) at each initial appointment
1.	1932	14	20.00
2.	1933	48	61.54
3.	1937	56	61.54
4.	1947	34	34.00
5.	1951	91	73.98
6.	1957	103	85.12
7.	1958	104	85.95
8.	1959	163	67.91
9.	1968	81	67.50
10.	1969	105	64.02
11.	1972	185	61.87
12.	1973	25	08.36
13.	1976	140	41.18
14.	1977	205	56.94
15.	1979	194	86.22
16.	1991	130	44.52
17.	1992	130	48.15

Source: Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

Combined with its officers derived from political parties such as People’s Party, Rassadorn Party and Chart Thai which competed in the election and usually acquired significant seats in the Lower House, military representatives had been able to control the Parliament.

⁷² Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁷³ Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks, op. cit.*, p.8.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Suchit Bubongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics 1981-1986* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), p. 5.

⁷⁶ Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks, op. cit.*, p. 11.

c. Military Business Complex

Military involvement in economic activities is one prominent excess of military intervention in politics. Its involvement in this sphere creates a syndrome the so-called “military business complex” or “military-industrial complex.”⁷⁷ By its involvement in business military elites have significant access to financial resources. These officers are in a condition to flow funds gained from such access to the military establishment or to their subordinates, supporters, and clique members. These funds strengthen political control and influence which in turn expand access to broader economic resources.⁷⁸ With this multiplying effects, it is common, therefore, military “corporate interests” expand into business or commercial considerations. Once they taste the “honey” of business pie, they would be “primarily concerned with political-economic power and status more than the ‘corporate interest’ or ‘professionalism’ of the Armed Forces.”⁷⁹

The rise of Thai military involvement in economic activities can be traced back. It was from the aftermath of the 1947 coup military officers were invited by businessmen to run a joint business for the first time.⁸⁰ Since then military officers had been appointed as members of the board of directors in several state-owned and private enterprises.⁸¹ The military officers were also invited “to hold stocks in companies at no cost.”⁸²

Thai military business followed the pattern of military clique, particularly in the period of 1947-1973.⁸³ The examples of cliques’ business were economic activities run by the Soi Rajakru and Sisao Deves cliques. As shown in Figure 5 and 6, the former controlled 24 companies, consisting of 7 banking and financial, 13 industrial, and 4 commercial sectors. The latter, on the other hand, controlled 29 companies consisting of 9 banking and financial, 11 industrial and 9 commercial sectors.

Figure 5
Companies Controlled by Leading members of the Soi Rajakru Clique, 1948-57

No.	Year	Number of Companies	Sectors		
			Banking and Financial	Industrial	Commercial
1.	1948	1	1	-	-
2.	1949	-	-	-	-
3.	1950	1	-	-	1
4.	1951	2	1	1	-
5.	1952	4	3	1	-
6.	1953	7	-	5	2

⁷⁷ Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” *op. cit.*, 14.

⁷⁸ Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 19-21.

⁸⁰ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 451.

⁸³ Catharin E. Dalpino, “Political Corruption: Thailand’s Search for Accountability,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 2, No. 4, Fall 1991, p. 64.

7.	1954	4	-	4	-
8.	1955	1	-	1	-
9.	1956	4	2	1	1
10.	1957	-	-	-	-
Total		24	7	13	4

Source: Piriyanan, Sungsidh, *Thai Bureaucratic Capitalism 1932-1960*, MA Thesis, Thammasat University, 1980, in Chai Anand Samudavanija, "The Thai Young Turks," *op. cit.*, p. 18,

Figure 6
Companies controlled by Leading Members of the Sisao Deves Clique, 1948-57

No.	Year	Number of Companies	Sectors		
			Banking and Financial	Industrial	Commercial
1.	1948	1	1	-	-
2.	1949	3	1	-	2
3.	1950	2	-	2	-
4.	1951	3	-	1	2
5.	1952	3	1	-	2
6.	1953	6	3	1	1
7.	1954	3	1	3	-
8.	1955	1	-	1	-
9.	1956	5	1	-	1
10.	1957	2	1	1	1
Total		29	9	11	9

Source: Piriyanan, Sungsidh, *Thai Bureaucratic Capitalism 1932-1960*, MA Thesis, Thammasat University, 1980, in Chai Anand Samudavanija, "The Thai Young Turks," *op. cit.*, p. 18,

With business becoming a great concern, military officers, when Marshal Sarit occupied prime ministerial post in particular, had transformed themselves into politico-economic interest groups. These groups acted as "agents or compradors of government"⁸⁴ in economic spheres.

After the death of Sarit in December 1963, business activities of the military did not decline. In 1969 for example, General Krit Sivara, General Praphat Charusathien, and Police General Prasert Ruchirawong were appointed as members of board of directors in 50, 44, and 33 companies respectively. Another example, the business of General Praphat, the "godfather" of the Sisao Deves clique, rose brightly. He rose as a new "don."⁸⁵ Due to Praphat's influence, his military aide, Colonel Som Kartaphan, and his son-in-law, Colonel Narong, were appointed as members of board of directors in 27 and 41 companies respectively.⁸⁶

In the end of 1972, military officers still occupied 12 of 16 commercial banks as members of board of directors.⁸⁷ In the early 1981, General Arthit Kamlang-ek, the Army Commander, was chosen as a honorary adviser of the Thai Rice Mills Association.⁸⁸ The military as institution also owned two television stations and 140 radio broadcasting stations as

⁸⁴ Chai Anand Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁸⁷ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 452.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 468.

of 1982.⁸⁹ In 1985, General Chaovalit and General Pichit, the contenders for the Army Commander post, hold shares at the Mahachon Pattawa, a private company set up mainly to run joint business with the government.⁹⁰

Recently, business activities as well as practices of the appointment of officers as board of directors of private companies and state-owned enterprises still existed although they declined due to growing demand for professionalism, transparency and accountability.⁹¹

3. Withdrawal and Re-intervention

In the wake of a successful coup the military may hand over power to civilian government and disengage from politics. After the withdrawal, however, the military may re-intervene politics by overthrowing such a government through coup. In Thai case, military withdrawals occurred six times. Five of which, however, were followed by re-interventions.⁹²

The first voluntary disengagement occurred soon after the military staged coup against the absolute monarchy in 1932. The military handed over power to civilian government under Phya Mano, a civilian conservative and respected judge. Due to Phya Mano's decision to dissolve parliament after debates on economic plan, Colonel Phya Pahol staged coup. The second disengagement occurred in 1947 following the ouster of civilian government by coup. Having handed over power to another civilian government, the military returned to the barracks. Not last very long however, did the military return to power by overthrowing the appointed government which was considered incapable to rule the country. Disengagement also occurred in 1957 following the successful coup by Marshal Sarit. After the coup, he disengaged from politics and transferred the power to civilian government under the leadership of Pot Sarasin. Sarasin resigned in December 1957 and was succeeded by General Thanom in January 1958. Dissatisfied with Thanom government, Sarit launched another coup in October 1958 and established an authoritarian regime.⁹³

Student demonstrations/uprisings in early 1973 until October 1973 against Thanom-Praphat regime marked the struggles for open politics and democracy. These demonstrations forced the military to withdraw and to return power to civilians. The civilian government established following the withdrawal was however fragile. Facing strikes, leftist movements, communist insurgency, and uncondusive environment such as the rise of communism in

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁹⁰ Anek Laothamatas, "Business and Politics in Thailand," *New Patterns of Influence, Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, April 1988, p. 466-71.

⁹¹ The military for example still has radio and TV broadcasting stations. The existence of Thai Military Bank is also notable. For the role of radio and broadcasting stations in the coups as well as demand to transfer them, at least a half, to private companies, see Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

⁹² Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-203.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-201.

Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the government was toppled by military coup in October 1976. The coup makers promptly transferred the power to another civilian government under Thanin, a civilian judge of the Supreme Court.

Substantial military withdrawal has been established since 1992. The preceding occurrence was the February 23, 1991 movement, when the armed forces led by Gen. Sunton Kongsompong and Gen. Suchinda launched successful coup and arrested PM Gen. Chaticai Choonhavan and deputy PM Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek. The military provided some reasons to justify their action, that is: (1) a pervasive corruption of cabinet ministers and elected politicians; (2) parliamentary dictatorship; (3) harrassment of honest permanent officials by politicians; (4) an intimidation of the military establishment by some politicians; and (5) assassination plots against a person in “the high place” (monarchy).⁹⁴ According to Suchit Bunbongkarn, however, the main factor of this coup was the appointment of Gen. Chaticai’s close colleague, General Arthit, as deputy PM in mid February amidst high tension in government-military relations. The appointment was regarded as placing someone to spy, control and counter any maneuvers of the incumbent military leaders.⁹⁵

Following the coup, military junta established the National Peacekeeping Council (NPKC), abrogated the Constitution and promulgated martial law. The junta appointed Anand Punyarachun as figurehead of an interim government with the task to prepare election to be held on March 22, 1992. In the election, there were two competing groups: pro-military and pro-democracy parties. Pro-military parties won the election and Suchinda was appointed as PM after the former candidate was opposed by the US. This decision was however rejected by opposition parties, students, and urban middle class as he was unelected MP and reversed his wordings of not advancing the post of premiership. The most significant reason was that they “did not want political control to stay in the hands of the military.”⁹⁶

Unlike uprising in October 1973 which was organised by students, the May 1992 large scale protests were led by opposition parties and “those who participated were largely middle class and professional people.”⁹⁷ The brutal suppression of these protests was counterproductive as it did not calm the opposition. Demanded by the King to solve the problems peacefully, Suchinda agreed to leave his post. The military has withdrawn significantly since then, particularly after the new Constitutions requesting a PM should come from the elected MPs (the 1992 Constitution) and abolishing the appointment of military officers in the Upper House (the 1997 Constitution) have been promulgated.

⁹⁴ Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand in 1991: Coping with Military Guardianship, *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, February 1992, p. 132. Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁹⁵ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p., 123.

⁹⁶ Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand in 1992,” “In Search of a Democratic Order,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No.2, February 1993, pp. 218-220.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

In sum, the cases of military withdrawals in Thai history can be summarised in the following figure.

Figure 7
Thai Military Withdrawals

No.	Year	Length		Pattern	Substance	Preceding Occurrence	Ensuing Occurrence
		Yr(s)	Mt(s)				
1.	June 1932 - June 1933	1	-	Voluntary	Partial	Toppling absolute monarchy	Reintervention
2.	November 1947 - February 1848	-	3	Voluntary	Partial	Toppling civilian government	Reintervention
3.	September 1957 - December 1957	-	3	Voluntary	Partial	Toppling military regime	Reintervention
4.	October 1973 - October 1976	3	-	Involuntary	Partial	People's uprising	Reintervention
5.	October 1976 - October 1977	1	-	Voluntary	Partial	Toppling civilian government	Reintervention
6.	May 1992 - March 2000*	7	8	Involuntary	Substantial	People's uprising	-

Note: *Until research project termination (Tokyo). **The average length of the first five withdrawals was 1.3 years.

The table shows that of six military withdrawals, the first five occurred partially which were mostly done voluntarily. Interestingly, involuntary withdrawals had longer interval compared to voluntary withdrawals. Moreover, all voluntary withdrawals ended with re-interventions. As Thai military politics was characterised by clique conflicts, such withdrawals mostly reflected clique withdrawals, not as institutional withdrawals (military withdrawal as a whole). It is understandable therefore the withdrawals were done half-hearted.

Such occurrences also showed that the pattern of withdrawal did not assure the establishment of a long-lasting withdrawal. Whatever the pattern of withdrawal, either voluntary or involuntary withdrawals, military re-intervention could occur. Until at the time of writing,⁹⁸ Thai military withdrawal established since 1992 has enjoyed a period of almost 8 years, surpassing the average previous withdrawals of about 1.3 years.

⁹⁸ Research project termination, March 2000, Tokyo.

Chapter 3

South Korean Military Politics

1. Coups D'Etat and Pattern of Military Rule

South Korean politics was characterised by long-term military intervention. Military's domination and influence spanned for a period of three decades.

Military's political adventures began in 1961 when the military led by General Park Chung Hee staged coup against legitimate government of Chang Myon. The latter was a civilian and successor of Syngman Rhee who was forced to resign by student demonstration in 1960. The motive of the coup was because Chang Myon government was regarded failed to deal with social unrests, public disorder and excessive student protests.⁹⁹ Chang Myon and civilian leadership were also deemed incapable to improve state's economic performance and to satisfactorily handle communist threat.¹⁰⁰

Although the course of military's dominance and influence in South Korean politics had been stable compared to that of Thailand, South Korea also experienced the second military coup of 1979/1980 which brought Chun Doo Hwan to power.¹⁰¹ The preceding occurrence was the assassination of Park in 1979 by Director of Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Kim Jae-kyu, that created political tensions. A civilian leadership under Choi Kyu-hah was unable to reduce tension and meet students' demands for termination of military rule, political liberalisation and democratisation. In fact, tensions increased, demonstrations and public unrest mushroomed.¹⁰² This situation provided an excuse for the military to take such "necessary steps" as declaring martial law, suppressing students and forcing Choi Kyu-hah to resign.

⁹⁹ Kwang H. Ro, "The Praetorian Military in South Korea: A Study of the Military in Politics, *Korea Observer*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1987; B.C. Koh, "South Korea in 1996: Internal Strains and External challenges," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, January 1997, p. 260.

¹⁰⁰ Korean Overseas Information Service, *A Handbook of Korea* (Seoul: Samhwa Printing Co. Ltd, 1990), p. 117.

¹⁰¹ Most experts on South Korean politics admit that South Korea experienced two coups. While the first coup was a common (classic) coup and occurred in 1961 the second coup was typical and interpreted differently among scholars concerning the "D" day of the coup. Young-Chul Paik, for example, argued that the second coup occurred on December 12, 1979 when Chun Doo Hwan and its follower arrested Martial Law Commander, Gen. Chong Song-hwa, and took over military command. Tim Sorrock and C.I. Eugene on the other hand argued that the coup occurred on May 17, 1980 when Chun declared a nationwide martial law instead of a limited one which gave him tasks to maintain law and order and to control government affairs. With this "dispute", Kwang H. Ro attempts to moderate by stating that the 1979 occurrence was an "initial coup" of the 1980 coup. In the meantime, B.C. Koh said that the 1979 military movement was "the first's step in Chun's takeover of government the following year." See Young-Cul-Paik, "Political Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea," *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 1994; Tim Shorrock, "South Korea, Chun, the Kims and the Constitutional Struggle," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1988, p. 95; C.I. Eugene, "The South Korean Military and Its Political Role," in Ilpyong J. Kim and Young Whan Kihl (eds.), *Political Change in South Korea* (New York: The Korean PWPA, Inc., 1988), p. 101; Kwang H. Ro, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

¹⁰² C.I. Eugene, "The South Korean Military and Its Political Role," *op. cit.*, pp. 99-101.

Since Chun Doo Hwan was elected President, he had ignored students' demand but continued applying Park's rule until he was succeeded by his former classmate, General Roh Tae Woo, in 1988. During the period of 1961-1988, the nature of Park and Chun's regimes had been authoritarian.¹⁰³ The difference between Park and Chun's regimes lay on the source of power base. While Park enjoyed personal power to control and use military forces, Chun's power base was more reliant on the New Military Group, "a collective leadership around Senior (military) leaders,"¹⁰⁴ to do so.

Although Roh Tae Woo provided significant contribution in political liberalisation, his connection with the New Military Group and his involvement in Kwangju massacre, rendered him half-hearted in establishing democracy. Thus authoritarianism—soft authoritarianism—still characterised his regime. Under his rule the military was "still a powerful forces in Korean society; it wields a strong influence in Korean politics and ex-officers still dominate key areas of politics and society."¹⁰⁵

2. Military Intervention

a. Political Arena

In South Korean military politics, coup d'etat was the most apparent and dramatic state-level military intervention. By coups and the promulgation of martial laws, civilian governments' rights to govern were abolished, activities of political parties and parliament were banned or curtailed. This phenomenon occurred not only in 1961 but also in 1979/1980.

At the community-level, South Korean military was so frequent curtailing freedom of expressions, demonstrations, political gatherings as well as arresting students, labour activists and even brutally killing ordinary people as occurred in Kwangju on May 18, 1980. The establishment of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in June 1961, which was then renamed the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP),¹⁰⁶ was significant since it was a powerful institution in dealing with internal security. With a series of emergency decrees and supported by Act Concerning Protection of Military Secrets and the National Security Act, ANSP had been the most effective military organ for silencing dissidents and suppressing pro-democracy groups.¹⁰⁷

In 1990, ANSP still involved in domestic politics and did not intend to terminate its

¹⁰³ Kwang H, Ro, *op. cit.*, p. 257. See also Chong-Min Park, "Authoritarian Rule in South Korea: Political Support and Governmental Performance," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXI, No. 8, August 1991.

¹⁰⁴ Yung Myung Kim, "Patterns of Military Rule and Prospects for democracy in South Korea," in R.J. May and Vuberto Selochan (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 126. See also Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw (eds.), *South Korea: A Country Study* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 316.

¹⁰⁵ Yung Myung Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

¹⁰⁶ Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 312.

¹⁰⁷ Kwang H Ro, *op. cit.*, 262.

political role in countering radical dissidents.¹⁰⁸ Due to its gross violation on human rights, this body received bad reputation in the eyes of South Korean people and overseas pro-democracy organisations.¹⁰⁹

b. Political Institutions

To attain legitimacy and public supports as well as to determine or influence state's policies, since the very beginning of its adventures, South Korean military had used strategy of the occupation of political institutions. To occupy such institutions the military took constitutionally “democratic” path. As summarised in Figure 8, President Roh and Park I (1963-1972) had been elected President by direct popular votes. General Chun and Park II (1972-1979) on the other hand had been elected indirectly by rubber-stamp electoral board/college.

Figure 8
South Korean Military Presidents, June 1962-1992

No.	Name	Tenure as President	Election System	Duration	
				Year(s)	Months(s)
1.	General Park Chung Hee	December 1963 – October 1979	- Direct, by popular vote (1963) - Indirect, by Electoral Board (1972)	15	10
2.	General Chun Doo Hwan	September 1980 – December 1987	- Indirect, by Electoral College	7	4
3.	General Roh Tae Woo	December 1988 – December 1992	- Direct, by popular votes	5	-
Total				28	2

The occupation of presidential post by a General was followed by an appointment of officers into strategic cabinet posts and government divisions. This practice had been exercised since South Korean military seized power in 1961. Soon after Park elected as President, he brought former military leaders from Class 8 of the Officers Candidate School (graduated in 1949), to key government posts.¹¹⁰ During Chun Doo Hwan's regime, “many former high-ranging ROK military officers have entered civilian branches of the government.”¹¹¹ Prior to Roh Tae Woo's era, President also had rights to appoint governors and mayors,¹¹² which in most cases were the “men on horseback.”

In a democratic state, a Parliament functions as government's critics. As this institution plays major role in watching government's performance and policy making, the

¹⁰⁸ Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 313.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 277. See also C. I. Eugene Kim, “The South Korean Military and Its Political Role,” *op. cit.*, p. 97.

¹¹¹ Edward A. Olsen, “The Arms Race on The Korean Peninsula,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVI, No. 8, August 1986., p. 853.

¹¹² Personal communication with expert on South Korean politics.

military government would also attempt to tame this institution. As in Thailand, South Korean military established political party. In Park's era, the regime established the Democratic Republican Party (DRP). DRP always won in the election, bringing Park's supporters (military officers or civilians) to the parliament.¹¹³ In Chun era, DRP was transformed into the Democratic Justice Party (DJP).¹¹⁴ In this party, he drew "its political bases from hundred of local officials Chun has appointed, and from the upper ranks of the middle class—retired military officers and businessmen with a stake in the system."¹¹⁵ The appointment of Lieutenant General Chung Nae-hyuk, the chairman of DJP, as the National Assembly Speakers was a case in point.¹¹⁶

c. Military Industrial Complex

In South Korea, the military involved in "business" the so-called military industrial complex.¹¹⁷ Due to high external threat, the "business" of the military as an institution focused mainly in arms production for military self-reliance. This "business" was not profit oriented. The lack of capital, human resources and technological expertise, rendered the military to invite private sectors as defense contractors. Under the auspices of the US, most contracts of such arms production as Rifles, Machine Guns, Artillery, Armoured Vehicles, Communication Electronics, Aircraft Missiles, and Naval Vessels have been given to private sectors. Some of them were famous private sectors or commercial enterprises owned by giant business conglomerates (*chaebol*), such as Samsung, Daewoo, Kia, Hyundai, Gold Star and so on.¹¹⁸

As individual, some retired-officers involved in economic activities. With military background such ex-officers "transformed their military contacts into valuable private sector contacts," thus benefited the companies they belong to. In return, it is hard to deny that such officers provided "economic access" to the incumbent officers since they acted as lobby for such industrial complex.¹¹⁹

Active-duty military officers gained financial resource through the so-called business clientelism whose officers acted as a domineering patron and the big business as an obedient client. With state's control over commercial bank credits, investment resources (investment rules, managing public enterprise), and favors business (entry permits, exit regulations, tax incentive, information services, price and wage control, curbing labour

¹¹³ Chi-Won Kang, *op. cit.*, p. 509.

¹¹⁴ Kwang H Ro, *op. cit.*, 257-8.

¹¹⁵ Tim Shorrocks, "South Korea: Chun, the Kims and the Constitutional Struggle," *op. cit.*, p. 95.

¹¹⁶ Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw (eds.), *op. cit.*

¹¹⁷ Edward A. Olsen, "The Arms Race on The Korean Peninsula," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVI, No. 8, August 1986., p. 853.

¹¹⁸ Moon Chung-In, "The Political Economy of Defense Industrialization in South Korea: Constraints Opportunities, and Prospects," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Fall 1991.

movement), patron's policies would by all means benefit the big business clients. In return for favors, the *chaebol* flowed funds to the elite in the Hanahoe,¹²⁰ both for personal shares and for election campaigns of the military's ruling party. It is interesting to note that, during the Fifth Republic (1980-1988) Chun's administration had openly asked funds for election campaigns and other financial supports. Those who denied could receive severe business constraints.¹²¹

Due to liberalisation in politics, press freedom, and growing public concerns on transparency and public accountability, such practices declined in Roh Tae Woo's era. Military industrial complex focusing on arms production however still existed. Until currently, besides supporting non military oriented economy, South Korean active duty and retired military personnel were still supporting military-industrial complex. The aims are twofold. First, to secure domestic needs for self-reliance. Second, to boost South Korean economy by exporting such arms production to developing countries.¹²² However, ex-military personnel are becoming professionals as they can no longer use military power to exert influence over private business. Political liberalisation initiated by Roh Tae Woo as well as transparency in financial sectors and disclosure of personal wealth demanded by Kim Young-sam government also damaged the practices of business clientelism.

3. "Re-Intervention" and Withdrawal

Genuine re-intervention did not occur in 1979/1980 as no withdrawal occurred beforehand. The absence of military leader was because of the assassination of Park. Such absence did not mean that the military withdrew from politics. In fact, the military still controlled South Korean politics and government affairs through the promulgation of martial law.

The assassination of Park in 1979 created political uncertainty. The appointment of civilian government under Choi Kyu-hah was however unable to mitigate political tension as well as to tame students' protests demanding political reforms. Realising he had no power under martial law, Choi resigned on August 16, 1980. General Chun Doo Hwan was elected by the National Conference for Unification (NCU) on August 30, 1980 to succeed him.¹²³ Thus, what occurred was "re-intervention," not a genuine re-intervention.

¹¹⁹ Edward A. Olsen, *op. cit.*, p. 854.

¹²⁰ Hanahoe, meaning "the Unity Society," was a private organisation of military officers. Some analysts said that it was an underground military organisation. Its members included Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo. This organisation was disbanded in 1993. See, David R. McCann (ed), *Korea Briefing 1994-96* (New York: Asia Society, 1997).

¹²¹ Yang Chong-mo (former president of the Kuckche conglomerate) in the testimony, for instance, said that his conglomerate was dismantled by Chun's regime since he denied political funds asked by Chun. See Chang-Hee Nam, "South Korea's Big Business Clientelism in Democratic Reform" *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, April 1995, pp. 357-366.

¹²² Moon Chung-In, *op. cit.*

¹²³ He assumed the presidency on September 1, 1980. See C.I. Eugene, "The South Korean Military and Its

The year 1987 marked the initial step of phased withdrawal. At that time, President Chun promised to relinquish power in the following year and to amend the Constitution. The debate was about the ensuing presidential election system, whether done directly or indirectly. As the debate created tensions Chun suspended it and asserted that the ensuing presidential election would be carried out indirectly by employing the existing constitution. This angered students, opposition parties, and labour activists. In the minds of these pro-democracy groups, indirect election of the president was “designed by Chun and the DJP to keep the opposition from taking power and to perpetuate military control over the country.”¹²⁴

In the next few months, opposition parties, students, Protestant and Catholic religious groups, labor unionists, and middle class organised endless massive demonstrations. Interestingly, some law makers of the ruling party supported the movement. Supporting demonstrators’ slogans they were quoted of saying “People want direct elections. People are fed up with the military running politics” and “We should get rid of the smell of the military barracks from our party.” This movement eventually forced the military to accept the public demands for a direct presidential election and political reforms.¹²⁵ The 1987 Constitution was promulgated afterward. It promoted popular presidential election and political reforms which by all means implicated military establishment. In this regard, one analysts argued that “The people, perhaps for the first time, had forced the military to return to barracks and prepared for civilian rule.”¹²⁶

The approval of a direct presidential election, making the election is the only route to form a government, undermined power base of the military. With this new mechanism, the military hardly designated scenarios for national leadership and for continuity of military rule. The election of Gen. Roh Tae Woo by popular votes was due to the split of the opposition forces. In fact, under new constitution Roh played role in reducing military power. When the opposition forces were solid, popular votes swung to non-military figure, as proven in 1992 when the opposition leader, Kim Young-sam, won the presidential election. The year 1992 marked substantial military withdrawal. He had radically reduced military power and strengthened civilian control by reforming military institution.¹²⁷ His project has been continued by his successor, Kim Dae Jung. Even though Kim Young-sam’s project shocked military establishment, Kim did not face significant opposition from the military. It seemed that the military had no other choices in the new environment settings (democratisation era) but to agree with the concept of civilian control.

Political Role,” *op. cit.*, p. 101.

¹²⁴ Tim Shorrock, “South Korea: Chun, the Kims and the Constitutional Struggle,” *op. cit.*, p. 96.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

¹²⁷ Yung-Chul Paik, *op. .cit.*, p. 737.

Chapter 4

Military Intervention and Withdrawal in Thailand and South Korea: A Causal Approach

There existed factors precipitating Thai and South Korean militaries to intervene in and to withdraw from politics. Such factors can be divided into three broad categories, that is, motivational factors, structural factors, and ideological factors.

1. Motivational factors

a. Endogenous Factors

According to Thai political scientists, Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Suchit Bungbonkarn, in their country, “political, social and economic crisis is not necessary for military intervention although they could facilitate the intervention.” Rather, “it is more often than not that a military coup is a means to alternate power.”¹²⁸ This means that struggle for power characterised Thai military intervention in domestic politics, and the military factor was central.

In Thai political history, the main factors causing the military to alternate power was the existence of acute military clique. To make matter worse, this long lasting military clique has transformed into clique culture. Some coups against civilian governments were also caused by conflicts between military cliques. As noted earlier, to establish a stable government, the civilians should seek supports or must be supported by the incumbent military top brass. When these officers transformed into cliques, the dissatisfaction of rival clique resulted in a coup against the civilian government. The clique-based coups occurred in 1933, 1935, 1938, 1948, 1949, 1951, 1957, 1958, 1971, 1977, 1981, 1985 and 1991.¹²⁹

In South Korea, military’s factions did exist. Factionalism even played role in the takeover of state power as occurred in 1961 when Park Chung Hee launched a military coup. In this regard, Yung Myung Kim maintained:

The Korean military was not sufficiently institutionalised to put its political domination on a formal basis; the coup was executed by factions centered on the eighth class of the Korean Military Academy, and the infighting among coup leaders was substantial.¹³⁰

With a strong personal power,¹³¹ Park was able to control the military for almost two

¹²⁸ Chai Anand Samudavanija and Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand,” *op. cit.*, p. 109.

¹²⁹ See “Coup Target” in Table 2 and Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-143.

¹³⁰ Yung Myung Kim, “Pattern of Military Rule and Prospects for Democracy in South Korea,” *op. cit.*, p. 121.

¹³¹ Yung Myung Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

decades. In the last days of his rule, however, the military “did not seem totally united behind President Park.”¹³² Due to partly disagreement over the best way to deal with student demonstrations and political crises, chief of military intelligence (KCIA), Kim Jae-kyu, his close and associate confidant, assassinated Park in December 1979.¹³³ The arrests of Martial Law Commander and Kim Jae-kyu’s followers by Chun Doo Hwan over alleged conspiracy to kill Park also reflected frictions in the military institution.

Military frictions in South Korea however developed neither into clique nor clique culture. Clique or clique culture is characterised by acute and deeply rooted factional conflicts within the military. South Korea experienced military’s factions as occurred elsewhere. Even when one regard Hanahoe is a clique organisation, since it did not have significant rivals but overwhelmingly dominated the military, it did not transformed into clique conflicts as was the case of Thailand.

Thus both countries experienced factionalism in their military institutions. The difference was that military faction in Thailand was deeply rooted in military institution and developed into clique and clique culture. In South Korean case, on the other hand, factionalism did not transform into clique or clique culture. This was one reason why military intervention in Thailand in the form of coups counter coups occurred frequently compared to that of South Korea.

Economic interests of the military especially among its officers are of importance as well. Clique-based military business complex has been notable in Thai case. This phenomenon occurred, as noted earlier, primarily between 1947-1973. This factor did not play a direct role in the coup, but facilitated. As well, it preserved the existing intervention or maintained military’s grips on power.

In South Korea, officers’ interests on military industrial complex also played role in sustaining military intervention in politics. In military thoughts, by continuing control over state power, the military could control the industrialisation drive in arms production for self-reliance as well as in controlling other “strategic industries,” mainly heavy and chemical industries.¹³⁴ It is understandable as in the Cold War era, South Korea was facing high threat of communist invasion from the North. The withdrawal, in military thinking, would endanger the country.

Although some South Korean military officers had economic interests for personal gains, the establishment of military industrial complex did not stem from economic interests, but from security reasons. This can be seen from the fact that military as an institution did not

¹³² C.I. Eugene Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

¹³³ Yung Myung Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

¹³⁴ Russel Mardon, “The Bureaucratic Authoritarian Industrialising Regime and Control of Foreign Capital Inflows: The Case of the Republic of Korea,” *The Korea Journal of International Studies*, Vol. XIX, No. 4, 1988, p. 567.

have particular interests to run its own business in non-military related business. The provision of arms production projects to private defense contractors has been significant. It seemed that this was influenced by country's situation. Critical external threat rendered the military less likely to have much interests for doing non-military business.

Thus, Thai military business complex and South Korean military business/industrial complex contributed to sustaining military intervention. Thai military business complex however stemmed from economic interests while that of South Korea from security interests. The underlying motive of military intervention in Thailand was to secure military business interests, while that of South Korea was for security reasons. It was true that in South Korea some active duty and retired military officers gained financial resources due to its connection with private business, and therefore, providing a push to continuing military intervention. However, since such officers merely played as lobbies or patrons, officers' economic interests lay in the periphery in the discourse of South Korean military intervention

Do these factors—military clique and economic interests—exist during military withdrawal from politics? In Thailand, since the military was forced to withdraw in 1992, clique conflict has never surfaced in the form of salient conflicts or coup d'état. In spite of that, it is hard to say that the “clique culture” has vanished since military clique is deeply rooted in Thai political history. This can be seen from the rumours in 1998 that the military might do certain “exercise,” an euphemism of coup, when General Surayudh (graduate from Military Academy's Class 12) was nominated the Army Commander by PM Chuan Leekpai, bypassing his seniors of Class 11.¹³⁵ The new military leader is able to unite the cliques so far so that it prevents the cliques from open conflicts. The challenging question is: What happens when the Army Commander can no longer be able to unite the cliques?

In South Korea, on the other hand, military's factions no longer exist within the military. It is still possible that military factions re-emerge as occurred elsewhere. However, since Roh Tao Woo elected as President, he had been able to unite and professionalise the soldiers. As a result, there relatively no frictions emerged in the military institution during his era. The more radical policy imposed by Kim Young-sam has also been successful to establish military institution whose officers adhere professionalism as part of moral (individual) and institutional obligation, not as clique obligation. The abolishment of Hanahoe was the most crucial step in this respect as in the past it was a powerful private military organisation.

In regard to military's economic activities, South Korean military' interests on military industrial complex still persist. However, officers' economic interests for personal gains have eroded significantly. It is true that the political economy of military industrial complex cannot

¹³⁵ Suchitra Punyaratabandhu, “Thailand in 1998: A False Sense of Recovery,” *Asian Survey*, Vol.

be ignored, thus the economic interests persist. However, such economic interests are shared with civilian governments to boost Korean economy at macro level (arms export). The economic interests in this industry do not belong to the military per se, but also to the government and business society. Such a military “business” is not employed as a stepping stone for gaining financial resources by military leaders. In Thai case, economic interests of Thai military are still relatively high so far. The fact that Thai military, both institutionally and personally, still runs business activities is considerable. To make matter worse, civilian governments have been reluctant to touch its “corporate interests” (military’s vested interest in economic and political fields as well as personnel and budgetary matters), making such interests to be preserved.

Thus, endogenous factors of military intervention in the case of Thailand cannot be “played back” for military withdrawal. These factors still exist so far; clique culture does not yet disappear and military’s business interests are still high. This means that these factors are not factors leading to military withdrawal. Rather, they are potential factors for military re-intervention. In the South Korean case, on the other hand, clique and military’s business interests do not significantly influence military intervention and military withdrawal. This means that these factors are not potential factors for military re-intervention.

b. Exogenous-to-the-Military Factors

In Thai case, the weakness or ineffectiveness of civilian institutions is one of main factors for military intervention. This is mostly related to government’s performance in handling economic issues, corruption, communist movement, and military’s “corporate interests.” In Thai military history, the military frequently used such sort of reasons to justify its intervention. The coups of 1933, 1947, 1958, 1976 and 1991 were some examples.¹³⁶ While the issues of economic problems, communist movement, and “corporate interests” could be relative, widespread corruption either among politicians and bureaucrats was salient.¹³⁷ The Chatichai government (1988-1991) for instance, was named as the “buffet cabinet” since corruption was a major problem in his government.¹³⁸ When civilian governments appropriately handled economic and political affairs, particularly when they treated military’s “corporate business” properly, there were some reasons for the military not to do “exercise.”

Frequent frictions among civilian politicians significantly contributed to the weakness

XXXIX, No. 1, January 1999.

¹³⁶ Cf. Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, pp. 119, 122-123, and 131.

¹³⁷ See Catharin E. Dalpino, “Political Corruption: Thailand’s Search for Accountability,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1991, pp. 61-62.

¹³⁸ See Scott B. MacDonald, “Transparency in Thailand’s 1997 Economic Crisis,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 7, July 1998, p. 693.

and ineffectiveness of civilian institution. This related to the fact that most civilian politicians in the legislature had no significant grassroots supports. They lacked ideological and policy basis to garner supports from the masses. In order to be appointed as MP or to secure its position in the Parliament, they mostly established patron-client alliance with businessmen, businessmen-turned politicians or those who had significant financial and political resources to finance and ease their candidacies. This kind of circumstances bore two implications. First, factions and cliques emerged to cement the alliance. Thus conflicts among civilian politicians were also unavoidable. Second, vote buying was widespread in Thai electoral process.¹³⁹ This did not only render political corruption widespread but also make the legislature weak, ineffective, and unfaithful, at least in the eyes of the military.

However, one cannot only blame Thai civilian politicians. In fact, the military itself was also responsible in this issue. Countless coups were the main reasons why the civilians were unable to organise and consolidate themselves, to build their power base, and to enhance their calibers. When they strove for improving their condition, the military abruptly grabbed their power by force. Facing this external threat, civilian politicians have attempted to improve their capabilities and competencies. In fact, it was fruitful. The success of civilian politicians in 1992 to drive mass demonstrations, which led to military withdrawal, was one indication. A long history of embarrassment experienced by civilian politicians (coups) has developed into resistance to military's dominance. This does not mean that in 1992 political corruption and factional conflicts disappeared. Rather, the intention of the military to strengthen its grip on power forced civilian politicians to garner supports from the people. In addition, since the past few years, law makers have become more active and critical to military establishment. Prior to the 1991 coup, for instance, some members of the parliament questioned the "secret fund" of the Ministry of Defense,¹⁴⁰ which was then interpreted by the military as interfering its corporate interests.

In South Korean case, the military dissatisfied with civilian governments under Chang Myon (July 1960 – May 1961) and Choi Kyu-hah (December 1979 – September 1980). In the eyes of the military elite, both were regarded weak and ineffective in handling daily government affairs, particularly political crisis. The takeover of the government by the military could be seen as an indication that the military did not trust the government to handle the situation. In the case of Chun Kyu-hah government, for instance, before he was formally appointed as head of government by military-backed National Conference for Unification (NCU), he used to be civilian figurehead of an interim government. This means that the military initially trusted him. But when he could not handle government affairs properly, the military forced him to resign. However, there is an opposing argument in that it is actually hard to judge the weakness and

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 693.

ineffectiveness of civilian governments in such cases. First, they were short-lived. Second, they were established during a chaotic situation. Regardless of these contradicting arguments, the most important lesson that can be drawn from such cases is the importance of capabilities and competencies of civilian institutions in the eyes of the military.

South Korean military had actually seen the strength of civilian politicians or political parties since 1963 when they significantly challenged the military. In the 1963, 1967, and 1969 direct presidential elections, for instances, voting margins between Park and civilian candidates were 1.6, 10.5, and 7.6 respectively.¹⁴¹ This figure mirrored, first, there existed a competitive election whose civilian candidate was quite strong. Second, the military faced legitimacy crisis and supports for civilian figures were increasing (particularly in 1969).¹⁴² Facing growing legitimacy problems, in 1972 Park abolished popular votes for presidential election and imposed an indirect election through Electoral Board. Thus, opposition parties had threatened military position at that time. In 1987, they were actually stronger and in a position to defeat the “man on horseback,” but because of the split in opposition forces upon presidential candidate, the opposition parties were defeated in the ballots (a total votes garnered by Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young-sam outweighed that of Roh Tae Woo).¹⁴³ When they were united in the 1992 election they won the competition.

Since Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae Jung proved the capability and competency of civilian governments to run the country, the military has had psychological constraints to re-intervene. In political spheres, the two Kims, have brought South Korea to become a democratic state. They have been able to handle any political problems, particularly students demonstrations and labour strikes. In economic spheres, Kim Young-sam government was able to continue South Korean economic miracle. Although economic crisis struck South Korea along with other ASEAN countries in 1997, Kim Dae Jung has been able to sort out the problems, leaving its two “competitors,” Thailand and Indonesia.

In sum, the weakness and ineffectiveness of civilian institution caused military intervention in Thailand. The less solid civilian institution in South Korea also brought about the same effect. In contrast, the improvement of their capabilities and competencies created favourable condition for military disengagement.

Another exogenous factors is public uprising. The armed forces in developing countries are undoubtedly so concerned with political stability and public order to assure

¹⁴⁰ Catharin E. Dalpino, *op. cit.*, p. 66

¹⁴¹ Seong-Ho Lim, “A Paradox of Korean Democracy,” *op. cit.*, p. 529.

¹⁴² Chi-Won Kang, “The Fifty Years of the Political Vortex,” *op. cit.*, pp. 510-511.

¹⁴³ In the 1987 presidential election, Roh Tae Woo received 36 % of total votes, while Kim Young-sam 28 % and Kim Dae Jung 27 %. See Brett L. Billet, “South Korea at the Crossroad: An Evolving Democracy or Authoritarianism Revisited?” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXX, No. 3, March 1990. Cf. Sung-Joo Han, “The

economic development or modernisation program. When unrests, riots, uprisings, and even peaceful demonstration, occurred, they can be regarded as triggers for political and economic crisis. When the existing government is unable to cope with these problems, the military may seize state power. In Thailand, however, people's uprising did not play significant role in military intervention, but in military withdrawal. Observing the occurrence of coups counter coups in Thailand, there were no significant people's uprising which led the military to seize power. In contrast, it was people's uprising which forced the military to surrender their power to civilian counterparts as evident in 1992. Students' uprising in 1973 was another evidence, even though the pattern of withdrawal established afterward was partial.

In South Korean case, the occurrences of public uprisings following the downfall of President Syngman Rhee and the assassination of President Park Chung Hee were factors stimulating military coups. Military intervention in 1961 occurred when students' uprising in 1960-1961 continued and developed excessively, which was regarded by the military as a threat to political stability. In the 1979-1980 uprisings, "the military perceived that internal political instability...could incite a North Korean invasion."¹⁴⁴ This was one factor motivating the military to seize power and to force civilian government to resign in the wake of Park's assassination. One may argued that this situation had been engineered by the military to provide an excuse for seizing power. However, looking at the way the military suppressed the Kwangju citizens it reflected that the situation was uncontrolled.

Interestingly, popular uprising also forced South Korean military to "prepare" withdrawal. As noted earlier, students and people's uprisings forced the military to adopt presidential election system by direct popular votes in 1987, marking the first step of phased military withdrawal from politics. With this system, the military no longer has had "bright prospects" to dominate competitive political system. The military seemed to be aware that sooner or later it should withdraw. It was evident when Gen. Roh Tae Woo realised the phased withdrawal by reorganising military institution conducive for improved political roles of civilians. It could be concluded that substantial withdrawal began since Gen. Roh Tao Woo was defeated by Kim Yong Sam in the 1992 presidential election.

Thus, in South Korean case, the existence of public uprising has both stimulated intervention and caused military withdrawal. In Thai case however, public uprising did not stimulate intervention, but it forced the military to withdraw.

c. Exogenous-to-the-State Factors

The threat of foreign communist forces is one important factor in this category. In Thai

Korean Experiment," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 93.

case, this threat was considerable during the Korean War in 1950s as well as Vietnam War and the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1970s. Under the circumstances, Thai military experienced the so-called “Korean Syndrome” and “Vietnam Syndrome” for three reasons. First, geographic location of Thailand is vulnerable for foreign invasion. It is surrounded by belligerent socialist/communist regimes. Second, the frequent incursions by foreign forces in Thai border in this period. Third, the belief that communist insurgencies within the state were external in origin. All of these precipitated the military to intervene. In regard to the role of foreign communist threat on Thai military politics, Thai political scientist argued that:

After the war a communist threat provided the armed forces with a new justification for its expansion and involvement in national affairs. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and the Vietminh’s struggle for Vietnam’s independence in the early 1950s forced Thailand to ally itself with the US. Postwar Thai militarism grew to meet the challenge of communism and Thailand was integrated into the US collective security system.¹⁴⁵

Since the end of 1980s, however, when Thailand open relationship with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,¹⁴⁶ the perception of communist threat was no longer adhered by military leaders. Thus it has been conducive for the relaxation of its grips on power.

To South Korea, it was mainly related to the North Korean factor. Traumatic with Korean War (1950-1953), the success of international communism forces in Indochina, and frequent incursions and subversion activities by North Korean forces rendered South Korean military to perceive that strong state should be established to counter any foreign forces. When the military regarded that the weakness of the existing government would incite North Korean invasion, the military had strong reason to play role as guardian of the country. This occurred following the downfall of Syngman Rhee and the assassination of Park. The military at that time perceived that foreign forces from the North would use a chaotic situation as a momentum. The situation of North Korean threat in relation to military’s takeover in 1961 was best described by Russel Mardon:

The fall of Rhee power was followed by a year of parliamentary politics. However, the ruling party was factionalised and the administration of government was highly chaotic. Popular demonstration against the government was escalated in the fall of 1960 and Spring 1961. North Korea troop build-ups and border hostility between the two Korean states also escalated during this period. In May 1961, a military coup led by General Park Chung-hee overthrew the government and seized

¹⁴⁴ Russel Mardon, *op.cit.*, p. 566.

¹⁴⁵ Suchit Bunbongkarn, “The military and Democracy in Thailand,” *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁴⁶ Scott R. Christensen, “Thailand in 1989: Consensus at Bay,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXX, No. 2, February 1990, p. 170-171; Scott R. Christensen, “Thailand in 1990: Political Tangels,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, February 1991, p. 182; Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand in 1992: In Search of a Democratic Order,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, February 1992, pp. 138-139.

power.¹⁴⁷

Re-unification policy introduced by Park Chung Hee did not mean that the threat from the North vanished. In fact, North Korea has built up their armed forces capability with offensive oriented strategy. The readiness for offensive attacks could be seen from increased number and mobility of its fire power particularly special warfare units, brigades, amphibious and airborne units.¹⁴⁸ This arms build-ups provoked South Korea, and as a result, South Korea also built its armed forces, but mainly for defense purposes. As shown in Figure 9, the arms race reflected the persistence of such a threat. The movement of military forces in domestic politics—including the establishment of military bureaucratic authoritarian regime—was its derivation.¹⁴⁹

Figure 9
Arms Race between North Korea and South Korea

No.	Items	South Korea	North Korea
1.	Total Armed Forces	650,000	980,000
2.	Army	550,000	850,000
3.	Navy	60,000	50,000
4.	Air Forces	40,000	80,000
5.	Corps (xxx)	10	15
6.	Division	48	55
7.	Brigade	15	61
8.	Tanks (units)	1,500	3,500
9.	Armored Personnel Carriers (units)	1,550	1,960
10.	Artillery	4,000	9,000
11.	Combat Vessels	170	460
12.	Submarines	-	24
13.	Tactical Aircraft	480	830
14.	Support Aircraft	690	770

Note: Navy includes Marines Corps in South Korea but excludes amphibious assault troops in North Korea (incorporated to the Army).

Source: Ministry of National Defense of R.O.K., Defense White Paper, 1989, in Korean Overseas Information Service, *A Handbook of Korea* (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Services, 1990), p. 339.

The establishment of current military withdrawal does not necessarily mean that the threat from the North is absent. Rather, such threat weakens. The weakening threat can be observed from two occurrences. First, high ranking officials of both countries have been undertaking exchange visits. Second, both countries are now undertaking peace talks to solve the problems, especially in the issues of arms control and re-unification.

The absence or weakening of such threat has undoubtedly provided conducive environment for recent substantial military withdrawal both in Thailand and South Korea. It is

¹⁴⁷ Russel Mardon, *op. cit.*, p. 566.

¹⁴⁸ Korean Information Service, *A Handbook of Korea*, *op. cit.* p. 338.

¹⁴⁹ Russel Mardon., *op. cit.*, p. 567.

interesting to note however, South Korean military “agreed” to withdraw in 1987, when communist threat was still notable. In this regard, the US factor as an external factor played an important role. It was mainly related to the strategic interests of the US in the Far East. At that time, due to US’s strong influence in South Korean politics and economics as well as the persistence of US forces and nuclear weapons in the peninsula, there emerged a strong anti-Americanism movement¹⁵⁰ organised by students and labour unions:

A major line struggle within the organised left (based mainly on the campuses and in labour unions) was reaching a conclusion. At issue was the question of the ‘main enemy’ of the Korean people—was it the military dictatorship or the foreign powers that supported it? A majority of activists were apparently won over to the theoretical line advanced by the Jamintu group, which held the position that the South Korean economic and political system was subordinate to the foreign power domination the country—America—and concluded that the main struggle was against US imperialism.¹⁵¹

Anti-Americanism had actually emerged in South Korea since the Kwangju incidents of May 1980. It was connected to US policies which backed Chun Doo Hwan’s regime in dealing with national security, including unrests in Kwangju. On this issue, one analyst asserted:

The US opted for a military solution and solidly backed General Chun’s claim that the Kwangju uprising was a threat to national unity. On 26 May, General Chun requested that US General Wickham release 20,000 troops under his command to put down the rebellion. The request was granted and early in the morning of 27th, paratroops and army troops armed with heavy machine-guns entered Kwangju and put an end to the resistance. During the crisis, a US aircraft carrier group led by the US *Coral Sea* and two AWAC surveillance planes were deployed to Korea to show US support, and North Korea was strongly warned ‘not to interfere.’ The news of direct support from the US was broadcast to the people of Kwangju from helicopter and proclaimed throughout the nation in blazing newspaper headlines.¹⁵²

The focus given on anti-Americanism did not mean that the demonstrators set aside their political reform agenda. In fact, they attacked not only the US but also Chun’s government and the military. Facing growing anti-Americanism in Seoul, America perceived that it was not the best guarantor to prolong military rule, because if it continued supporting Chun’s government which faced growing domestic opposition, it “could lead to the formation of an anti-American regime, causing incalculable damage to their strategic position in Far East.”¹⁵³ Accordingly, American government put pressures to Chun’s regime for political reforms, including reforms in the military establishment. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and

¹⁵⁰ Tim Shorrock, “The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of anti-Americanism,” *The Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 4, October 1986., p. 1208. See also Gi-Wook Shin, “South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspective,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 8, August 1996.

¹⁵¹ In Tim Shorrock, “South Korea, the Kims, and Constitutional Struggle,” *op. cit.*, p. 100.

¹⁵² Tim Shorrock, “The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of anti-Americanism,” *op. cit.*, p. 1202-1203.

¹⁵³ Tim Shorrock, “South Korea, the Kims, and Constitutional Struggle,” *op. cit.*, p. 108.

Pacific Affairs, Gastor Sigur called for “civilianisation of politics” in Seoul, supporting people’s struggles. He provided reason that “the complexities of warfare today’s highly technical world require that the military devote their full concentration to defense against external threat.”¹⁵⁴ According to Tim Shorrock “this was the first time an American official had ever addressed the issue of Korea military intervention in politics, and was widely interpreted as a signal for the Korean Army to return to the barracks.”¹⁵⁵

In Thai case, the role of the US was inconclusive. The US indeed deplored the 1991 military coup. When Narong Wongman, a civilian, was nominated PM by military-backed parties, America opposed him due to alleged involvement in drug trafficking.¹⁵⁶ The pressure from Washington was heard by Bangkok, and finally the Parliament appointed General Suchinda as PM of the last resort. US government did not have an objection with this appointment. However, as mentioned earlier, the appointment of Suchinda angered opposition party, students and middle class. It was the King Bhumibol Adulyadej, not the US, who played significant role in Suchinda’s decision to step down¹⁵⁷ which led to substantial military withdrawal. From this case one might argue that without US intervention (Narong’s case), there would never have been military withdrawal. Yet if Narong was not opposed by the US, significant military withdrawal might not occur as Narong was nominated by coalition of five pro-military parties. The appointment of Narong would most probably lead to the creation of military-dominated government under civilian figurehead or at least the preservation of military’s dominance and influence as the previous government did. The 1991 Constitution imposed by coup makers which allows unelected MPs as PM and “gives the military appointed 270-member Senate to vote in a no-confidence debate”¹⁵⁸ was considerable.

2. Structural Factors

Structural factors can be divided into international structure and domestic structure. While international structure deals with international order during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, domestic structure relates to the structure of civil-military relations within a particular country.

In the period of Cold War, international structure was characterised by ideological rivalry between the US with its capitalism on one side and the Soviet Union with its communism on the other. To win the war, to attract potential allies or to keep the allies intact,

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁵⁶ The US State Secretary confirmed that it had denied Narong’s visa application in July 1991 due to alleged involvement in heroin trafficking. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 April 1992.

¹⁵⁷ Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand in 1992,” *op. cit.*, p. 220.

¹⁵⁸ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 April 1992.

the superpowers supported the existence of strong state which, in most cases, meant tolerating authoritarianism and even military rule. In the case of Thailand, military intervention in the name of fighting communism was not condemned as it could help strengthen US-sponsored collective security system against communism in Indochina. With this kind of situation, the military was “facilitated” to do “exercise” without bearing international risks when communist threat was perceived critical. In many cases, however, this “tolerance” had been used to justify military action for personal or factional gains or to suppress civil and political rights.

South Korea also allied with US bloc, in contrast to its enemy, North Korea. At that time, Korean peninsula was a battlefield of capitalist and communist forces and therefore the tension in the peninsula was so high. As mentioned earlier, the two coups in South Korea raised the issues of communist threats. In the Cold War period, such coups were not opposed by the US even though US forces stationed in the peninsula. The US even backed Chun’s government in suppressing unrests, to prevent North Korea from taking action in the chaotic situation. From this case, ideological rivalry during the Cold War was conducive for such intervention.

The end of Cold War and global democratisation movements have changed the international structure. In the post Cold War period, international structure based on ideological rivalry has no longer existed. Soviet Union collapsed. Its successor, Russia, has been turning to capitalism. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and China are now becoming friends. The change of this structure has changed military’s perception over threat. In Thai case, this change has been so conducive for military withdrawal. In South Korean case, the North Korean threat has weakened due to the change of alliance. Such threat has no longer been regarded so critical. For those facts, it is reasonable to say that South Korean military has relaxed its control over the society, and has even established substantial military withdrawal.

As for domestic structure, the structure of civil-military relations in Thailand can be dated back from the absolute monarchy’s era. At that time, the King tried to modernise Royal Thai Army (RTA) by introducing Western education to military personnel and building its capabilities under the auspices of the US. The fact that Thailand was never colonised by foreign aggressors showed, to a certain extent, the capability of its military. The military institution in Thailand received further assistance program during the Cold War. Between 1950 and 1971, for instance, it received assistance worth \$ 46 million which was 50 per cent of a total budget of Ministry of Defence at that time,¹⁵⁹ including the establishment of its own military academy. During this period, the development of military institution had been emphasised. In contrast, the development of civil society was neglected. The latter was not given priority. Even for the fulfillment of people’s basic needs the government faced considerable constraints. The

¹⁵⁹ Yung Myung Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

widespread poverty was one indication.

The condition of such civil society provided serious implications. At the elite level, the less developed civil society produced weak political parties and politicians. They could not act as a catalyst to establish links with various social groups, pro-democracy groups, political institutions, and the masses, which was an important element to prevent the military from seizing power.¹⁶⁰ At the grassroots level, weak civil society produced depoliticised masses. Due to poverty and lack of political education, the people, especially in the rural areas did not care about politics:

They [Thai people] are not concerned with power contests of political elites unless these contests directly affect their way of life. They do not feel that they need access to the political process even if it has been offered. Among those who voted, quite a number cast their votes not because they wanted to exert influence but because of various “personal” reasons. Some were paid to vote, some has personal ties with a candidate, and some were mobilised by military officers. Such political attitudes do not pose obstacle for military leaders who seize power or wish to perpetuate their political control.¹⁶¹

This gap, certainly, rendered the military unchallenged in front of civilians so that the military elite, without any interruption, decided “to what degree and power they want to assert in politics.”¹⁶² In this regard one analyst said that:

The development of the armed forces further strengthen the political position of the military elite. During 1960s and 1970s civilian politicians forces were unorganised, fragile and unable to challenge the military. They lacked mass support and linkage to groups in the society. The Democratic Party was the only organised political force but it was popular only in Bangkok. The military establishment was expanded in part to provide a basis support for military leaders. Since coups had become a method of changing government, the military organisation was an important political resources for those officers who sought the use of coups as an avenue to control over state power.¹⁶³

Due to modernisation program, economic development, and improved performance of capitalist development, a new class has emerged in Thai society, especially in the urban areas. Although capitalist development in Thailand has less developed compared to that of South Korea, it has multiplied the number of middle class. Its proportion in 1990s was 12 per cent, which was the same as the Philippine, lower than Singapore (50 per cent), South Korea (33 per cent) and Malaysia (15 per cent), but higher than Indonesia (8 per cent).¹⁶⁴ Their political

¹⁶⁰ Suvarnajata Supaluck., *op. cit.*, p. 64.

¹⁶¹ Suchit Bunbongkarn, “The Military in Thai Politics 1981-1986,” *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁶² See Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

¹⁶³ Suchit Bunbongkarn, “The Military and Democratization in Thailand,” *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁶⁴ Helen Hughes and Bernahu Wolkiden, “The Emergence of the Middle Class in ASEAN Countries,” *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1994, pp. 139-149; James Cotton and Kim Hyung-a van Leest, “The New Rich and the New Middle Class in South Korea: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Golf Republic’,” Richard Robison and David S.G. Goodman, *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile phones, McDonalds and*

awareness increased significantly and reacted promptly when their concerns were neglected. This was proven in 1992 when they organised mass demonstrations in the capital city and forced the military to return to the barracks. One analyst argued that:

Thai civil society now poses a real threat to the military. The business community is expanding and becoming more complex. Several professional and societal groups, including doctors, lawyers and teachers' associations, are demanding an end to the military's political involvement. It can be argued that their popular uprisings have been largely a phenomenon of Bangkok and other major urban areas, and that they are unlikely to have a strong impact in the country. However, it has always been the urban people who have led public opinion and successfully pressed for political reforms.¹⁶⁵

Thus the development of civil society in Thailand has been quite significant. Even though the military is still an important political actor which could potentially overturn the government, civil society in Thailand is now a significant rival for the military as argued by Suchit Bunbongkarn:

The breakdown of the democratization process in 1991 and the pro-democracy protest against PM General Suchinda Kraprayorn in mid 1992 showed that although the military was able to seize state power, as it did in the February 1991 coup, civil society was strong enough to curb the military's influence in government. The 1991 military intervention reflected the armed forces disaffection with the increasing influence of political parties and the civil society's attempt to exert more control over the military.¹⁶⁶

At the grassroots level, even though vote buying is still present in Thai politics, more people are now very concerned with a clean and fair election, and therefore, they have been concerned with the establishment a responsible and representative parliamentarians.

South Korea has the same pattern. Korean war provided lessons to South Korean military and US bloc that the development of military institution and preparedness was important. The country needed strong, modern, and professional military to defend the country from invasion or communists' takeover.

South Korea started building its forces under the Korea Constabulary run by the American military government (1945-1948) aiming at maintaining stability in the peninsula. Because of the division of the nation, the military gained socio-political importance in this period. Military position was strengthened in the Korean war (1950-1953) although it did not intervene until 1961 mainly due to "the time-lag between the creation of the Republic and the military on the one hand and the politicisation of military officers on the other."¹⁶⁷ Owing to the

Middle Class Revolution (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 187.

¹⁶⁵ Suchit Bunbongkarn, "The Military and Democratization in Thailand," *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁶⁷ Yung Myung Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

war, South Korean armed forces strength increased by 600 per cent during 1950-1956. Its institution, warfare technology and organization also highly developed due to US assistance. Thus, during 1950s “the military developed into the most modernised sectors in Korea.”¹⁶⁸

Civilian institution on the other hand was weak at that time. It was true that industrialisation had been also carried out during that period, but since the focus was on military build-ups, civilian institutions, especially bureaucracy and universities, were less developed and less organised compared to military institution. This social structure created gap in military-civilian relations, in that military institution was superior than civilian institution. Therefore, the military had dominated the country without significant challenges from the civilian institution in general. Opposition to authoritarian rule has surfaced since 1961, however, but since it was less organised and less developed, the military institution was unchallenged.

Intensive modernisation, rapid industrialisation, advanced capitalism development, and economic miracle have changed social structure of South Korean society: civil society has developed; middle class and class of businessmen have increased in significant number; civilian institutions have been better organised; and opposition forces have been solid. Military institution on the other hand is no longer the most advanced institution in South Korea, as Yung Myun Kim stated:

During the course of almost thirty years of military rule, the Korean economy and society were fundamentally transformed; society become diversified, class forces grew and became better organised, and democratic orientation of the general populace strengthened. With these change, the military was no longer the most advanced sector of Korean society.¹⁶⁹

Structural change have actually appeared since 1980, but it had not been realised by the military.¹⁷⁰ It was in 1987 when the civilians did succeed to force the military to “prepare” the withdrawal, which was eventually followed by substantial withdrawal in 1992. In today’s South Korea, civilian institution is so solid, better developed, and better organised compared to the military institution, making it a real threat for the military if the latter attempts to re-intervene for political control. Yung Myung Kim said that: “the structure of the relationship between the military and civilian sectors has been reversed: now the military is underdeveloped in comparison to the civilian sectors, and political power will never again be derived primarily from naked physical force.”¹⁷¹

In sum, both international and domestic structures have facilitated the military to either intervene or disengage. In international structure, the ideological rivalry between the US

¹⁶⁸ Yung Myun Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

and Soviet Union during the Cold-War era had similarly facilitated military intervention in Thailand and South Korea. In post-Cold War era, on the other hand, the absence of ideological rivalry has created a structure conducive for military disengagement.

Domestic structure also provided significant effects for military intervention. The better developed the military and the less developed the civil society in Thailand and South Korea had created gap in civil-military relations. This structure facilitated the military to intervene civilian affairs. The difference was that the gap between civil-military relations in Thailand was wider compared to that of South Korea. This partly because South Korea was more successful in its industrialisation and modernisation programs so that civil society developed faster. Long-term opposition by Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae Jung reflected a better development of civil society in South Korea. Unfortunately, however, the development of South Korean civil society until 1987, until 1992 in particular, was not sufficient yet to force the military to (substantially) withdraw from politics. Interestingly, even though the development of civil society in Thailand was not as impressive as that of South Korea, it had significantly facilitated military disengagement.

3. Ideological Factors

The function of ideology is important for actions. Ideology can provide framework and justification for present and future actions.¹⁷² The function of military ideology adhered by the armed forces is with no exception and it provides framework and justification for military intervention.

Ideological factor deals with two issues. First, it relates to military's mission. Second, it deals with the position of the military in civil-military relations; more precisely, military's perception, stance or adherence to the concept of civilian control or civilian supremacy.

Thai armed forces do not have definite military ideology. It evolves over time. It can be traced back from the Kingdom era. Due to coup plot in 1912, King Rama's intention to create an army aiming at guarding the palace and the state from internal and external threats has become the foundation of Thai military ideology. The military "was taught to respect and admire the nation, the religion and the monarchy." Officers' response was "we, the army officers, play no politics, we devoted ourselves to serve the King, and our duty is to fight and fight to protect our nations"¹⁷³

The military monthly newspaper, Yuthagoth, published since 1893 up to now, has frequently mentioned its principle and ideology. Yuthagoth emphasised that the position of the

¹⁷² Constantine P. Danopoulos, "Civilian Supremacy in Changing Societies: Comparative Perspectives," *op. cit.*, p. 8-9.

¹⁷³ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

military is as “a guardian or protector of the nation.” In military thoughts, “power of the nation emerged from the strength of the army and only the army could withstand the inside or outside intruders.” In this situation, “military institutions would stand beside the monarchy, the national assembly, the legislature and government.” Without the military “Thailand would disappear from the earth.”¹⁷⁴

Since the 1932 coup, Thailand has turned into a constitutional monarchy. With the new system, the military changed its ideological emphasis. The 1931 coup leader, Field Marshal Pibul stated that he adhered “the ideology of leadership and militarism, and the country would be at its best if ruled by military dictatorship.” The main points of Pibul’s idea was that “the country and the armed forces are intertwined and are inseparable” and the armed forces should change their position “from a position of guardian into the political institution.” This eventually became a prototype of Thai military ideology for many years. Contemporary military officers still respect this concept.¹⁷⁵

According to Suvarnajata Supaluck, since the first successful coup of 1932, military ideology has consisted of three aspects, that is, 1) statism and national security, 2) militarism, and 3) leadership. The first concept of military ideology, statism and national security, deals with the mission of the military “to preserve the nation, the religion, and the monarchy with all the soldiers’ lives.” It is also stated that “national security concerns the safety and defense of the nation.” With this ideology, between 1950s and 1970s in particular, anti-communism was the first priority of government and military’s policy with the aim to defend the mainland from foreign attacks by neighbouring communist countries or from communist subversions and insurgencies within the state.

Second, militarism refers to “the exaltation of war, the armed forces, martial values, and military ritual over civilian institution and norms.” This concept requires the military to establish a powerful military institution and play significant role in politics.¹⁷⁶ The military is positioned inseparable with politics since “military leaders have to make decisions or give advice to the government on the matter of domestic and foreign security affairs.”¹⁷⁷ In its development this concept expanded into civic mission “to include rural development, peace-keeping duties and other civil affairs.”¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 43

¹⁷⁵ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *ibid.*, p. 43.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 44-45.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁷⁸ Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86*, op. cit., p. 7. Military’s civic mission has been done since 1960s under the command of Gen. Sarit Thamarat. In 1987, the military run an ambitious project the so-called “The Make Northeast Green.” This project, initiated by the King, was aimed to reduce forest degradation, improve irrigation system and increase rural welfare. From political perspective, military’s civic mission was aimed to bolster its legitimacy over high budget and “participation” in politics and business as well as to maintain control and patronage. In this matter, Clard. D. Neher said that “because Thailand is neither under threat from external powers nor from internal insurgency, the Thai

Third, leadership relates to military's capability to lead the country. Military officers believe that the capability of military institution/man is better than that of civilian due to its/his organisation, discipline, and quite often, charisma (*barami*). Thus, the military officers believe that "the military elite would be a better leader of the government than the civilian counterparts." This renders Thai military officers usually do not trust civilian leaders especially when the latter incapable and ineffective to resolve political and economic problems.¹⁷⁹

From the elaboration above, the first two concepts—statism and national security and militarism—relates to the first aspect of military ideology. Thus, the mission of Thai military is to defend the country from external threat and to preserve political stability from internal threat. The third concept—leadership—relate to the second aspect of military ideology, that is, the position of the military in civil-military relations in that Thai military is not subordinated to the civilian authority, but is even above the military. With this kind of ideology, it is understandable therefore the military quite often intervened in politics for the sake of national security or because they regarded civilian leadership was weak, ineffective, and incapable. The ideology has provided main framework or guideline on how to deal with the state's problems as well as a justification for its action.

When the military withdrew however, the first aspect of military ideology unchanged. The scrutiny on the second aspect of military ideology becomes important. In fact, Thai military still does not recognise the subordination of the military. The fact that civilian governments have been fearful to touch military "corporate interests" is one indication.

South Korean military ideology also evolves over time. In the earliest times of military rule, the military had no clear-cut ideology, except anti-communism. A differing opinion among military officers about the roles of the military indicated such vagueness. Yung Myun Kim said that:

Factional disputes during the years of direct rule were essentially struggles for more power sharing, but they also reflected different conceptions of the coup leader's role in politics. At the time of the coup, the officers, although having to a considerable degree a ruler mentality, did not have a clear ideology or set of policy programs to implement after seizing power. In other words, they had not yet developed the kind of "new professionalism" which Latin American officers developed from the late 1950s; all they possessed was unequivocal anti-communism and vague conceptions of reforms, intra-military and societal.¹⁸⁰

military has needed to find a new rational and justification for its large budgets and central role in politics. "Development" has become a new basis. Moreover, the military's participation in rural development program assure degree of control over local officers, and its development role provide the basis for political patronage, which is at the heart of Thai politics." Clard D. Neher, "Thailand in 1987," *op. cit.*, pp. 195-196.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46..

¹⁸⁰ Yung Myung Kim, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-122.

In its development, the ideology of anti communism had been strengthened by Park by imposing the ‘ideology of security,’¹⁸¹ referring not only national defense (in response to external threat) but also national security (in response to internal threat). The development of South Korean military ideology was clearly described by Yung Myung Kim:

Officers’ ideological orientation also undergoing change during Park’s rule. Within the military there emerged growing interest in non military political issues. Through curriculum changes in the institution of higher military education, such as the National Defense College, military officers systematically studied political and social issues. For them, the concept of national security should be expanded to include defense against internal enemy such as communist agitator. Although the officers’ major concern lay still in the area of national defense against possible invasion from North Korea, they were developing aspects of the “new professionalism” found in their Latin American counterparts.¹⁸²

With such a concept, even “loyal” opposition was regarded dangerously disruptive. Therefore, quite often “political opposition was confused with communist subversion.”¹⁸³

The concept of national security was further expanded into social, political, and economic fields. In these issues the military believed that:

South Korea’s survival as a nation depended on the reestablishment of social and economic stability. They viewed the strength of the armed forces and reinstitution of the National Security Act of 1960 and other laws intended to reduced civil disturbances as necessary means to restore order and promote sound economic development¹⁸⁴

In short, South Korean military missions were to defend the country and to establish national security. Based on the missions, South Korean military had played role as Guardian and dominated the country for a long period of time. Such missions had been used to justify its intervention.¹⁸⁵

Military ideology regarding to its missions as a defender of the country and a preserver of the nation still exist. It was even asserted in the 1987 Constitution. Why has it then agreed to withdraw? The answer can be found in the second issue of military ideology concerning civil-military relations, especially its adherence to the concept of civilian supremacy or civilian control of politics.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹⁸³ Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 303.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.277.

¹⁸⁵ As in Thailand, to justify its intervention and to bolster its legitimacy over involvement in politics, the military undertake civic mission. In the 1980s, for example, the military helped farmers “in planting and harvesting rice, assisting civil authorities in preventing loss of life and property during and following natural disasters, delivering medical services in rural areas, and providing other social services.” In 1987, 561,000 soldiers helped farmers in planting rice and 392,000 military personnel in harvesting the crops. See Andrea Matles savada and William Shaw (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 280.

In fact, the military ideology regarding its position in civil-military relations has changed. Article 5 of the 1987 Constitution states that: “The armed Forces are charged with the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land and their political neutrality must be maintained.”¹⁸⁶ Thus even though its role is still as a defender of the country and preserver of national security, the military should be politically neutral. Neutrality means that it cannot take side with parties or, this is the most important thing, intervene in politics. The intervention means the military poses itself in opposition to others, thus it is not neutral. Non-intervention in politics means the civilians control political spheres.

Such a position has been strengthened by recent development particularly in the promotion of democracy. First, South Korean military believes that the most effective way to fight against communist subversion is by promoting democracy and improve standard of living of South Korean people. Second, in the issue of re-unification, the military also believes that such a strategy is also the most promising way to win the hearts and minds of North Korean people to unify. The case of German re-unification is a notable reference. With the agreement to promote democracy the military by all means no longer has legitimacy to rule since military rule is detrimental to democratisation process. Thus, the military has no choices but to surrender their power to civilians. With a well established civilian institution, the military has agreed to the concept of civilian control of politics, meaning the subordination of the armed force to civilian institution.

Thus, both Thailand and South Korea have similar military ideologies. First, both militaries pose itself as a defender from external threat and preserver from internal threat. With this kind of ideology, the military has a justification to intervene domestic politics. Secondly, the militaries regarded themselves more capable and effective in handling state’s problems, especially political issues. This kind of ideology provided them stimuli to intervene. The difference is that, Thai military still holds both ideologies rigidly, while that of South Korea has changed their ideology in civil- military relations by adhering the concepts of civilian control of politics. This is why the threat of military intervention and re-intervention is still stronger in Thai case. It is true that some officers in Thai have changed their ideology as General Surayudh did, but as an institution military’s adherence to the concept of civilian supremacy is questionable. Most Thai military officers still trivialise the capabilities of civilian politicians.

To sum up, the positions or roles of factors leading to military intervention and withdrawal in Thailand and South Korea are summarised in the following table.

¹⁸⁶ On the Internet at <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ks00000_.html>, accessed in January, 2000.

Figure 10
Factors leading to Military Intervention and Withdrawal in Thailand and South Korea

No.	Factors	Thailand		South Korea	
		Intervention	Withdrawal	Intervention	Withdrawal
1.	Motivational Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Military factors (military clique and economic interests) are conducive for military intervention. ● Exogenous-to-the-military factors: ineffectiveness of civilian institution is conducive for intervention; public uprisings do not play significant role for military intervention. ● Exogenous-to-the-state factor (external threat) is not conducive for military intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Military factors: “clique culture” is not/less conducive for military withdrawal; military’s economic interests is not conducive for military withdrawal. ● Exogenous-to-the-military factors: civilian opposition and, to a certain extent, government’s capabilities & competence facilitate the withdrawal. ● Exogenous-to-the-state factors: the absence of external threat is conducive for withdrawal; US factor is inconclusive. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Military factors (factionalism and, to a certain extent, military’s economic interests) are conducive for military intervention. ● Exogenous-to-the-military factors: public uprisings and, to a certain extent, ineffectiveness of civilian institution are conducive for intervention. ● Exogenous-to-the-state factor (external threat) is conducive for intervention; US factor facilitates intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Military factors: the absence of factionalism and military’s economic interests is conducive for military withdrawal. ● Exogenous-to-the-military factors: the existence of public uprising/ civilian opposition and the effectiveness of civilian institution are conducive for withdrawal. ● Exogenous-to-the-state factors: external threat is not/less conducive for military withdrawal; US factor facilitates the withdrawal
2.	Structural Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● International structure (Cold War) is conducive for military intervention. ● Domestic structure (civil society condition) is conducive for intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● International structure (third wave global democratisation) is conducive for substantial withdrawal. ● Domestic structure (civil society condition) is, to a greater extent, conducive for substantial withdrawal. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● International structure (Cold War) is conducive for military intervention. ● Domestic structure (civil society condition) is conducive for intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● International structure (third wave global democratisation) is conducive for substantial withdrawal. ● Domestic structure (civil society condition) is conducive for substantial withdrawal.
3.	Ideological Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Military ideology claiming that its missions to guard the state from external threat and to preserve the nation from internal threat as well as its position subordinating civilian institution is conducive for military intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Military ideology claiming that its missions to guard the state from external threat and to preserve the nation from internal threat as well as its position subordinating civilian institution is not favourable for an established military withdrawal. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Military ideology claiming that its missions to guard the state from external threat and to preserve the nation from internal threat is conducive for military intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Military ideology claiming that its missions to guard the state from external threat and to preserve the nation from internal threat, but the military should be neutral politically, to a greater extent, facilitates military withdrawal.

From that table, in South Korea most factors leading to military withdrawal can be “played back” and in Thailand some crucial factors such as economic interests and ideological factors cannot be “played back.” “Clique culture” is also not/less conducive for military

withdrawal. It is understandable therefore military withdrawal in South Korea is more secured compared to that of Thailand as such factors no longer become a threat to the existing military withdrawal.

Chapter 5

Civilian Control and Democratisation in Thailand and South Korea

1. Civilian Control

The foundation of civilian control in South Korea has been established since the First Republic was founded (1952), when the Constitution requested a direct presidential system¹⁸⁷ and posed the President as head of state and head of government as well as Commander-in-Chief. During the first decade of Park's era, such foundation had been preserved. A direct presidential election was abolished in 1972, marking the erosion of civilian control, even though the position of President as Commander-in-Chief was maintained. Since 1987 up to now, presidential election system by direct popular votes has been readopted. Article 66 (1) and (4) of the 1987 Constitution respectively stipulates that "The President is the Head of the State and represents the State vis-à-vis foreign state" and "Executive power is vested in the Executive Branch headed by the President." Article 67 (1) states "The President is elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot by the people." Furthermore, Article 74 (1) asserts that "The President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces under the conditions as prescribed by the Constitution and law."¹⁸⁸ The passage that the President as head of state and government implies that the President is a civilian since presidential post is a political/civilian post, not a military post. This is strengthened by the passage of a direct presidential election since in a fair and direct presidential election active military officers would be hard to compete. Therefore, the position the President as Commander-in-Chief implies the subordination of the military to civilian institution.

The problem emerges when the "man on horseback" is elected as President. In fact, Park Chung Hee and General Roh Tae Woo were elected as President by popular votes. As their origins were the military, they maintained significant role of the military and Park even imposed strong authoritarian rule.

The election of Kim Young-sam marked the significant step in the establishment of civilian control in South Korea. In fact, he had taken crucial efforts to deal with this issue. First, he dissolved the so-called "Hanahoe," the most politicised and influential private military organisation within the military institution founded in Park Chung Hee's era. In the past, this organisation played significant role in decision making of crucial issues such as political succession and the promulgation of martial law. Kim's main aim in this respect was to undermine political resources of military leaders, so as to prevent coup politics. He endeavoured

¹⁸⁷ See Seong-Ho Lim, *op. cit.*, p. 529.

¹⁸⁸ On the Internet at <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ks00000_.html>, accessed on January 11, 2000.

to maintain and strengthen the mechanism that election would be the only route to come to power.

Second, to secure civilian control he removed “political soldiers” held key positions in the military and exposed their misdeeds. The first target was the officers associated with Hanahoe. Sanghyum Yoon described:

The government now removed those officers whose military carriers had received a significant boost from their association with the Hanahoe. Defense minister was ordered to exclude members of Hanahoe from consideration for promotion to ranks above brigadier general and for assignment as commanders of units above regiment.¹⁸⁹

Third, the function of Military Security Command in political surveillance was abolished and its branches were reduced significantly. Kim also narrowed the spheres of activity of the ANSP (formerly KCIA) which had exercised considerable authority in the civilian institutions.¹⁹⁰ Fourth, he attempted to eliminate the “reserved domain” of the military by exposing military budget (except for strategic reasons). Finally, he ordered the investigation upon bribes and irregularities in defense procurement, in the Yulgok project for instance,¹⁹¹ and punished the military officers who involved in the misconducts of promotion and budget allocation.¹⁹²

Kim’s move has had a significant effect. Civilian institution is now able to control the military. The military on the other hand has become more professional and accountable as described by one analyst:

The military reforms also have had an indeterminate benefit, given the adverse effects they have had on morale in the armed forces. A significant number of professional officers are opting for early retirement, to the extent that combat capability are being questioned.¹⁹³

In Thailand, the question of civilian control is a delicate matter. The Khuang (1944-1945) and Seni (1945-1946) governments as well as civilian governments established after the 1932, 1947, 1957, 1973, 1976 withdrawals could never fully control the military.¹⁹⁴ Such civilian governments “only took the place of a political leadership vacuum which interrupted the shortcomings of military regimes.”¹⁹⁵

Why can’t the civilians fully control the military? One answer is because the ideology of civilian supremacy has never been rooted in Thai politics unlike that of in Western developed

¹⁸⁹ Sanghyum Yoon, *op. cit.*, p. 512.

¹⁹⁰ Soong-Hoom Kil, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 512-513.

¹⁹² Young-chul Paik, “Political Reform as Democratic Consolidation in Korea,” *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 1994, p. 736.

¹⁹³ Sanghyum Yoon, *op. cit.*, p. 514.

¹⁹⁴ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

countries, India, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippine, etc. Thai Constitution has never mentioned the subordination of the armed forces over civilian government. Chapter II, Section 10 of the latest constitution (1997), for instance, only mentions the King as the head of the state in that “The King holds the position of Head of the Thai Armed Forces.”¹⁹⁶ The post for Supreme Commander of the armed forces since 1932 has been reserved for Generals. The promotion of the Generals to this post has been based on the suggestions of former or retired Supreme Commanders and the supports of military top brass.¹⁹⁷ Thus, the Prime Minister as head of government has “neither a position nor the role in the armed forces.” This is why coups occurred frequently in Thailand. In the military thinking, it did not stage a coup against the King, but against the government.¹⁹⁸

Although the civilians have been unable to fully control or subordinate the military, civilian control has improved and provided hopes for some reasons. First, the new constitution asserts that “The Prime Minister must be appointed from members of the House of Representatives.”¹⁹⁹ This means that the only route to come to power is through election, not by coups counter coups. Thus, if all citizens, including the military, abide by the Constitution, this would prevent the military to dominate and subordinate (civilian) political institutions. Second, the appointment of military officers in the Upper House has been abolished.²⁰⁰ This establishes mechanism that it is the elected members who will determine state’s policies, not the military appointees. Third, since pro-democracy parties won in the 1992 election the military has “pledged to support the government and to remain in their barracks.” Military leaders have also reiterated that “the military will not interfere in political affairs; modernisation programs and professional development will be the main priorities.”²⁰¹ Recently, the new Army Commander, General Surayudh, has asserted his commitment “to turning the Thai army into a professional army, one that stays out of politics.”²⁰² Although this does not assure that re-intervention will not occur, the military at least realises its proper position and role. The question will be how to

¹⁹⁶ On the Internet at <<http://203.152.23.33/law/text/pub/e11102540/text.html>>, accessed on January 11, 2000.

¹⁹⁷ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

¹⁹⁸ To avoid this, one Thai expert proposes a solution by establishing a rank between the King (Commander-in-Chief) and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces for the Prime Minister. He said that: “Whoever become elected prime minister, the constitution should say, he shall obtain a specific rank in the armed forces (a rank with higher dignity than that of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but lower than that of King). Be that as it may, if the premier shall customarily obtain a rank in the armed forces, sooner or later, he should receive respect from the military personnel. Accordingly, the likely of coup will probably decrease.” Suvarnajata Supaluck, *ibid.*, p. 231.

¹⁹⁹ The 1997 Thai Constitution, on the Internet, *op. cit.*

²⁰⁰ Chapter VI, Section 121 of the 1997 Constitution states that “The Senate shall consists of two hundred members to be elected by the people.”

²⁰¹ Suchit Bunbongkarn, *Asia Pacific, op. cit.*, p. 57.

²⁰² Suchitra Punyaratabandhu, “Thailand in 1998: A False Sense of Recovery,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January/February 1999, p. 185.

maintain their commitments as well as to socialise these values to their subordinates.

From such two cases, soon after the withdrawal, civilian controls had been established in South Korea and Thailand. Both countries used constitutional, institutional, and practical approaches to secure civilian control. South Korean Constitution has stipulated a direct presidential election and political neutrality of the military. In the case of Thailand, its Constitution has been successful to stipulate a direct election of the members the Senate and an appointment of PM from members of the House of Representatives. This is by all means not yet one hundred per cent successful as both constitutions do not explicitly stipulate the subordination of the armed forces to civilian authority. The assurance of such subordination in the Constitution is of importance as experienced by the Philippine. Besides stipulating the President is Head of state and government, Commander-in-Chief, and shall be elected directly by the people, the 1987 Filipino Constitution asserts that “Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”²⁰³ With this passage, it has undermined any attempted coups in this country. In regard to the role of such assurance and the Philippines’ experience, Suvarnajata Supaluck argued:

If the role of civilian supremacy over the military is to be mentioned and enumerated in the Constitution, the likelihood of coup occurrence will apparently diminish. It is because the coup group would lack the immediate legitimation to govern and the right to rule and would be fail since the coup oppose the law written in the Constitution.

When a military coup occur, the coup leaders would realise at once that they are breaking the law and are annihilating their civilian superiority as well as their constitution. For example, the failure of several Filipino military coups against President Corazon Aquino in the late 1980s was the result of the lack of legitimacy to govern, against the rule of civilian supremacy written in the law, and opposite to the public.²⁰⁴

As for institutional approach, Thailand has succeeded to abolish the appointment of military officers in the Senate. The government also significantly ousted military officers in civilian bureaucracy. This was easier to be managed as military men occupy civilian institutions at national level, and mostly at high-ranking position.²⁰⁵ The ease to oust military out from political institutions also occurred in South Korea since the officers mostly neglected the “non-strategic” position (local institutions and lower levels).

To tame constitutional constraints, both countries attempted to look forward another means to secure civilian control, that is practical approach. In South Korea, the government radically reorganised the military to weaken its power so that the government could exert

²⁰³ On the Internet at <<http://www.members.tripod.com/~mololos/1987/toc.html>>, accessed on January 12, 2000.

²⁰⁴ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-231.

²⁰⁵ Suchit Bunbongkarn

control and influence over the military. In Thailand, however, the government has attempted not to touch the “corporate interests” of the military, including not to reorganise military institution.

Two questions remain: Why did the military accept civilian control scheme? Why did the degree of acceptance is different between South Korea and Thailand? There has been a growing awareness among militaries in both countries to establish normal politics, meaning the politics is the area of politicians and military’s specialization is in defence. The acceptance is higher in South Korea because the civilian governments are trustworthy in running the country, economically and politically. In Thailand, on the other hand, the military is still doubtful about the maturity of politicians and the performance of civilian governments. Furthermore, in the new era (the end of Cold War), the relative absence of external threat, a growing awareness among society on the issues of human rights, democratisation, and civilian control, has rendered the militaries having no other choice but abiding by the real politics. Certain reservation is maintained by Thai military due to the lack of trusts to civilian governments.

2. Democratisation

Long-term Thai military intervention, particularly in the period of 1932-1971, made Thai democracy stalled. It is true that open politics was introduced in 1973-1976, owing to students’ uprisings and growing demands to political liberalisation and democratisation. However, as the military was not willing to withdraw, it strove to continue its control over people’s political activities. It was proven in 1976 when, having successfully staged coup, the military established a military-backed ultra-rightist civilian government.

Political liberalisation had been initiated by the military due to, amongst other, its failure in suppressing communist insurgency. During Marshal Sarit’ era, the communist insurgents were regarded “merely bandits, without an organisation, and could be easily dealt with the police force.”²⁰⁶ In dealing with armed insurgency in 1965 in Northeast, the government used offensive military force. It did not calm the situation, however, but fuelled the rebellions and spread the insurgencies to other parts of the country. Soon after General Kriangsak took over power in 1977, he changed the strategy to fight against communism. He used political offensive strategy instead of military offensive strategy. He began with the lifting of suppression measures against the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and offered amnesty to its members and sympathisers. As a result, many CPT activists returned to normal lives, meaning the decrease of insurgency activities. With this success, political offensive strategy was then officially adopted through Prime Ministerial Decree No. 66/2523 by his successor, General Prem Tinsulanond. This decree provided a detailed guideline of political means to counter

²⁰⁶ Suchit Bunborngkarn, *The Military and Democracy in Thailand*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

insurgency, such as the alleviation of poverty and socio-economic injustice, promotion of political participation, strengthening democratic institutions, and assurances of political freedom. Thus, this decree shows that “building democracy was the only means to defeat communism.”²⁰⁷ In practice, Thai democracy was however not fully developed as the military still dominated the country.²⁰⁸ Political liberalisation has been done half-hearted, and the result was a semi-successful semi democracy.²⁰⁹ This semi-democracy continued during General Chatichai’s era (1988-1991), with some improvements.²¹⁰

Shortly after the military was forced to withdraw, Thailand promulgated the 1992 Constitution. This constitution provided a strong basis for democratisation processes. Unlike its predecessor, as abovementioned, the 1992 Constitution explicitly stipulated that the Prime Minister must be appointed from the members of the House of Representatives. This passage has democratised political institution in the country since it prevented the “ghost” candidate from being PM.

The amendment of the 1992 Constitution in 1997 strengthened such foundation. The promulgation of the 1997 Constitution “represents a radical departure from its predecessors both in substance and in drafting process.” This constitution was drafted by a 99-person elected MPs and involving public consultation through public hearings, public discussions, talk shows and the like. The drafting took a period of eight months. In substance, further democratisation efforts have been done by abolishing the appointment of members of the Senate and replacing it with a direct election. The Constitution also requests the end of money politics and party system based on clique, by requiring all eligible people to vote and establishing transparency in the management of political funds.²¹¹ Based on the current constitution, many political laws relating to vote buying, assets’ declaration, election funding, political freedom, human rights, and so on have been promulgated.

In practical aspects, press liberty, political freedom, and the promotion of human rights have improved significantly. The improvement of government’s performance in the issues of clean government, transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to people’s aspiration and political and economic issues has been promising as well.

Thus, since recent military withdrawal was established, democratisation process in Thai politics has been impressive. With its performance in democratising politics, Thailand, along with the Philippine, have become two leading democratic states in Asia. With its confidence in promoting democratic principles, Thailand even proposed the implementation of

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*,

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 55

²⁰⁹ Clark D. Neher, “Thailand in 1987: Semi-Successful Semi-Democracy,” *Asian Survey*, Vol., XXVIII, No. 2, February 1988, p. 192.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ Suchitra Punyaratabandhu, “Thailand in 1997: Financial Crisis as Constitutional Reform,” *Asian*

engagement foreign policies in ASEAN, meaning partial involvement in members' domestic politics that having regional impacts.²¹²

Similar to Thai case, since South Korean military handed over power to civilian leadership and substantially withdrew from domestic politics, South Korea has undergone a dramatic democratisation process.

Political transition began when Roh Tae Woo succeeded Chun Doo Hwan. The election of President Roh through popular votes marked the transition from authoritarian rule to a more democratic state power.²¹³ During Roh tenure, South Korean politics had become more open since he undertook political liberalisation.²¹⁴ For instance, he abolished the oppressive Press Basic Law in 1987 and enacted Law of Local Autonomy (April 1988) and Law of Assembly and Demonstration (March 1989). These efforts significantly contributed to securing the foundation of democracy in South Korea.²¹⁵

However, as previously examined, due to his military background, his membership in the military private organisation, and his involvement in the brutal suppression of Kwangju citizens, his efforts to liberalise politics were done half-hearted. This can be seen from his attempts to maintain military power by preserving "Hanahoe" as well as to maintain the function of Military Security Command in political surveillance. To a certain extent, he still used the military as his power base. Therefore, the creation of a democratic society was done with reservation. It was not surprising therefore that students and opposition leaders regarded him still-maintaining authoritarianism.

When Kim Young-sam was elected as President he underwent substantial democratisation process. He continued Roh's political liberalisation and substantially democratised political and economic systems. He did not only liberalise political institutions, provide greater freedom to the people, press, and labour unions, but also establish an accountable and responsive government, parliament, political parties, and military institution. The declaration of his assets and wealth which was then followed by the passing of law requiring all high ranking officials to declare their wealth, of law prohibiting the use of fictitious name over bank or finance accounts and transactions, and of bill requesting politicians and political parties to report their political funding, were some examples.²¹⁶

Survey, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, February 1998, p. 165. See also Scott B. MacDonald, *op.cit.*, p. 697.

²¹² Unfortunately, however, only the Philippine did support Thailand's proposal while the rest rejected.

²¹³ Young Chul Paik, *op. cit.* p. 733.

²¹⁴ Chang-Hee Nam, "South Korea's Big Business Clientelism in Democratic Reform," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, April 1995, p. 365.

²¹⁵ Young -Chul Paik. "Political Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea," *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 1994, p. 733.

²¹⁶ See Chong-sik Lee and Hyuk Sang Sohn, "South Korea in 1993: The Year of Great Reform," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, January 1994, p. 2; See also Sanghyun Yoon, "South Korea's Kim Young Sam Government: Political Agendas," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 5, May 1996, p. 512. Soong-Hoom

With such post-withdrawal efforts, President Kim Young-sam successfully improved South Korean democracy, as Seong-Ho Lim asserted:

The military's political hegemony stretching over nearly three decades came an end in the 1992 presidential election when Young-Sam Kim won the presidency, and is unlikely to come back under the current civilian-dominant political atmosphere. The absence of military influences signals a significant improvement in Korean democracy. Korean democracy got another tremendous boost when the 1997 election resulted in a peaceful transition of power to an opposition leader and his party for the first time in Korean political history.²¹⁷

His efforts have been continued by his successor, Kim Dae Jung. One expert argued that due to the measures of the two Kims, South Korea is now "undergoing transition to more mature forms of liberal democracy and market capitalism."²¹⁸

Thus, both countries experienced similar patterns in democratic transition and democratisation processes. Thailand has started the transition since 1977 when a reform minded military officers took over power. The military however still controlled the political system. Significant political liberalisation has been carried out since Gen. Prem Tinsulanond took over power (1979-1988), particularly when he was succeeded by Gen. Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991).

In South Korea, significant political transition occurred when a new Constitution employing a direct presidential election was promulgated in 1987. The elected president, Gen. Roh Tae Woo, liberalised politics by giving greater political freedom to the people and political institutions.

The starting point of democratisation process was also similar, namely, when the military returned to the barracks. Both in Thailand and South Korea, democratisation processes have improved significantly since the civilians led the governments. In Thailand, with a new mandate given by the 1992 Constitution, Chuan Leekpai democratised the political system by introducing new system of election, giving more political freedom to the press, people, students, and labour forces, and establishing transparency and accountability. His attempts were followed by his successors. Although following the 1992 withdrawal a military-background PM, General Chavalit Yonhcahiyuth, was appointed as Prime Minister, this General was unable to act as a military representative but to follow democratic process. Democratic system has forced him to leave his attribute as a military man. The fact that he could only stand for 11 months as Prime

Kil, "Political reforms of the Kim Young Sam Government," *Korea and World Affairs*, Fall 1993, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 421-426. Chong-sik Lee and Hyuk Sang Sohn, "South Korea in 1994: A Year of Trial," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXV, No. 1, January 1995, p. 30.

²¹⁷ Seong-Ho Lim, "A 'Paradox of Korean Democracy: 50 Years' Experience of the 'Imperial' Presidency and the 'Peripheral' Legislature," *Korea and World Affairs*, Winter 1998, p. 530.

²¹⁸ Tong Whan Park, "South Korea in 1997: Clearing the Last Hurdle to Political Economic Maturation," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, January 1998, p. 1.

Minister proved that he abode by the power of democratic rule. Since he was succeeded by former PM, Chuan Leekpai, Thai democracy has become more mature. The promulgation and implementation of the 1997 democratic constitution reflected this development.

In the discourse of military withdrawal and democratization, the position of mezzanine regime is very important. Mezzanine regime is a regime between authoritarian regime and democratic regime. This regime plays a critical role since, on one hand, it can provoke authoritarian forces to seize power, and on the other hand, it can lead to a democratic regime. In South Korea, there was no doubt that Roh Tae Woo government played a mezzanine regime. As shown in Figure 11, his regime positioned itself between authoritarian regime of Chun Doo Hwan and democratic regime of Kim Young-sam. In his era, the return to authoritarianism was less likely to occur as the authoritarian forces (Chun Doo Hwan and the military) agreed to carry out political transition. Civilian politicians, middle class, students, and labour union were also strong in positioning themselves as military's rival.

Figure 11
Mezzanine Regimes in Thailand and South Korea

No	Regime	South Korea	Thailand
1.	Authoritarian Regime	Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan (1971-1987)	Military-dominated regime (1932-1977)*
2.	Mezzanine Regime	Roh Tae Woo (1980-1992)	Kriangsak (first phase) (1977-1980) Prem (second phase) (1980-1988) Chatichai (third phase) (1988-1991)**
3.	Democratic Regime	Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae Jung (1992-present)	Chuan Leekpai, Banhard, Chavalit, Chuan Leekpai (1992-present)

*Democratic interlude between 1973-1976 ** Mezzanine regimes in Thailand were incrementally democratised and the degree of democracy in such regimes improved in phase, from the first (Kriangsak) to the second (Prem) and the third (Chatichai) regimes.

In Thailand, the mezzanine regime encompassed three regimes. Even though Kriangsak Chamanan's regime came to power through coup, the coup was done aiming at improving the performance of democracy. The use of political strategy to counter communist insurgency by improving democracy was one indication. Kriangsak's strategy was followed by Prem Tinsulanond. Prem regime even officially elaborated the use of political strategy to counter communist movements. With political strategy, greater democratic practices were introduced. In Chaticahai's era, democratic political system improved. Analysts even regarded Chatichai regime as a semi-democratic regime. In such transition period, the military still played significant role and therefore authoritarianism still existed. Under the circumstances, two

possibilities could occur, that is, the return to authoritarianism or the improvement of democracy. The return to authoritarianism was less likely to happen since civilians became stronger. In 1992, for instance, the military unsuccessfully established military rule after seizing power. A long term period of Thai mezzanine regimes (1977-1991) might be one explanation of this because the given time could facilitate the democratic forces to consolidate.

In South Korea, since the military returned to the barracks, civilian leadership under Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae Jung have undertaken tremendous steps in democratising South Korean politics. Democratisation has been done through reforms in the political institutions and political practices.

There are some differences however in the democratisation issue. First, democratisation in South Korea has been wider in scope, smoother in process, and more stable in nature, compared to that of Thailand. So far, South Korea does not face challenge from the military upon the course of democratisation process. In Thailand, the civilians are still fearful to “touch” military corporate interests, so that civilian government has been unable to establish a truly “accountable” military institution. With this feature, the military potentially becomes a “spoiler” in the ongoing process.

Second, democratisation process in South Korea has been supported by all sections of the community, including the military. The fact that the military no longer has political ambitions and economic interests has strengthened such a process. In Thailand, on the other hand, the military has been still half-hearted in supporting democratisation process. The military’s supports have been made with reservation—to protect its “reserved domain.”

3. Conclusion

Thailand and South Korea were two countries experiencing military intervention and long-term military rule. Both militaries had intervened and dominated political arena and political institutions. While Thai military’s intervention in business stemmed from economic interests, South Korean military’s involvement in military industrial complex was due to security interests.

Thailand and South Korea have established substantial military withdrawals that began in the same period, that is, in post-Cold War era or in the era of world democratisation. The difference was that Thailand experienced some partial withdrawals beforehand while South Korea did not. As well, while recent substantial military withdrawal in Thailand occurred abruptly, the withdrawal in South Korea was carried out in phase.

Military intervention in both countries could not be explained by one single factor. In fact, it was caused by a set of factors that can be distinguished into three broad categories, that

is, motivational factors, structural factors and ideological factors. In spite of that, there were certain dominant factors bringing about the intervention. Factors leading to military withdrawal can also be divided into such categories. For substantial military withdrawal, however, not all of the factors leading to intervention can be “played back” (to be employed) for military withdrawal. This means threefold. First, factors leading to military withdrawal are not exactly the same as factors leading to military intervention. Second, there are certain factors playing dominant role in military disengagement. Third, there are certain factors left which can pose themselves as a threat to the recent substantial withdrawal.

In Thailand, the main factors stimulating military intervention were clique conflict and the weakness/ineffectiveness of civilian institution. The intervention became possible as Thai military ideology justified it. Thus ideological factor was also critical. Other factors such as economic interests, international and domestic structure, external threat, and communist insurgency had facilitated the intervention. In South Korea, on the other hand, the main factors were external threat and people’s uprising. Military ideology also played important role as it provided justification for its intervention. International and domestic structure facilitated the intervention.

In Thai military withdrawal, ideological factor of military intervention cannot be “played back” for military withdrawal. Its mission positioning itself as defense, security, and political forces as well as its rejection to the concept of civilian supremacy are also not conducive for substantial and long-term military withdrawal. This means that in Thai case, military ideology does not play important role for military withdrawal. In regard to endogenous factors (military factors), institutional and non-institutional economic interests of the military remain high, which are not conducive for withdrawal. “Clique culture” is also not/less conducive for military withdrawal. Military clique has become Thai military’s “identity.” Because of this, military withdrawal in Thailand has been less secured. In fact, such ideology is a potential factor for military (re)intervention; if such ideology does not change in the future, it could facilitate future intervention. The most important factor was thus people’s uprising or opposition (exogenous to the military) demanding military withdrawal. This factor enabled to play considerable role due to significant changes in structural factor—the structure of civil-military relations—as a result of modernisation program or capitalist development. Thus, military clique, economic interests, and ideological factor are still left. This means that they could become a threat for recent military withdrawal. More precisely, these factors could potentially lead to military re-intervention.

In South Korean military withdrawal, most factors can be “played back,” except, to a certain extent, external threat (exogenous to the military) and military mission as preserver of internal security (ideological factor). The perception of communist threat from North Korea is still present, albeit diminished. Due to growing democracy and the end of ideological rivalry,

the influence of this factor has weakened. It is correct that military mission to keep internal security is like a lesser of two evils in that the military can use such mission to justify its intervention. But since the military agreed to the concept civilian control (political neutrality), ideological factor can also, to certain extent, be tamed. Thus, most factors have played roles for military withdrawal—although some are by all means such dominant as people uprising/opposition, the strength of civilian institution and changing military ideology. This means that there are relatively no other factors left which could threaten recent military withdrawal.

Following military withdrawal in both countries, Thailand and South Korea have enjoyed civilian control. In both countries, civilian controls have been attained by constitutional approach. Even though they are not one hundred per cent successful in securing civilian control, South Korean Constitution provides more assurances or better prospects in doing so compared to that of Thailand. In practical approach, civilian control in South Korea has been achieved by radically reorganising military institution. In Thailand, on the other hand, it has been attained by not interfering military's "corporate interests." Thai civilian government has been too scare to touch "corporate interests" of the military as it could precipitate the coup. With such condition, the degree of civilian control in Thailand is lower than that of South Korea.

Due to military withdrawal, both countries enjoy substantial democratisation process. Both countries are now becoming two leading democratic countries in Asia. The ongoing political democratisation in Thailand is however less secured compared to that of South Korea since civilian control in Thailand is not fully acquired and the factors discussed above (military clique, economic interests, and ideology) could potentially interrupt such process.

Based on such condition, prospects for an established civilian control and an advanced democracy in South Korea is so promising. First, a better institutionalised military withdrawal provides strong foundation for future improvement in the issues of civilian control and democratisation. Second, the military on one hand has no objection to absorb the notion of civilian control/supremacy and South Korean civilians on the other hand have proven their "class." Third, societal condition needed for long term military withdrawal has been met. Industrialisation, modernisation, and market capitalism have transformed South Korean people into a more advanced condition, economically and politically. Their concerns on democracy and civilian rule potentially challenge the military, particularly if the latter intends to seize power by force. Finally, the possession of the view that German reunification experience could be replicated by promoting democracy and market capitalism—to win the hearts and minds of North Korean people. This notion is not only shared among South Korean people but also by the military. Thus, it strengthens the concerns of all section of the community to build South Korean economy and democracy.

In the case of Thailand, this country still faces some impediments. First, with its

“clique culture,” rigid military ideology, and institutional and non-institutional economic interests, Thai military could potentially re-intervene. Second, Thai economy “needs to be developed.” Thai economic development is less promising compared to that of South Korea. Thus, the establishment of a strong and widescale politicised civil society would be hard to achieve in the near future. Third, Thailand has not yet successfully established the so-called high caliber civilian politicians. They are still factional in nature.

Nevertheless, the commitment and concerns of middle class in urban areas have positioned themselves as a guardian of democracy from military’s threat. Global democratic trends will also hamper the willingness of the “men on horseback” to undermine democracy. In the discourse about the establishment of long-lasting military withdrawal and advanced democracy, however, this is not sufficient yet. The 1991 coup was one instance. It showed that the military was still capable to stage coup in the era of global democratic trend and when Thai middle class increased in size. In fact, in such global trend most developed countries have been still pragmatic. They would not sacrifice their economic interests merely for Thai “small event.” In relation to the latter (middle class), Bunbongkarn said that “as with other coups in Thailand, there was no large scale protest. Only some academics and politicians who lost their jobs quietly expressed resentment. For the general public, the coup seemed acceptable.”²¹⁹

As experienced by South Korea, I would argue that the future of civilian control and democratisation would lie in Thai capitalist development. This issue does not merely deal with economic aspects but also political aspects. The more mature capitalist development will further change societal condition of the society. It will produce more middle class, class of businessmen, or bourgeoisie. It is true that structural change does not guarantee the establishment of pro-democracy civil society as was the case of Singapore. However, due to differing path of capitalist development in that Thai capitalism developed under democratic movement’s heroism, Thai middle class would be more politicised and so concerned with democracy. This would produce a strong civil society which in turn contributes to the establishment of strong civilian institutions, particularly the legislature and government.

The change of societal condition and improved quality of civilian institution would affect military ideology. When military officers see that civilian institutions are capable and competent to manage the country, economically and politically, they will realise that civilian control of politics is a better choice and a must, thus it could change military’s perception on the adherence to the concept of civilian supremacy. The sign of this, to a certain extent, can be seen from recent military elite’s statements in that they have reiterated that the military will continue to professionalise itself and to stay out of politics. The change in military ideology and the recognition of civilian control of politics would in turn hamper the development of cliques

²¹⁹ Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand in 1992,” *op. cit.*

leading to coup. Since they would no longer have a framework or justification to interfere, the interests to seize power and to intervene “neighbour’s business” would diminish.

In addition, the better developed the economy would make military officers better pay, thus it would reduce business interests of the military. The absence or decline of business interests would undermine factors polluting military establishment and its officers; it would undermine reasons/interests of the officers to intervene. Since military clique stems from, amongst others, economic interests, the absence of business interests would also undermine clique culture.

In short, the fate of future civilian control and democratisation in Thailand would lie mainly in its capitalist development. Unfortunately, however, since 1997, Thailand has been a “patient” of the IMF. Thus, uncertainty would still occur in the foreseeable future.

Chapter 6

Contemporary Indonesian Military Politics

Lessons from Thai and South Korean Military Withdrawal and Democratisation

1. Historical Background

Prior to Indonesia's independence, there existed armed struggles against the colonial power, the Dutch. The struggles were however less organised, sporadic and more reliant on charismatic leaders. One notable instance was the so-called Java War or Diponegoro War (1925-1930) led by Prince Diponegoro. In 1930 the Dutch established the KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) whose tasks were to maintain security and public order. A few Indonesians had received opportunities to join this military organisation. Since 1942, Japanese military authorities had mobilised, armed and trained young Indonesians (*pemudas*) in preparation to defend the archipelago from the Allied attacks. The Japanese authorities did not only establish the Heiho, Peta, Seinendan, Keibodan and Gakutotai but also encourage the formation of such local militias as *Laskars*, *Pasukans*, and *Barisans*.²²⁰

When the pre-war leaders, Soekarno and Hatta, declared independence on 17 August 1945, they were "in no position to claim that they had the body that later become the TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or Indonesian National Army)." Even though the state and military forces emerged as a single process, in military thinking, "psychologically the army had been there prior to the Republic." The military claimed that "we were there prior to the Republic." This perception arose for some reasons. First, the military-like organisations had existed during pre-independence's era. Second, the government postponed the creation of a national army because Indonesian leaders "feared that such a policy would antagonize the allies" and they "were not convinced that Indonesia possessed an adequate military capacity."²²¹ Instead, the government formed the BKR (People's Security Organisation) on 20 August 1945, which was "not clearly an army"²²² but "local militia units."²²³ With the establishment of the BKR, many

²²⁰ I Ketut Gunawan, *Recent Discourse about Military Withdrawal in Indonesia's New Order*, p. 20. Cf. George McT Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolutionary in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 101-115; Benedict Richard O'Gorman Anderson, *The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-19467* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilm, Inc., 1967), pp. 17-35; E. Utrecht, *The Indonesian Army: A Socio-political Study of the Armed, Privileged Group in The Developing Countries* (Owensville, Queensland: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1980), pp. 2-3; Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967* (Oxford, New York, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 1-5.

²²¹ David Jenkins, "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of *Dwifungsi*," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1983, p. 16.

²²² Salim Said, *Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics 1945-1949* (Singapore and Jakarta: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and PT. Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991), p. 22.

militias joined this organisation, accepting government's exhortation. But some were refused to join as the BKR was regarded as collaborator or because of other reasons. Instead, they kept their militia groups and even formed new ones. Some affiliated with political parties, some with religious organisations, and other with none but simply to defend their regions. Third, government neglected the newly-established military organisation, the TKR (People's Security Army), founded on 5 October 1945, a successor of the BKR. Having elected its Chief of General Headquarter, the government left this organisation to do its own business. General Simatupang pointed out that "the new animal just did its own thing." General Nasution claimed "Here began the creation of an army with its own initiative, an army which formed itself on its own initiative which equipped and armed itself and which carried out its operations according to its own desires."²²⁴

During the post-1945 revolutionary period, the view of "We were there prior to the Republic" expanded to the view of "We were the Republic."²²⁵ There were two main reasons for this. First, during this period many Indonesian youths had joined guerrilla resistance alongside the TNI to defend the Republic since the Dutch did not fully recognise Indonesia's independence. Villagers also supported the struggles by supplying logistics. Due to frequent contacts between the military and guerrilla groups and villagers, the military argued that Indonesian people viewed the army was the Republic. Second, while the TNI and guerilla groups struggled for independence, Indonesian leaders allowed themselves to be captured by the Dutch. This was regarded as a betrayal to the Republic.²²⁶ Due to its disappointment with the government, the military said that "With or without the government, the TNI goes on with the struggle."²²⁷

In the earliest years after the Dutch fully recognised Indonesia's independence (1949), the military posed itself as guardian of the country from external and internal threats. Because of its origins and contributions during the revolutionary period (1945-1949) and its roles in the "rebellion's era" (1950s) the military later claimed its right to participate in politics and government. This claim was however hard to exercise since parliamentary democracy established in the 1950s upheld the concept of civilian supremacy. Having been alienated by this system and its distrust of civilian politicians, in 1952 the military forced Sukarno to dissolve the

²²³ David Jenkins, "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking", p. 16.

²²⁴ *Ibid.* When the TKR was established, Indonesian military was not unified yet. Many militias still run their own organisation. On 3 June 1947 when the TRI was transformed into the TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian National Army), the military was able to be unified as a national army.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*

²²⁶ *Ibid.* p. 17.

²²⁷ David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1984), p. 63. This Gen. Soedirman's statement is later interpreted that the military is not a government's tool but a state's tool, meaning the military is not subordinated to the government. I Ketut Gunawan, *Recent Discourse about Military Withdrawal in Indonesia's New Order*, pp.21-25.

Parliament because the politicians were regarded heavily “touching” military corporate interests.²²⁸ This was the first blatant attempt of the military to intervene in politics.

Military’s “rights” to participate in politics have been exercised formally since the promulgation of martial law in 1957. Following this, military officers were given positions in the parliament, cabinet, and various branches of government departments, at national and local levels. The army also played major roles in regional politics and in the economy mainly due to regional rebellions and the nationalisation of the Dutch enterprises. To justify its increased involvement in politics as well as to guarantee its claims over rights to participate in non-military sectors, the military introduced dual function doctrine claiming itself as a defense force and socio-political force. With this doctrine, the military continuously and pervasively intervened Indonesian politics especially after such doctrine was formally adopted in 1965/1966.

The nature of military intervention in politics was different from that of Thailand and South Korea. It was not done by dramatic military intervention in the form of blatant coup²²⁹—as was the case of Thai military coups and the 1961 South Korean coup—but by soft means done gradually and consistently stemming from political ambitions of the military to participate in non-military sectors. This soft means however has been so sophisticated as with such a means (concept and implementation of dual function) it has intervened all aspects of political life pervasively and continuously. Ben Anderson noted that only Indonesian and Burmese militaries did claim that their political roles (intervention) last forever.²³⁰ In other countries, after seizing power the military promised that its intervention was temporary and therefore would return the power to (another) civilian government soon the political and economic crises ended. In the Indonesian case, military officers “feel no need to apologies for power”²³¹ they have taken from civilians.

In regard to the evolution of pattern of “military rule,” the period of 1945-1949 was the early formulation of military role or the search of military’s identity. The period of 1949-1957 was the period of civilian supremacy advanced by parliamentary democracy. At that time,

²²⁸ It is interesting to note that in this era the military emphasised its autonomy vis-à-vis civilian government. In other words, the military attempted to clearly distinguish military affairs and civilian affairs or to create a sharp dichotomy between military institution and civilian institution. Its purpose is to prevent civilian politicians to interfere military corporate interests. After the formulation of military doctrine, *dwifungsi*, particularly since the New Order government was established, civilians’ attempts to dichotomise between military institution and civilian institution have been prevented or undermined. See Nadjib Asca, “ABRI Dalam Wacana Public Atawa Public Dalam Wacana ABRI,” in Rudini, et. al., *ABRI dan Kekerasan* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1999), pp. 31-43.

²²⁹ Nasution however called the 17 October 1952 Affairs, in which the military organised civilian demonstration, directed tanks to the Presidential Palace and requested Soekarno to dissolve the Parliament, as a half coup. In relation to the other “coup,” foreign experts interpreted the 1965/1966 affairs as a disguised coup.

²³⁰ See Lance Castle, “Kata Pengantar”, Rudini, et. al., *ABRI dan Kekerasan*, p. xxv.

²³¹ R. William Liddle, “Indonesia is Indonesia” in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds), *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia* (Clayton: CSEAS Monash University, 1990), p. 57.

the military leaders “possessed no shared ideology, programme, or defined political goals.”²³² During 1957-1965 the military had been in ascendancy.²³³ In this period, dual function was formulated and military involvement in political and economic spheres increased tremendously. Since 1966 up to 1998, Indonesia had been ruled by a “man on horseback,” General Soeharto, who later enjoyed personal power. After a short term political honeymoon with students and civilian politicians (1966-1969), Soeharto consolidated his power and established authoritarian rule. Strong authoritarian rule had been established since 1973/74, following the emasculation of political parties and the press in 1973 and the Malari Affairs in 1974. In 1992, Soeharto’s regime launched the discourse of political openness aiming at providing greater space for freedom of expressions. But the nature of the regime remained the same; the military was his power base.²³⁴ The military power has declined since Soeharto was forced to resign in 1998.

2. Dual Function

Indonesian military ideology or doctrine originated from Gen. Nasution’s Middle Way speech made in November 1958. He said that:

The position of the TNI was not like that of an army in a Western countries, in which the military was solely an “instrument of the government” (*alat pemerintah*). Neither was it like that of various Latin American armies which monopolised political order. Rather, the TNI was one of the forces of the people’s struggle (*salah satu kekuatan perjuangan rakyat*) which was at the same level and which fought shoulder to shoulder with other forces, such as party. The military itself would not be politically active yet neither would it be simply a spectator.²³⁵

With such a concept or stance, Nasution elaborated its implementation in political practices. He continued that:

Individual officers must be granted an opportunity to participate in the government and make use of their non-military skills in helping develop the nation. Officers must be permitted to participate in determining economic, financial, international and other policies at the highest levels of government. Therefore, they must have in all the institution of the state, not just in the National Council and the Cabinet, as was already the case, but also in the National Planning Council, the diplomatic Corps, parliament, and elsewhere in the government. If this did not happen, the army might react violently to discrimination against its officers.²³⁶

Based on such speech, Indonesian military doctrine the so-called *dwifungsi* or dual function was formulated. Dual function provides the military dual role or function, that is as a military force and a socio-political force. As a military force, the military is responsible for

²³² David Jenkins, “The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking,” p. 18.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 15-23.

²³⁴ In 1994 for example, the government continued to shut down three prominent magazines, *Tempo*, *Detik* and *Editor*.

²³⁵ David Jenkins, “The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking,” p. 20.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

defence and security, whereas as a socio-political force the activities of the military cover ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, and spiritual and religious spheres.²³⁷ Since 1965/1966, when such a doctrine was formally adopted, military “participation” has been pervasive.

To justify its roles as well as to preserve dual function doctrine, the military institutionalised such a doctrine in four main ways. The first one was through laws such as Law No. 80/1958 and MPR(S) Decree No. II/1960 (A/III/404/Sub/C) positioning the military as a functional group. Also Laws Nos. 16/1969 and 5/1975 on the Structure and Composition of the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), DPR (Parliament) and DPRD (local parliaments), Laws Nos. 2/1985, 3/1973, and 3/1985 on Political Parties and Golkar, and MPR Decrees Nos. IV/1973, IV/1978, II/1983, II/1988, II/199 on GBHN (Broad Outline of State Policy). Law 20/1982 on Defense and Security and Law 2/1988 on *Prajurit ABRI* (Indonesian Soldiers) were included as well.

Second, through national education. In civilian curriculum, the dual function and military’s heroism during the revolution were emphasised in the subjects of PSPB (History of the National Struggle), History, *Kewiraan*, and P4. The subjects of History and PSPB attempted to show that “since 1945 the military have been the true guardian of the Indonesian state and ideology (and conversely) civilian politicians contribute very little to the Revolutionary Struggle and at times undermine it.”²³⁸ In military education, the officers were taught to be leaders, and “brainwashed” with *dwifungsi* doctrine. It was said that the goal of military schools was “to prepare officers for command and staff positions throughout the upper echelons of the Army and government.”²³⁹

Third, the most crucial development was the government’s attempts to make *dwifungsi* sacred by linking it to Pancasila, especially Pancasila Democracy. It was claimed that *dwifungsi* was a part of the implementation of Pancasila or Pancasila Democracy which adopted the concept of familiness (*kekeluargaan*). With familiness, the New Order government claimed that all Indonesian citizens (civilian or military) had equal rights to participate in politics:

The government often says that “*Dwifungsi* is an implementation of Pancasila or a part of Pancasila Democracy” or “One characteristic of Pancasila Democracy is the existence of *dwifungsi* ABRI”. According to the government, these statements are based on the fourth principle (*sila*) of Pancasila (Five Principles); this fourth *sila* is said to adhere the principle of familiness (*kekeluargaan*) and is becoming a core of Pancasila Democracy (democracy based on consultation and consensus). It is argued that in this type of democracy, all Indonesian citizens, including the military, are one family; they have equal positions and rights to participate in all

²³⁷ Nugroho Notosusanto, *The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Department of Defence and Security, 1975), p. 70-71.

²³⁸ David Bourchier, “The 1950s in New Order Ideology and Politics,” in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds), *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s* (Clayton : CSEAS Monash University, 1994), pp. 52-53

²³⁹ Charles Donald McFetridge, “Seskoed – Training the Elite,” *Indonesia*, No. 36, October 1983, p. 95.

aspect of people's life. Thus *dwifungsi* doctrine claiming that the military has rights to participate in all fields of state affairs is said to be the implementation or part of (the fourth *sila* of) Pancasila or Pancasila Democracy.²⁴⁰

Finally, the doctrine has been institutionalised by carrying out civic missions. The most prominent military program has been *ABRI Masuk Desa* (AMD, ABRI Enters the Village). To show the “friendliness” of *dwifungsi* as well as to win the hearts and minds of village people, the military has built village halls and other public buildings, constructed roads, irrigation systems, and so on. This civic missions have been important “to revivify the ‘organic’ link between soldier and citizens demanded by both ideology and doctrine.”²⁴¹

Compared to Thailand and South Korea, as a mission or function, the concept of *dwifungsi* or dual function is not unique. In Thailand and South Korea, their militaries also have functions as a defence force and a socio-political force. Thai and South Korean militaries’ missions to defend the country (in response to external threat) is related to their function as a defence force, and their mission to preserve internal security or political stability (in response to internal threat) through their involvement in political arena, people’s political activities, political institutions and economic activities—to “stabilise” domestic politics—is connected with their function as a socio-political force. Even the concept of New Professionalism of Latin American militaries is similar in this issue. However, in regard to military position in civil-military relations, Indonesian military doctrine is distinct. *Dwifungsi* abolishes or ignores the concept of civilian supremacy.²⁴² This stems from the notion that the military has rights equal to those of civilian. With these rights, the military claims that “the position of the military and the civilians is equal: the military is not below the civilian, and the civilian are not above the military,”²⁴³ Thus, in military’s thinking, “there is neither civilian supremacy nor military supremacy.”²⁴⁴ This is by all means different to that of South Korea whose military ideology is vague in this issue and to that of Thailand whose military ideology subordinates civilian institution to military institution.

This moderate position has some crucial implications. First, such a position creates an image that *dwifungsi* is a “soft creature” and “rational enough.” This makes easier for the military to penetrate political institutions pervasively without facing wide scale strong opposition particularly in the New Order era. Second, with such rights and position the military

²⁴⁰ I Ketut Gunawan, *Recent Discourse about Military Withdrawal in Indonesia’s New Order*, p. 34.

²⁴¹ David E. Weatherbee, “Indonesia’s Armed Forces: Rejuvenation and Regeneration,” *South East Asian Affairs*, 1982, p. 152.

²⁴² I Ketut Gunawan, *Recent Discourse about Military Withdrawal in Indonesia’s New Order*, p. 86.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 87. The military even claim that there is no concept of “civil-military relations” in Indonesia. See Ian MacFarling, *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia* (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies, 1996), p. 166.

feels no need to apologise to the civilian or to promise to return to the barracks. In the New Order era, the Indonesian military even asserted that *dwifungsi* would last forever, meaning their “participation” would be permanent, not temporary. This is a serious matter which can be seen from the efforts of Indonesian military to preserve its doctrine. Besides institutionalising such a doctrine in various ways as discussed above, the military has “transplanted” *dwifungsi* into the Indonesian “body” by incorporating it into Indonesian culture, history, and state ideology. In Soeharto’s era, any efforts to undermine *dwifungsi* could be regarded as an attempt to Westernise Indonesia or to undermine Indonesian culture and anti-Pancasila.²⁴⁵

Due to doctrine’s distinctiveness, its implementation, and military’s efforts to socialise and preserve *dwifungsi*, such a doctrine attracted attention Burmese military. In 1993 a large delegation of Burmese high ranking military officers led by SLORC’s Secretary, Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, visited Jakarta to gain first hand information on dual function as they wanted to study and imitate *dwifungsi* doctrine for their country. According to Sundhaussen, however, it is unlikely for Burmese military junta to be able to imitate such doctrine due to differing historical origins, leadership pattern, economic management, political culture, government practice, and management of ethnic diversity.²⁴⁶

3. Military Intervention

a. Political Institutions

In the New Order era, Indonesian military intervention in political institutions was extensive and pervasive. In 1967, 25,000 military officers occupied civilian posts throughout the country, either in legislative and executive bodies or judiciary. The occupation of such posts did not only in the top and medium levels of such institutions but also in lower levels. In 1980s, its number decreased to 20,000 and to 14,000 in 1995.²⁴⁷ The nature of such occupation was different from those were in Thailand and South Korea which mostly occupied national civilian institutions (top levels).

As shown in Figure 12, in the Cabinet, their proportions up to 1988 showed an upward trend. The percentage of military ministers was 26 per cent in the 1968-1973 Cabinet and reached its peak of 38 per cent in 1983-1988. Since 1988, its composition has decreased. In the 1988-1993 Cabinet, its percentage was 29. It further decreased to 24 and 18 per cent in the 1993-1998 and 1998-1999 Cabinets respectively. In the recent Cabinet²⁴⁸ its number totaled 14

²⁴⁵ I Ketut Gunawan, *Recent Discourse about Military Withdrawal in Indonesia’s New Order*, p. 86.

²⁴⁶ Ulf Sundhaussen, *Indonesia’s New Order: A Model for Myanmar?*, *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXV, No. 8, August 1995, pp. 773-780.

²⁴⁷ I Ketut Gunawan, *Recent Discourse about Military Withdrawal in Indonesia’s New Order*, p. 76. Cf. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 may 1995 and 28 April 1994.

²⁴⁸ Data until November 1999.

per cent. Even though the figure shows a downward trend, during Soeharto's and Habibie's regimes strategic posts such as Ministry of Defence and Security,²⁴⁹ Ministry of Home Affairs, Coordinating Ministries (responsible for "coordinating" many departments) have been dominated by the military.

Figure 12
Proportion of Military Ministers in the Indonesian Cabinets

No.	Name of Cabinet	Period	Percentage of Generals
1.	Development I	1968 - 1973	26
2.	Development II	1973 - 1978	24
3.	Development III	1978 - 1983	37
4.	Development IV	1983 - 1988	38
5.	Development V	1988 - 1993	29
6.	Development VI	1993 - 1998	24
7.	Development Reform	1998 - 1999	18
8.	National Unity	1999 - 2004	14

Source: *Tempo*, 7 November 1999

In the Parliament (DPR), its number increased in 1987 from 75 to 100 MPs due to the increase of DPR members from 460 to 500. In 1997 the seats occupied by the military decreased from 100 to 75. In 1998, "the men on horseback" in the DPR were further reduced to 38. In the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the military also has had its own representatives, numbering around a half of those were in the DPR. In the New Order era, combined with its retired officers in the Parliament derived from government's party, Golkar, its role in the DPR and MPR were influential.

In local parliaments (DPRDs), its number in Provincial and District Parliaments throughout the islands have been considerable as well. While in 1998 military appointees decreased in the national parliament due to growing opposition, for local parliaments the military resisted such demand.

b. Political Arena

In the New Order era, the most obvious example of military penetration of the political arena was their presence in the government party, Golkar (Functional Group). Until 1999, Golkar consisted of three elements, namely, the armed forces, civil servants, and civilian politicians/activists. Sudomo (former Chief of Kopkamtib, Operation of Command for Restoration of Security) asserted that "ABRI [the armed forces] was absolutely Golkar and a

²⁴⁹ During Wahid's regime, civilians were appointed as Ministers of Defence. This is one crucial step in the efforts to uphold civilian supremacy.

key member of the Big Golkar Family.”²⁵⁰ In the course of Golkar history, Golkar was a political arm of the military.

Under Soeharto’s regime, the military formidably controlled people’s political arena/activities. The existence of industrial labour relations code whose military involvement was justified, law on political parties and Golkar, anti-subversion law, (political) criminal code, and other repressive laws was part of the mechanism. The establishment of Kopkamtib (later replaced by Bakorstanas, Coordinating Board for Assisting in the Consolidation of National Stability), “the most oppressive and most feared agency of the regime,”²⁵¹ was included. Last but not least, the military set up Litsus (*penelitian khusus*, political screenings) to screen civil servants, parliamentarians, soldiers, high ranking officials, employees of state-owned enterprises and so on. Through these mechanisms the military not only had power to interfere the appointment of government employees, law makers, leaders of political parties and mass organisations but also to screen campaign’s topics and speeches as well as to interfere in workers’ disputes and to arrest labour leaders, dissidents, NGO activists, and even intellectuals and former vocal generals.

To establish a wide scale mechanism control, the military redesigned its territorial management, establishing territorial commands paralleling every level of civilian bureaucracy as shown in Figure 13. This territorial management was the implementation and improvement of Total War strategy founded during the guerrilla warfare in the 1950s and the implementation of the concept of threats which were regarded coming from within the state.

Figure 13
Parallel Structure of Military Command and Civilian Bureaucracy

Military Command	Civilian Bureaucracy
Kodam (Regional Military Command)	Province(s)
Korem (Resort Military Command)	Province, Residency
Kodim (District Military Command)	District
Koramil (Rayon Military Command)	Sub-District
Babinsa (Non-Commissioned Officers)	Village(s)

Note: Kodam can cover a cluster of provinces (regional) or one province; Korem covers either one province or a cluster of districts (residency); Babinsa (Village Development Non-Commissioned Officers) can cover one village only or a cluster of villages.

Harold Crouch argued that with this territorial management, the position of the

²⁵⁰ An Asia Watch report, *Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor* (USA: The Asia Watch Committee, 1989), p. 34.

²⁵¹ Ulf Sundhaussen, “The military, Structure, Procedures, and effects on Indonesian Society,” in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, *Political Power and Communication in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 64. The repressiveness of Bakorstanas was not so different with that of

military command was no less than a shadow government at every level of government.²⁵² During the New Order government, such a structure together with military-dominated bureaucracy not only provided the military with a formidable capacity to control civilian bureaucracy and direct the result of, for instance, elections, but also provided opportunities to spy and control people's political activities in any region.

c. Military Business Complex

Military activities in business has evolved since the struggles for independence. Initially, the military ran unorganised business, stretching from such petty business as trading, barter, and security services to smuggling and drug trafficking activities.²⁵³ This was mostly to supply logistics and buy weapons for the *laskars* (militia groups) and regular army. Approaching 1950, the army established 7 territorial commands. These commands had tasks to stage guerilla operations, but without sufficient budget from the government.²⁵⁴ Instead, they were given rights and full autonomy to do "necessary steps" to fulfill its logistics and weaponry. Thus, running business was a must to survive. With these rights local Commanders became powerful, politically and economically. While in the earliest years their businesses were small, sporadic and unorganised, later their business were becoming bigger and bigger, organised and institutionalised. Interestingly, many economic activities were run under formal commands of Local Commanders. Moreover, such activities, including illegal activities, were organised not only by Local Commands in the Outer Islands but also by military establishment in Java, such as by Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command) under the command of Soeharto at that time. One reason for doing business was because the government failed to allocate sufficient budget for military's operations, basic needs, and amenities of its personnel "to enable members of the armed forces to live in a style to which they felt entitled."²⁵⁵ The military claimed that such business activities were part of its roles as a stabiliser, either to optimise its defence and security roles or to prevent social jealousy among underpaid military personnel.

Military business increased after the promulgation of martial law in 1957, particularly after the nationalisation of the Dutch enterprises. Since then ABRI business had been done systematically and military Commanders became economic oriented and deeply involved in business. Their business activities encompassed agribusiness, estate crops, transportations, forestry, shipments, banking, and hotels. Due to mismanagement many military business were

Kopkamtib.

²⁵² *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995.

²⁵³ Indria Samego *et. al.*, *Bila ABRI Berbisnis* (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1998), p. 45.

²⁵⁴ Total budget received from the government could only cover one third of military operation.

²⁵⁵ Harold Crouch, "Generals and Business in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 1975-76, p. 520.

bankrupt in the end of Guided Democracy (1959-1965).²⁵⁶

Since Soeharto came to power, he had established a strong foundation for military business by conducting joint business with Chinese businessmen and by placing military officers in strategic state-owned enterprises such as Pertamina and Bulog. During his reign, military role in business had expanded rapidly because most of high ranking military officers became members of the ruling group which commanded “almost unlimited access to expanding financial resources in the economy.”²⁵⁷ They were assigned to supply a constant flow of funds to the army and were allowed “to reap off part of the proceeds as a reward for their efforts, provided they did not take ‘too much’.”²⁵⁸

Military business empires can be divided into institutional business and non-institutional business. Institutional business consists of, first, cooperatives with the purpose to fulfill personnel’s basic needs. Second, foundations (*yayasan*), for social purpose (charity, non-profit). In its development many *yayasans* have become business oriented. Third, business in state-owned enterprises such as Pertamina (oil), Bulog (rice) and PT. Berdikari. Military business in *yayasans* and state-owned enterprises has become the main fund raising bodies for military establishment. Surprisingly, not only has the Army carried out this institutional business but also other forces within the Armed Forces—the Navy, the Air Force and the Police Force. Non-institutional business on the other hand has been business run privately by active duty and retired officers and their families. Gen. Ibnu Sutowo, Gen. Suhardiman, Gen. Tahir, Gen. Sjarnoebi Said, Gen. Andi Sose, and Gen. Benny Murdani are some examples of Generals who are “successful” in their business.²⁵⁹ This non institutional business is dominated by ex-army officers.

Since 1976 the business of the military had declined significantly for various reasons. First, the dismissal of Director of Pertamina (Gen. Ibnu Sutowo) in 1976 over alleged corruption and mismanagement, the collapse of oil prices (mid 1980s), and the rationalisation of the Indonesian economy have been a series of factors striking military business. In regard to rationalisation, *The Economist*, reported that: “The generals are losing their hold on Indonesian business. The armed forces’ business empires are being rationalised, their string of corporations brought to heel, and retired officers’ sinecures are being turned into real jobs under civilian managers.” Second, the trend of Chinese businessmen to eschew military business partners was also responsible for such a decline. This apparently related to government policy in the post oil boom period, namely to encourage the expansion of the private sector to reduce economic

²⁵⁶ Indria Samego, *et. al.*, *Bila ABRI Berbisnis*, p. 55.

²⁵⁷ Jon Ormur Halldorson, *State, Class and Regime in Indonesia: Structural Impediments to Democratisation*, Ph.d. Thesis (Camberbury: University of Kent, 1991), p. 181.

²⁵⁸ Harold Crouch, “Generals and Business in Indonesia,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 1975-76, p. 525.

²⁵⁹ Indria Samego, *et. al.*, *Bila ABRI Berbisnis*, p 67-125.

dependence on oil production. In this new environment, the rigid, incapable, and conservative nature of military management was regarded hampering ambitious business expansion. Third, the opening of diplomatic relations with China in 1989/1990, the opening up of East Timor in early 1989 and the separation of East Timor in 1999 had implications as well. As a result of direct trade relations with the communist China, the businessmen no longer needed to contact, and therefore to pay tribute, to the Ministry of Defence and Security. The monopoly of military-owned business enterprises in East Timor, such as in coffee trade, had been undermined by the new comers (due to the opening up of East Timor). The destruction of facilities in the wake of referendum also damaged business facilities, especially the business of Kopassus (Army Special Force Command).²⁶⁰ Fourth, the 1997 economic crisis leading to the collapse of many banks and enterprises has also weakened military business.

The decline of military business, and therefore profits, forced the military to re-design its enterprises. Deregulation, managerial reform, and so on were conducted to optimise the performance of its business. These attempts were indeed successful; their results had appeared in the early 1990s. This success caused the army to encourage its officers to increase their managerial skills by employing military officers in the Department of Finance, taking short courses, or obtaining MBA degrees. The military also did not surrender to the economic crisis; political and financial generals—borrowing Crouch's terminology—have still fought for business opportunities. In short, although military business has declined, its economic activities are still significant in maintaining financial resources of the military. Military's commitment in economic activities remains high.

Military business has some implications. The positive implications are to support military operations and to increase the welfare of military personnel, their families as well as the civilians involved in such business. The negative impacts are however more destructive. Political and financial generals have become a comprador class and rent seekers of ersartz capitalism. Officers' involvement in business activities also increases corruptions, strengthens state corporatism, nepotism and neopatrimonialism, and undermines military professionalism.²⁶¹ Long term economic crisis experienced by Indonesia (since 1997 up to now) has been mainly contributed by such military business practices.²⁶²

4. Recent Situation : A Sixty per cent Withdrawal

The year 1997 was a hard time for General (Ret) Soeharto. He faced wide scale legitimacy crisis as a result of economic and political turbulence. Due to economic crisis, annual

²⁶⁰ For business of Kopassus, see *ibid.*, p. 123.

²⁶¹ Indria Samego, et. al., *Bila ABRI Berbisnis*, pp. 127-141.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 140-141.

economic growth of approximately 7 per cent dropped drastically to below zero in the late of his reign. In political scheme, mass riots had undermined his guaranty to provide public order and political stability. The behaviour of his backbone, the military, which kidnapped, tortured, killed, and shoot-to-death activists and students damaged his image as well as the military. In May 1998, students occupied the Parliament demanding Soeharto to step down and putting pressures to the military to return to the barracks and to abolish its *dwifungsi* doctrine.

Reform plans proposed by Soeharto were too late. The occupation of the Parliament supported by wide scale demonstrations throughout the big cities by students and intellectuals strengthened such movements. The “man on horseback” who had ruled the country for more than three decades was successfully forced to leave his post. His resignation marked a notable step of military withdrawal in Indonesia.

Under Habibie’s regime, some changes had been made. First, the reduction of military seats in the Parliament. This was a direct response to students’ demands. In this respect, the military only agreed to cut its seats in the DPR from 75 to 38. Its representatives in the MPR and DPRD’s (local parliaments) were untouchable although it decreased slightly due to the reduction of MPR members and competitive election. Second, the military had been separated from Golkar. With such separation, military’s political arm has been cut off, narrowing its roles in the political arena.²⁶³ It seemed that the military had no choice but to cut its “historical” link with Golkar which was widely condemned over its roles in bringing the country into economic and political crises. Third, with its political activities in kidnapping, torture, murder of activists, and other human rights violations in Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, any military’s activities have been under public scrutiny. This substantially prevented it from doing further suppressions or illegal political activities. This became significant as the military had no choice other than to follow the stream of strong democratic movement in Indonesia. Fourth, the separation of the Police Force from the Armed Forces. With such separation, formally, security matters (from internal threats) have been the responsibility of the police force, thus reducing the power of the military, at least in structural organisation.

During Wahid government, further changes have taken place. First, he appointed civilian academics (Prof. Dr. Juwono Sudarsono) as Minister of Defence, which has never been done during Soeharto’s regime. In recent cabinet reshuffle (August 2000), he also appointed an academics (Prof Dr Mohammad Mahfud MD) as Sudarsono’s successor. Second, he removed conservative elements in the military by replacing, rotating and suspending military officers. Third, to prevent the military from regaining control of political arena, he rejected the promulgation of martial law demanded by the military, particularly in Aceh. Fourth, he attempted to bring the military more accountable by allowing military personnel, including

²⁶³ I Ketut Gunawan, “Military Withdrawal from Politics: Discourse and Reform Agenda,” *Jurnal Sosial-*

military top brass, to be investigated under alleged human rights violations. Fifth, he allowed the investigation of past occurrences in which the military allegedly involved in the human rights abuses, such as Tanjung Priok Affairs, the July 1997 Affairs, the destruction of East Timor following the ballots, etc.²⁶⁴ In March 2000, he abolished Bakorstanas (formerly Kopkamtib) and Litsus (*penelitian khusus*, political screening mechanism).²⁶⁵ Sixth, in the MPR annual sessions of August 2000, the military agreed to withdraw from the DPR in 2004 and from the MPR in 2009/2010. Seventh, in December 2000 Wahid's government publicly introduced the concept of civilian supremacy to be imposed in civil-military relations. Minister of Defence, Mahfud MD, said that in reforming civil-military relations Minister of Defence in 2001 would replace all military personnel in upper echelons of military institution and appointed 4 civilians out of 11. "This was aimed to inject fresh blood into the military body and to support the realisation of civilian supremacy. I would provide legal basis for the establishment of civilian supremacy," said Mahfud. "There were some opposition backed by retired military hardliners," he argued, "but as institution the military did not oppose such a move."²⁶⁶ Finally, Wahid has successfully made the military to stay out of political arena. The passivity of the military in "street politics" seemed to be caused by popular demands and strong condemnation over its alleged involvement in human rights abuses in the past.²⁶⁷

Wahid's efforts to force the military to withdraw from political institutions has not been as successful as from the political arena. He has no constitutional power to oust the military from the MPR, DPR and DPRD. Even though he has authority to oust the military from government institutions he failed to do so. He has been reluctant to substantially oust military officers from occupying various government branches at national or local levels. Even though Wahid appointed civilian academic professors as Ministers of Defense, the strategic posts such as Minister of Home Affairs, Commanding Minister of Political and Security Affairs were still given to the military men. As well, Wahid failed to place the police force, whose tasks dealt with public order, under the Ministry of Home Affairs, but is still under the Ministry of Defence. Even though current Ministry of Home Affairs is chaired by a General and Ministry of Defence by a civilian, such an organisational structure reflects that he does not successfully yet to break the influence of the military over the police force. In practice, the police force is indeed

Politika, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 1999, pp. 32-33.

²⁶⁴ Even though the results of the inquiries did not meet people's expectation, the inquiries became shock therapies for the military.

²⁶⁵ *Kompas Cyber Media*, 8 March 2000, on the Internet at <<http://www.kompas.com>>.

²⁶⁶ *Kompas*, 30 December 2000.

²⁶⁷ It is ironic here that when security issue become a main problem in today's Indonesia (riots, ethnic conflicts, bomb terror, etc), Indonesian people said that "Where is our military?" The police force, which is now responsible for internal security issue, is paralysed. The inability of the police force to deal with security problems seems to be caused by the lack of skills (intelligence and action) in dealing with politically motivated conflicts and crimes and/or its impediments in dealing with the military itself since many today's security problems are believed to be engineered or supported by some elements in the military or by ex-military officers.

paralysed before the military.

From above description, such withdrawal was not yet substantial withdrawal as occurred in Thailand and South Korea. In Thailand and South Korean cases, because the military occupied political posts at national level, not on (relatively) local levels, substantial withdrawal were easier to achieve. In the Indonesian case, however, due to its pervasive intervention in all political institutions, both at national and local levels, prompt substantial withdrawal is more difficult to attain. Nevertheless, military withdrawal in Indonesia has not been trivial, as experienced by Thailand in the 1930s-1970s. The occupation of presidential post and Ministry of Defence by civilians, the withdrawal of the military from political arena (Golkar, Bakorstanas, Litsus, spying people's activities, curbing opposition), the reduction of military military seats in the DPR (parliament), the agreement to totally withdraw from the DPR in 2004 and from the MPR in 2009/2010, the relative absence of military opposition to proposed replacement of military officers by civilians in upper echelons of military institutions and to current Minister of Defence's agenda to uphold the concept of civilian supremacy were considerable. The most appropriate term to describe the substance of recent situation might be a 60% withdrawal.

It is interesting to note the crucial potentials for total or more substantial military withdrawal in Indonesia. First, in the first amendment of the 1945 Constitution (October 1999), the Presidential term of office had been limited to a maximum of 2 terms (5 years each). Although in the second amendment of the Constitution (August 2000), a proposed direct presidential election failed to be realised, many sections of the communities continue to struggle for the third constitutional amendment for popular election. Limited term of office and wide supports of a direct election mean preventing the rise of long-term authoritarian regime, the military power in particular. Second, although it would only come into effect after the forthcoming election of 2004, the MPR annual session of August 2000 has decided the abolishment of all military seats in the DPR (Parliament). This decision along with the decision to abolish military seats from the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly, the highest political institution in Indonesia) in 2009/2010 made a more substantial withdrawal is just a matter of time. Third, government's official announcement to uphold and implement the concept of civilian supremacy in civil-military relations has systematically undermined the ideology of *dwifungsi*.

5. Factors Leading to Military Intervention

From discussion earlier, there is no doubt that the main factor of military intervention is dual function doctrine. The formulation of this doctrine and its "implementation" mainly stem from historical claims that the military was there prior to the birth of the Republic and it played major role in defending the Republic. A train of political and social crises ever since the

declaration of independence, such as Madiun affairs (1948), October 17 affairs (1952), Darul Islam/Permesta/PRRI rebellions (1950s), the 1965 attempted coup, January 1974 Affairs (Malari), SARA conflicts (ethnic, religion, race, societal groups) justified such a doctrine, and therefore, its intervention.

Economic interests of the military are of importance as well. As has been discussed, these interests have preserved military “participation” in political and economic activities.

In regard to the role of other factors, external threat was not a stimulating factor. After the revolutionary period, Indonesia did not face significant external threat.²⁶⁸ While people’s uprising did not play significant role for military intervention, a series of rebellions was significant. In the 1950s the government and the military faced rebellions in some parts of Indonesia, particularly Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Sumatra and Java. Interestingly, these fundamentalists-backed rebellions were supported by some regional military commands, reflecting the existence of factionalism within the military. There were three types of military factions at that time. First, in the 1950s, factionalism existed between officers in local Commands. Crouch noted that in this period there existed “a series of coups against several regional commanders.”²⁶⁹ These “coups” were staged by former Peta dissidents and some officers of local commands, particularly in Sumatra. The struggles were mainly for economic and political access and resources. Second, conflicts between central and local commands in the form of rebellions of local commands against the government and central command by supporting fundamentalist-backed rebellions such as DI/TII, PRRI/Permesta, and so on. Harold Crouch argued that gradual intervention was a result of “a series of response to particular crisis arising, in the main, from the actions of dissident officers.”²⁷⁰ Third, factions between military sections in the central Command. This occurred in 1960s due to the rise of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Even though the 1965 occurrence has been still inconclusive so far, the killings of six generals in 1965 under the command of Colonel Untung—which was regarded to affiliate with the PKI—indicated factionalism within the military. Regardless of the rivalry between the military vis-à-vis the PKI and Soekarno, this factional conflicts brought Gen. Soeharto to power. Since all of these occurrences significantly contributed to military’s control over national politics, military factions were one factor precipitating the military to dominate politics.

As for civilian institution, the behaviour of civilian government and politicians was crucial factor precipitating the military to intervene in politics. It was believed that a series of

²⁶⁸ There were some salient issues in this respect, that is, West Irian Struggle (against the Dutch) and Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation. Although these issues provided legitimacy to the military to intervene in politics, they were not real external threats to Indonesia. West Irian issue was a territorial dispute between Indonesia and the Dutch while Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation mainly related to an effort to create a new enemy to attract public attentions.

²⁶⁹ Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 30.

rebellions in the 1950s was due to their incapacities to establish a workable political system and their deep interference in military corporate interests. The promulgation of martial law in 1957 was a response of this situation at that time. Justified by martial law, the military intervened politics and economic spheres (military occupation of the Dutch enterprises). The importance of this factor was recognised by David Jenkins. He argued that gradual military intervention was partly due to “a strong distrust of civilian politicians”²⁷¹ and “the weakness of successive political systems.”²⁷² Similarly, Harold Crouch pointed out that intervention occurred because of “the government of weakness, incompetence, corruption, and, not least, disregarded of military interests.”²⁷³ In the meantime, Sundhaussen stated that “the army involved itself in politics, and potentially usurped power, because civilian elites had failed to set up workable political systems.”²⁷⁴ He concluded that “it must be said that civilians bear a considerable amount responsibility for the army’s assuming power in Indonesia.”²⁷⁵ More significantly, civilian politicians in the New Order quite often invited the military into politics simply because they badly needed the military’s supports to achieve their goals or to counter the civilian adversaries. This phenomenon may be called a “pathology of the civil-military relations”. To be fair, however, the military also played role in the establishment of the existing unworkable political system or such a phenomenon. The supports of military factions to certain conflicting parties in Parliament, government departments, mass organisations as well as military’s political ambitions to participate in politics were notable.

In relation to structural factors, both domestic and international structures were conducive for military intervention. The structure of international relations relates to communist threat in the Cold War era. As occurred in Thailand and South Korea, the supports of international communism to local communist movement flourished communist movement in Indonesia. During the Cold War era, the threat of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to the political system and its challenge to the military in mid 1960s had been regarded to be supported by international communism, particularly from the Soviet Union and China,²⁷⁶ thus providing reasons for the military to take over power. The continuity of military domination in politics during the New Order era was also because the military perceived that communist movement was still alive. The use of such terms as “latent danger”, “danger from the left”, “formless organisation”, referring to the remnants of PKI’s movement, by the Indonesian military was significant. Interestingly, in the post Cold War era the military had still used such terminology, at least until 1998.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 35.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁷³ Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 31.

²⁷⁴ In *ibid.*, p.35

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

Domestic structure also played a notable role. Although pre-war civilian leaders were stronger than the military leaders, as a whole the civil society was weak. First, until at least 1970s, economic development was not impressive, thus it could not produce significant middle class. Without sufficient number of middle class, civilian struggles against the military faced difficulties. The military on the other hand was more developed and better organised. Its organisation has been developed since 1950s when it received assistance and military training from the US. With this structural gap the military was unchallenged so that it could dominate Indonesian politics. The appearance of the “strength” of civilian institution in 1965/1966 led to the downfall of Soekarno was different. It was mainly due to specific political situation at that time and the role of the military in instigating anti-communist sentiments.

6. In Search of Substantial/Total Military Withdrawal

The concept of “play back” is important in understanding military withdrawal. Military intervention is caused by some factors. If factors leading to military intervention could be “played back,” theoretically, there are no longer reasons to intervene; thus military withdrawal occurs. In other words, the existence of factors conducive for military withdrawal (or factors which are no longer conducive for military intervention) is of importance at this point. This is justified by empirical cases. In Thai and South Korean experiences, the existence of conducive condition is a driving force for substantial withdrawal.

In the Indonesian case, the absence of external threat is conducive for military withdrawal. The end of the Cold War terminating ideological rivalry between communism and capitalism followed by (the third wave) global democratisation has also created international structure conducive for local democratic movement, including military withdrawal. Factors which are not conducive for substantial withdrawal are military factions, military’s economic interests, societal conflicts, growing regionalism (i.e. separatist movement), military’s distrust of civilian government, and ideological factor. The condition of domestic societal structure should also be taken into consideration.

a. Societal Structure and the Role of Students

As occurred in Thailand and South Korea, the development of civil society, the middle class in particular, is important in narrowing the gap between civilian institution and military institution. A better developed civil society could challenge a well-organised military institution. In the Indonesian case, as discussed in Chapter 4, proportion of Indonesian middle class is small compared to that of Thailand and South Korea. However, if one sees its absolute

²⁷⁶ Following the 1965 occurrence, Indonesia cut its diplomatic relations with China until 1989.

number as shown in Figure 14, that is 14 million people, as argued by Arief Budiman, Indonesian middle class actually has potentials to drive changes²⁷⁷ particularly to challenge the military. Its number outweighed to that of the Philippine (7 million), Thailand (6.2 million), Malaysia (2.5 million) and Singapore (1.4 million),²⁷⁸ and similar to that of South Korea (14.4 million).²⁷⁹ In fact, they do not yet pose itself as a threat to the military establishment.

Figure 14
Middle Class in ASEAN Countries and South Korea

No.	Country	Proportion (%)	Absolute Number (million)
	South Korea*	33	13.2
	Thailand**	12	6.2
	Indonesia**	8	14
	Philippines**	12	7
	Malaysia**	15	2.5
	Singapore**	50	1.4

* 1992 ** 1994

Even though many of them have started playing role in Jakarta's politics, they are in transition from Soeharto's legacy (depoliticised due to its dependence on the state for jobs, business opportunities, facilities, contracts, access to resources) to the post-New Order era under democratically elected regime led by President Abdurrahman Wahid. Fortunately, their roles have been taken by students. So far, the archrival of the military is students whose activism has coloured Indonesian history. Their struggles can be dated back to 1928 when they successfully brought primordial sentiments into one national identity (*Sumpah Pemuda*, Youth's Oath). During post-independence era, the students had played considerable role in overthrowing Soekarno in 1965/1966, in opposing Soeharto in 1974 and 1978, and in ousting Soeharto from presidential office in 1998.

Currently, Indonesian students in big cities are so politicised and react promptly when they see injustice. Successive demonstrations in the late Soeharto's reign as well as in Habibie's era were some indications. Interestingly, their movement did not only occur in Jakarta and big cities in Java, but also in the big cities in the Outer Islands. It seemed that they had built effective communication networks in the struggles for democracy. Most analysts do not include students as middle class, however, although most of them come from middle class families.²⁸⁰ This is because most parameter used to categorise middle class based on economic indicators

²⁷⁷ *Forum Keadilan*, Special Edition, April 1996.

²⁷⁸ Helen Hughes and Bernalu Wolkinden, "The Emergence of the Middle Class in ASEAN Countries," pp. 139-149.

²⁷⁹ James Cotton and Kim Hyung-a van Leest, "The New Rich and the New Middle Class in South Korea: The Rise and Fall of the 'Golf Republic'," in Richard Robison and David S.G. Goodman, *The New Rich in Asia*, p. 187.

²⁸⁰ If one uses political parameter to categorise middle class, students could be included in this

such as income, living expense, consumerism, business opportunities, luxury goods possessions, etc. Students are mostly reliant on their parents economically. During economic crisis (particularly during 1997-1998), for instance, many Indonesian students had dropped out from campuses and became unemployed because their parents no longer afforded to pay tuition fees or living expenses.

The most interesting thing in the Jakarta's politics is that they are increasingly becoming more radical like South Korean students. This is maybe due to their impatience, the recalcitrance of their rival (military), or the change of strategy. Moreover, common people in big cities in Java, particularly in Jakarta have been so politicised. This maybe stems from their sympathies to the killings, kidnappings, and tortures of the students by the military. Or because they have been socialised by students as the latter frequently stage demonstrations in their surroundings. During the struggles to oust Soeharto from power, for instance, common people in the capital city supported students by supplying food, fresh water, etc when they occupied the Parliament for some days.

Thus students' roles were actually strong enough to challenge the military which have been proven by the ouster of Soeharto from his office. However, an increase in the size of the middle class will strengthen this factor in the struggles for a more substantial military withdrawal, particularly to convince the military that all sectors are ready in the handing over full power from the military to the civilians. There is a promising development on the role of middle class. In 1994 for instance a group of middle class protested the regime over the shut down of three prominent print media, *Tempo*, *Detik* and *Editor*. Along with common people, they also played role in supplying logistics for students' struggles in the parliament aiming at ousting Soeharto from office.

b. Military Factions

In the surface, Soeharto's regime seemed to be successful in integrating military institution. Under his autocratic rule, Soeharto created complicated organisation and used "divide and rule" strategy to control the military. First, he attempted to integrate military institution by incorporating Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Commander into one post. When this powerful post would be occupied by a potential rival, he split such a post into their origins. To secure the control, he, at least until 1988, "selected officers who were not Javanese or not Muslim, and therefore, according to the conventional wisdom, not qualified as political successor."²⁸¹ Examples of those who were appointed as Ministry of Defence and/or Armed Forces Commander were General M. Jusuf (a Muslim but Makasarese), General

Pangabean (a Christian but Sumatranese), General Benny Murdani (a Javanese but Christian), and Gen. Feisal Tanjung (a Muslim but Sumatranese). Second, he established special forces within the military by which he was able to bypass the Armed Forces Commander. The existence Army Special Force Command (Kopassus)—which later involved in the kidnappings, tortures, and killings of activists in 1997—was a case in point. Third, he established many intelligence bodies among military organisations. For example, BAIS, BAKIN, intelligence bodies in the Navy, Air Force, Police Force, local Commands and so on. Fourth, he established cronyist and nepotistic practices among military officers in term of, mainly, access to economic resources. With this kind of arrangement Soeharto was able to control the military. At the same time, however, he inherited potential conflicts among officers in the military establishment. In this respect one analyst said that:

The conflict between the officers is one serious heritages of political system of military during Soeharto. Other problems of Soeharto's era include complicated organisation of the military, the tendency or military officers to intervene politics, misinterpretation of civil-military paradigm, cheating because cronyism and nepotism. As Soeharto governed the country, such conflicts have existed but they never came up because the power of Soeharto.²⁸²

The conflict has come to the surface when former armed forces commander, Gen, Wiranto, was asked by Presiden Abdurahman Wahid to resign over his alleged involvement in the destruction of East Timor following the referendum. The supports of pro-reform military faction under Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah over President's exhortation and Wiranto's statement that he had failed to teach his junior (referring to Wirahadikusumah) indicated the conflict between the conservative and the reformist factions. The later removal of Wirahadikusamah from military's strategic post, meaning the triumph of conservative elements, was also a case in point.

In post-Soeharto's era, military factionalism can be mapped in three poles. First, military faction within cronyist and nepotistic pole. This can be divided into the gradualist (patiently pass curving ways, though they will end in the domination of troop) and the radicalists (firmly defend the old political pattern). Second, non-cronyist and non-nepotistic pole which is not as conservative as the first category. This can also be divided into the gradualists (those who want an equal relationship between the civilians and the military to be defended, though, it should pass the curving ways) and the radicalists (those who defend the balance by rejecting the reform agenda that harm the military's position). Third, non-cronyist, non-nepotistic, and pro-reform pole. It also consists of the gradualists (who want reform

²⁸¹ Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 357.

²⁸² Eep Saefulloh Fatah, "Wiranto, Agus and the Political Future of Military," *Tempo Interaktif*, 1 March 2000, on the Internet at <<http://www.temponews.com>>

gradually) and the radicalists (who want immediate reform).²⁸³

In the course of Indonesian military politics, factionalism has never turned into clique or clique culture as was the case of Thailand. Even though current factionalism is not as worse as the 1950s factionalism, since it has historical and structural roots such internal military factions are not trivial cases. The existence of this factionalism is by all means an hindrance for the establishment of substantial military withdrawal. The prospects of this factors would lie on the management of military leaders or commanding posts. If reformist military officers dominated military posts, the future of conservative elements would wane. Furthermore, it also depends on structural change of military institution, particularly military business structure and cronysm practices.

c. Economic Interests

Economic activities of the military is the most important reserved domain of military establishment. From Thai and South Korean lessons, the still-high military's economic interests hamper the establishment of full civilian control in Thailand, and the absence of business interests of South Korean military enhances the development of civilian control. This means that economic interests are so imperative in bringing the military back to the barracks or in subordinating the military. In the Indonesian case, although military business declines, officers' economic interests are still high. Its business still functions as important financial resources for the military establishment and the welfare of its officers. It is "understandable," therefore, its resistance to the demands of military withdrawal because if the military withdraws and no longer has significant political power or influence, their business would suffer.

Two issues would make this factor conducive. First, the increase of military budget. In the earliest years of Indonesia's independence, the military did not have significant budget for its operation. Budget allocated to the military covered only one third to a half of its expenditures.²⁸⁴ The rest were covered by their own business, including illegal business. Second, along with government employees, Indonesian military officers and its soldiers are underpaid. Until recently, the government could not provide sufficient budget for military's operations and for "proper" salaries of military officers so that the role of military business is still important. To increase military budget that could cover all military needs is a *conditio sine qua non* effort therefore. Even though the increase of military budget does not automatically undermine military business interests, it would create conducive condition for military withdrawal. To assure, reorganising military institution, particularly military business institutions/activities is required. One strategic measure would be to undermine all nepotistic

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

and cronyist military business practices. Another measure is to “nationalise” or “privatise” all military big business. Petty business in unit levels such as cooperatives could be allowed in a transition period. Thus, “compensation” and structural change are required to change military business interests. Exhorting the military to terminate its business activities is meaningless without providing “compensation” and carrying out structural change. Systematic efforts in curbing military business interests and activities which have polluted military professionalism and establishment are more important.

d. Societal Conflict, Separatist Movement and the Performance of Civilian Government

As in Thailand and South Korea, the military of Indonesia is so concerned with national integrity. This is understandable as the military regards themselves as the main actor in preserving the Republic during the revolutionary period. Even though East Timor issue is a different case, the “loss” of East Timor in 1999 has traumatised the military so far. The fact that Indonesia is now facing ethnic and religious conflicts (Ambon, West Kalimantan, Lombok, Central Kalimantan), growing regionalism (East Kalimantan, Riau, Bengkulu), particularly separatist movements (Aceh and Irian Jaya), has enhanced such concerns. In officers’ thinking, if the military withdraws and does not play role in decision making processes this would lead to disintegration. This is related to the performance of civilian government in the post Soeharto’s era. First, Habibie’s “adventure” in East Timor issue. Due to the “loss” of East Timor, the military blamed his political “adventure” (allowing referendum in East Timor). It was impossible that Habibie did not consult his approval for referendum with the Armed Forces Commander, at least informally. However as an institution the military actually rejected that decision. This can be indicated from resentments among military officers and the destruction of East Timor after pro-independence groups won a landslide victory in the ballots. It seemed that because the Armed Forces Commander or some high ranking officers agreed to that decision, the soldiers should follow the Commander.

Second, the military has not yet fully trusted Wahid government. There is no doubt that the task of the security apparatus is to handle security issue (from external threat), thus without being involved in politics, security apparatus’s tasks actually remain to secure national integrity. However, Wahid factor is different. The military does not fully trust him as he is regarded as an “unstable” leader since he plays zig-zag politics and frequently is not consistent with its previous statements.²⁸⁵ This was the case because he initially agreed to run an East-Timor-like referendum in Aceh and then dropped his consent without feeling guilty due to strong pressures from the military and many elements of the communities. Thus, in officers’

²⁸⁴ Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 274.

²⁸⁵ In the establishment of plural societies and democratic state, however, many argued that he is surely consistent.

thinking, without their contribution in altering Wahid's decision, Indonesia would collapse soon Aceh province attains independence. His move in suspending Wiranto also confused the military. In his overseas trips he reiterated asking Wiranto to resign. When Wiranto rejected and some politicians demanded Wahid not to make statements that could intensify tensions and be counter productive to economic recovery efforts, he provided signals to change his mind. When Wahid met Wiranto, he dropped his advance to suspend Wiranto. But a few hours later, he did suspend Wiranto which shocked military establishment but surprised pro-democracy forces. In short, the military still distrusts him, particularly in policy consistency.

Under such circumstances, the military may want the right moment to withdraw. The military may even think that many countries would support the existing military role to keep Indonesia intact. Significant military role in politics which could hamper the establishment of full democracy, in military thinking, may be tolerated rather than the establishment of full democracy but threatens regional stability. However, this argument is flawed for some reasons. The military still tries to use such issues to maintain its political role and especially its doctrine. Judging from its political ambitions and its behaviour since the revolutionary period there is no doubt that it still struggles for political power and economic advantages. By becoming professional soldiers and without being involved in politics, the military can actually maintain territorial integrity and help the police force to uphold public order in emergency condition. National integration is not only the concern of the military but also the concern of all sections of Indonesian society. Because East Timor case is different with other provinces, if Acehnese demand referendum or would like to separate, the Indonesian people would reject such a proposal. The role of Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDI-P), along with the military, in altering Wahid's decision for an East Timor-like referendum in Aceh was notable. Thus military's stance on national integration is actually supported by most people. At this point, military withdrawal from politics is not a problem actually. People would be even satisfied with the abolition of *dwifungsi* as human rights violations in the name of maintaining public order mainly come from this doctrine, as was the case of human rights violations in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and former East Timor. The abolishment of *dwifungsi* would become a remedy, especially to those who received and saw human rights violations committed by the military.

e. Ideological Factors

The main problem of military withdrawal is the dual function doctrine. Dual function is the core of Indonesian military politics as its political intervention and its "rights" to participate in various spheres are justified and instigated by this doctrine. In response to the demand of the abolition of military doctrine, the military under Soeharto's regime cleverly rejected such demand by claiming that what was wrong was not such a doctrine, but its implementation. In post-Soeharto era, the military responded by introducing the concept of

reposition, reactualisation, and redefinition, which was claimed as a reform in the military institution. Many analysts argued that this is a half-hearted reform, a softness of *dwifungsi*, and even merely a lip service or rhetoric.²⁸⁶

Because many civilian politicians, especially during the Soeharto regime, agreed that the problem was not on its doctrine but on its implementation, one observer argued that the discourse of military withdrawal has fallen into its implementation, not into the existence of its doctrine.²⁸⁷ This is not one hundred per cent correct. In fact, the discourse and opposition to abolish this doctrine was seen very earlier, soon after the Middle Way speech (1958) was made. The discourse aiming at the abolition of *dwifungsi* has used various approaches, that is, practical approach, constitutional approach, philosophical approach and historical approach. In practical approach, student movements demanding the abolition of dual function doctrine have become everyday political discourse. The demand of the abolition of such a doctrine through demonstrations has emerged systematically since 1973 and reached its peak in recent times. In constitutional approach, the discourse falls into the question of the position of *dwifungsi* vis-à-vis the Constitution of 1945. Many constitutional law scientists argue that *dwifungsi* contravenes the Constitution since the Constitution adheres the concept of civilian supremacy, poses the military as a defense force only, and does not include the military as a functional group for representation in the MPR.²⁸⁸ As for philosophical approach, the issue of the establishment of normal politics has been the center of the discussion. It is argued that normal politics is characterised by civilian control of politics and specialisation of modern sectors. If this does not occur the political situation is called not normal or still in an emergency condition. Since *dwifungsi* is contrary to the efforts establishing normal politics, *dwifungsi* has been branded as an emergency doctrine. From historical approach, military's efforts to exaggerate its role during the revolutionary period and trivialise the role of pre-war civilian leaders have been counter attacked by pro-democracy actors. By referring the role of civilian leaders especially Soekarno and Hatta, they argued that it was the civilian elite who had played more significant role prior to and after the independence. They added that those who struggled in the revolutionary period by forming militia groups such as *Laskars*, *Pasukans*, and *Barisans* as well as those who supplied logistics for the TNI were civilians. They joined and supported guerrilla war due to the "whispers" from the motherland (*ibu pertiwi*). They hoped for nothing except to defend the dignity of an independent state. If the military asked rewards for the same struggles, they argued, the nature and motives of its struggles were highly questionable. Even if the military role was significant, it could not use history to legitimise its intervention or doctrine. In the country upholding rule of law, the first reference is the Constitution, not historical claim. In

²⁸⁶ Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, *Kompas Cybermedia*, 29 February 2000 on the Internet at <http://www.kompas.com>.

²⁸⁷ Nadjib Asca, "ABRI Dalam Wacana Atawa Public Dalam Wacana ABRI," pp. 31-43.

²⁸⁸ *Forum Keadilan*, 6 August 1992 and 30 March 1995; *Kompas*, 9 July 1992.

fact, *dwifungsi* and its practices contravene the principles adhered by the Constitution.

Thus, the discourse questioning the existence of dual function doctrine has existed for decades. The problem is why don't pro-democracy groups succeed to abolish *dwifungsi* doctrine? The role of the military is of significant because if the military intends to do so it is easy to drop such a doctrine. The rise of young independent military leaders is thus important as they could not use historical claims as was the case of the 1945 generation. Even though current military leaders are from new generation of the military, most of them are "brainwashed" with historical claims and dual function doctrine. The sign of the emergence of the Indonesian Young Turks has emerged in today's Indonesia. The rise of Maj. Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumah as Chief of Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), who opposed political involvement of the military and proposed the reduction of number of regional military commands (Kodam), for instance, was a seed for the establishment of young independent military leaders. The legacy of the New Order regime was however still apparent. The new Army Chief of Staff (KSAD) Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, who opposed Wirahadikusumah' proposal in the issue of the reduction of Kodams, said that the military was committed to the concept of "back to basic" but it should not be interpreted as "back to the barracks." "Back to basic" meant back to the people while "back to the barracks" meant separating the military from the people.²⁸⁹ This statement was similar to that of under the New Order regime. In 1992, Gen Theo Syafei, who seemed to share the view of Gen. Rudini (former Army Chief of Staff and Minister of Home Affairs), said that the military did not come from the barracks but from the people, so "Why should we go back to the barracks? We must go back to the people."²⁹⁰

Even though some military officers would like to terminate its political role, formally, the initiative would be hard to come from military institution because of its historical claims. Thus the struggles from outside would be of significance. The most important thing in this movement is the intensity of struggles to abolish such doctrine and its practices either through discourse or practical movements. So far, the struggles of civilians, especially students, have been optimum, but are not successful yet to abolish such a doctrine. Besides continuing the struggles undermining *dwifungsi*, further practical efforts to civilianise all political institutions in national and local levels are crucial. If this is successful, the abolition of such doctrine is a matter of time. In this timely and critical circumstances, the role of politicians in the parliament is important as they could prepare laws abolishing the appointment of military officers in political institutions and avoid the use of terminology the so-called *dwifungsi* in any laws. In fact, this has been already done although it would only come into effect after the forthcoming elections (2004, 2009).

²⁸⁹ *Kompas Cyber Media*, 7 March 2000.

In sum, in today's Indonesia the position of factors that could lead to a more substantial military withdrawal derived from factors leading to military intervention can be summarised in the following table.

Figure 15
Factors Leading to Indonesian Military Intervention and Their Recent Conditions

No.	Factors	Factors Leading to Military Intervention	Factors' Condition for Withdrawal
1.	Motivational Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military factors (factionalism and economic interests) are conducive for military intervention. • Exogenous-to-the-military factors (growing regionalism and ineffectiveness of civilian institution) are conducive for intervention. • Exogenous-to-the-state factor (external threat) did not play role for intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military factors (factionalism and economic interests) are not conducive for a more substantial military withdrawal. • Exogenous-to-the-military factors (societal conflict, growing regionalism, and military's distrust of civilian government) are not conducive for a more substantial withdrawal. • Exogenous-to-the-state factor (US factor) does not play significant role.
2.	Structural Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International structure (Cold War) is conducive for military intervention • Domestic structure (civil society condition) is conducive for intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International structure (third wave global democratisation) is conducive for a more withdrawal. • Domestic structure (civil society condition) is not yet conducive for a more substantial withdrawal. But the role of middle class has been taken over by students.
3.	Ideological Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Dwifungsi</i> doctrine claiming that its missions to guard the state from external threat and to preserve the nation from internal threat as well as its position which is regarded equal to civilians is conducive for military intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Dwifungsi</i> doctrine claiming that its missions to guard the state from external threat and to preserve the nation from internal threat as well as its position which is regarded equal to civilians is not conducive for a more substantial withdrawal.

From the table above many factors cannot still be "played back." It is understandable therefore Indonesia can only achieve a 60% withdrawal. The prospects for a more substantial withdrawal will depend on the handling of such inconducive factors (factionalism, military's economic interests, the performance of civilian government in handling disintegration issues, dual function doctrine, and civil society condition). From Thai and South Korean lessons, all of these factors are not necessarily to be "played back" simultaneously to establish a more substantial withdrawal. However, the more factors that can be "played back", the more substantial and the more secured the withdrawal.

²⁹⁰ *Forum Keadilan*, 6 August 1992.

7. In Search of an Established Civilian Control and Democratic Regime

From the experiences of Thailand and South Korea, civilian control could be established by using constitutional, institutional, and practical approaches. Constitutional approach relates to the amendment of constitution to provide foundation for the enhancement of civilian control. Institutional approach deals with efforts to establish civilian control through political institutions. Practical approach relates to the political skills of civilian politicians to tame military institution and its officers. In the Indonesian case, to secure civilian control, constitutional approach would relate to the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. Institutional approach relates to the abolishment of military seats in the MPR, DPR, local parliaments and in civilian bureaucracy at central and local levels. These efforts, in a greater extent, would relate to the amendment of the Constitution and MPR Decrees. Political approach on the other hand relates to the skills of civilian government in reducing military power in political sphere.

The 1945 Constitution actually recognises the concept of civilian supremacy. Article 10 of the 1945 Constitution asserts that “the President shall hold the highest authority over the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces.” This means that the President is a Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces or the armed forces are subordinated to or under control of the President. In other words, the armed forces must obey the President or their activities must be approved by the President. In the discourse about the position of the President, one can still distinguish two functions of the President, that is, as a head of state and as a head of government. In this discourse, the military claimed that army’s obedience is in his capacity as a head of state, not as a head government.²⁹¹ This argument is not wrong as the Elucidation of Article 10 clearly stipulates that the function of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces refers to the President as a head of state, not as a head of government. The task of the armed forces here is, however, in defence. With the existence of *dwifungsi*, such a claim is highly questionable. Due to the existence of *dwifungsi*, the military should also obey the President as a head of government. This is because the military executes tasks in political, economic, social, and religious affairs which are the government affairs. Final accountability for the implementation of such tasks by ABRI is in the hands of the President as a head of government.

As occurred prior to 1987 in South Korea, the constitution positioning the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, does not guarantee civilian control. This was proven in Indonesia’s New Order since with such a constitution, a “man on horseback” occupied presidential post for more than three decades. As was the case of South Korea, the amendment of the Constitution should be directed to a direct election of the President by popular votes. In the first amendment of the 1945 Constitution (19 October 1999), President’s tenure has been

²⁹¹ *Forum Keadilan*, 16 March 1995. In Wahid’s era, when the President announced the reshuffle of military positions—which was regarded administratively flawed—Gen. Sudrajat (President’s military adviser) said that the President did not have a right to interfere internal military affairs (corporate

successfully limited to two terms of office (5 years each). In the second amendment (August 2000), the Ad Hoc Committee of the MPR prepared an article for a direct presidential election to be applied in 2004.²⁹² Unfortunately, however, this proposal was eventually dropped due to the opposition of the military faction and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). PDIP's rejection was questioned by many political analysts since it won in the 1999 election and its chairperson was embarrassed by horse-trading politics in the MPR.²⁹³

In political institution, South Korea and Thailand abolished the appointment of military officers in the parliament. In Thailand, in particular, a direct election of the MPs both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate has been practiced. In Indonesia, the appointment of the military officers in the DPR and MPR are still practiced. The future of civilian control and democracy, to a greater extent, would lie in this issue and a promising development has been at stake. The military has agreed to abolish the appointment practices of military representatives in the DPR which come into effect after the 2004 election. Furthermore, the military has also agreed to abolish its seats in the MPR after the 2009 election. If "the men on horseback" would like to be MPs after that time frame they should compete in the elections.

In political practices, the political skills of civilian government to tame military institution is important. While South Korean politicians reorganise the military and use his skills to reduce military power, Thai civilian governments have not touched the corporate interests of the military. As the system used in Indonesia similar to that of South Korea in that the President as Commander-in-Chief has legal power to tame military establishment, South Korean path would be more applicable for Indonesia. In fact, to a certain extent, this has been exercised by Wahid government.

Since Habibie, a civilian, succeeded Soeharto, he had been unable to control the military. First, he has linked to the past (Soeharto's regime) where the military played dominant role. Economic and political benefits as well as supports gained by Habibie through his relationship with the military hampered him to take radical steps in reforming military institution. Second, he lacked of legitimacy to rule as he was "appointed" by Soeharto, not by the MPR. This forced him to establish mutual symbiosis with the military led by General Wiranto to support his government. When Habibie's successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, assumed

interests). (Gen. Sudrajat was then fired by the President as his adviser).

²⁹² Some civilians such as Minister of Autonomy, Prof. Ryas Rasyid, however, argued that Indonesian people do not ready yet to vote directly for presidential candidate in the coming election (2004). Many experts and politicians however rebutted his argument by stating that don't regard Indonesian people still stupid; those who voted for PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle), PKB (National Awakening Party), and PAN (National Mandate Party) were because of Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amin Rais. Thus people have already practiced a direct vote for personal candidates. *Kompas Cyber Media*, 25 February 2000.

²⁹³ The second amendment of Constitution promulgated on 18 August 2000 without substantial changes since it failed imposing a popular presidential election. Many analysts argued that if PDIP agreed of a

presidential powers through election by the MPR members, he has had no psychological burden to reduce military power. Some signs of increasing civilian control are as follows. First, President Wahid showed his control over the military in the issue of martial law. In response to requests made by the military to promulgate martial law in Aceh, Wahid rejected. Second, Wahid has tamed the military by what *The New York Time* called “Confuse and Rule” strategy. This strategy was used in suspending General Wiranto, a conservative element in the military, from his post of Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs. Third, through reshuffle of military posts he has replaced some conservative elements within the military with reformist officers, or at least, with his supporters within the military. Fourth, he has appointed a civilian as Minister of Defence and a Navy personnel as the Commander of the Armed Forces. This broke a long standing “taboo” in Soeharto’s politics and a part of strategy to reduce the power of the military, the army in particular.

Apart from military’s dual function and the appointment of the MPR and DPR members which he has no power to abolish, Wahid so far does not radically change the configuration of military politics (which he has power to do so) particularly in ousting all military officers in various branches of the government either at national or local levels. One main reason is due to the existence of dual function doctrine. Another reason, he seems not to sideline the military drastically as it is facing severe criticism due to human rights abuses in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya. Furthermore, he faces a delicate task in handling trouble provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Mollucas whose military contribution would be required in a certain condition.

In regards to democratisation, there are two lessons learnt from Thai and South Korean cases. First, the more substantial the withdrawal the deeper and smoother the democratisation process. Second, in political transition, the existence of mezzanine regime (a regime lies between authoritarian and democratic regimes) is crucial in the establishment of a democratic state. In relation to the first lesson, due to the substance of military withdrawal—a sixty per cent withdrawal—democratisation process still face resistance especially from the military. As for the second lesson, the role of Habibie (and of Wahid to a certain extent) is crucial.

Habibie’s regime truly positioned itself as a Mezzanine regime. His regime type potentially led to a democratic regime, but it could also provoke authoritarian forces to re-seize power. In establishing foundation for democratic regime he had liberalised bureaucracy (abolishing government employees’ mono-loyalty to Golkar), liberalised press (revoking censorship practices), provided more freedom of speech and expressions as well as the rights to

popular presidential election, its chairperson would have a better chance to win presidential seat in the

assembly and to form political parties, freed political prisoners, and—the most important thing—carried out free election. All of these were crucial steps in the efforts to establish a democratic regime. Due to the performance of his regime in other fields however, he received severe criticism. His government's performance failed to establish accountability, transparency, and a more responsive political system. In fact, his government and his aides faced charges of corruption, misuse of power, and of providing too much lip services. This condition contributed to regime instability as such performance was conducive for the emergence of public unrests. The most crucial thing was that he looked after a looser but power-hungry “tiger” in the military establishment. This “tiger” could use such instability to regain power. Observing the situation at that time, however, the return to authoritarianism or military rule was less likely to occur. First, the military was under strong criticism over human rights violations in Aceh and East Timor and over misuse of power throughout the country. Second, Indonesian students were the main archrival of the military if the military attempted to re-seize power. Third, no such critical condition as political crisis occurred without the involvement of some elements in the military.

With the above explanation, the pendulum of mezzanine regime had more chance to swing to a more democratic one. It was true in fact. The establishment of Wahid's regime was a case in point. Wahid has continued Habibie's move into political liberalisation. For example, along with the Department of Social Affairs, he abolished the Department of Information. During the Soeharto's era this department had been a nightmarish institution for press freedoms since it had power to arbitrarily revoke the licenses to publish. Wahid's move was a follow up of Habibie's policy to abolish censorship practices. In dealing with the military, besides reshuffling military posts he abolished Bakorstanas (formerly Kopkamtib) and Litsus (political screening mechanism). In non-military sectors, he has promoted and placed civilian reformists in strategic civilian posts. The most important thing, he supported and facilitated the amendment of the 1945 Constitution to provide a stronger constitutional basis for future democratic regime. In short, Habibie's efforts have provided a strong basis for Wahid to carry out further liberalisation and democratisation.

However Wahid has been unable to create an established and stable democratic political system yet due to some opposition in the military establishment (particularly the hardliners military generals), societal conflicts, political instability (riots, unrests, terrors) and growing political regionalism. These factors could still undermine his regime. With this situation, the position of Wahid regime is thus so far between Mezzanine Regime and an established Democratic Regime; in the other word, at the latter phase of Mezzanine regime or the initial phase of an established Democratic Regime, as shown in the following figure.

Figure 16
Mezzanine Regimes in Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea

No	Regime	South Korea	Thailand	Indonesia
1.	Authoritarian Regime	Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, 1971-1987	Military-dominated regime (1932-1977)*	Soeharto (1966-1998)
2.	Mezzanine Regime	Roh Tae Woo, 1980-1992	Kriangsak (first phase), 1977-1980	Habibie (first/former phase), May 1998-October 1999
			Prem (second phase), 1980-1988	<i>Abdurrahman Wahid</i> (second/late phase), October 1999 to present (Dec. 2000)**
			Chatchai (third phase), 1988-1991	
3.	Democratic Regime	Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae Jung (1992-present)	Chuan Leekpai, Banhard, Chavalit, Chuan Leekpai, 1992-present	<i>Abdurrahman Wahid</i> (first/initial phase), October 1999 to present (Dec. 2000)**

*Democratic interlude between 1973-1976 ** Two positions

Since his regime has passed a delicate transitional period of Habibie's Mezzanine regime and military's power has weakened politically, the possibility of the return to authoritarianism is less likely to occur compared to that of Habibie. His regime is on the road to an established democratic regime.

Efforts to achieve such an established democracy are not trivial however. The establishment of a stable and full democracy would depend on his measures in dealing with five main issues. First, it relates to the most important threat to democracy, the military. The more substantial the withdrawal the better the performance of democracy. Military's dual function is the main obstacle for military withdrawal, and therefore, democratisation process. Dual function does not only reject the creation of normal politics characterised by civilian control of politics but also reject the democratisation of political institutions. Second, government's performance in handling political regionalism (particularly separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya), ethnic and religious conflicts, and political instability (riots, unrests and terrorism).²⁹⁴ If the government could handle these problems, the road to an established democracy would be smoother. Third, the economic performance of the government. A better developed state economy would reduce social unrests, improve the condition of civil society, increase budget allocation to the military, and make government officials and military officers better pay. If these can be achieved, they would be conducive for the establishment of a stable democracy.

²⁹⁴ On Christmas Eve of 2000, there were bomb terrors across the country. Bombs were planted near the Churches (Jakarta, Medan, Mojokerto, Mataram, Pekanbaru, Batam Riau, Bekasi, Sukabumi). Many

Fourth, civilian conflicts. The lesser conflicts between civilians (government Vs DPR/MPR) the smoother the democratization process through political reforms. Currently (December 2000), conflicts between Abdurahman Wahid Vs Chairmen of DPR and MPR continues to intensify. It reminds us civilian politicians conflicts in the 1950s. With this conflict, Wahid government has spent much energy to counter any attacks from his “enemies.” His “enemies” on the other hand has spent much energy simply to find strategy to oust Wahid from his office. This rivalry sacrifices a political reform agenda, and if it develops to be out of control, this could become a pretext for authoritarian force to come to power. Fifth, the rise of the so-called neo-New Order forces (former hegemonic party, Soeharto’s cronies, active and retired military hardliners, “dirty” conglomerates, political opportunists) which systematically undermine Wahid government and hinder Wahid’s political reform efforts for the sake of their interests and grabbing power. Radical steps such as drawing bold line with neo-New Order forces, replacing conservative and neo-New Order officials in the government, and bringing economic and political crimes of the New Order elements and former military hardliners to the courts would be the only choice to challenge the rise of neo-New Order. Otherwise, they could bring Indonesia back to the New Order-like era.

8. Conclusion

Similar to South Korea and Thailand, Indonesia experienced a long term military domination. Military’s “participation” in non-military sectors consisted of intervention in political institution, political arena and economic activities. Different from those two countries, military intervention in Indonesia has been more extensive and pervasive. While Thai and South Korean militaries dominated mostly national political institutions, Indonesian military dominated both national and local political institutions; thus it is more difficult to establish a total withdrawal

Military intervention in Indonesia was caused by some sets of factors similar to those were in South Korea and Thailand (motivational, structural, and ideological factors). While the main factors of long term military intervention in Thailand and South Korea were caused by military clique and communist (external) threat respectively, the main factor of Indonesian military intervention was the dual function doctrine.

In regard to military withdrawal, most factors of military intervention in South Korea can be “played back” for military withdrawal, meaning conducive conditions needed for withdrawal have been mostly met. Because of this military withdrawal in South Korea is so

argued that the terrorists were backed up by old forces, referring to former military hardliners, conservative elements of the New Order, and the “dirty” conglomerates.

secured. In Thailand, some factors cannot be “played back” and as a result military withdrawal is less secured. In Indonesia, as many factors are still not conducive yet for a more substantial military withdrawal, only a 60% withdrawal does occur. These include economic interests of the military, societal conflicts, growing political regionalism, military’s distrust to civilian government, and ideological factor (dual function). Structural factor does not pose itself as an impediment as the role of middle class has been taken by students. However, the improvement of structural factor would be so conducive for a more substantial withdrawal.

A lesson from Thailand is that a substantial withdrawal could occur although the most important factor of military withdrawal (clique or clique culture) could not be (relatively) played back. Following its experience, it is arguable that a more substantial withdrawal could also occur despite the dual function still exists. For example, if the military agrees to withdraw from the MPR, DPR and in all civilian institutions as well as in the remaining political arena, but it still keeps its mission to safeguard the country from internal threat, in the theory of military withdrawal this can still be categorised as substantial withdrawal (in advanced condition). But the withdrawal would be less secured as the dual function still exists. To establish a well preserved military withdrawal, the abolishment of *dwifungsi* is inextricably required.

While South Korean civilians can fully control the military, Indonesian and Thai civilians are unable to fully control its respective militaries. While Thai civilian government cannot fully interfere military’s corporate interests, Indonesian civilian government is unable so far to oust the military from the MPR, DPR, local parliaments and bureaucracy at national and local levels. While South Korea and Thailand have done efforts to increase civilian control by constitutional, institutional and practical approach, Indonesia so far is only successful to do so by practical approach, and partly institutional approach. Thus civilian control in Indonesia is less secured compared to that of Thailand, and especially South Korea.

To achieve a secured civilian control, constitutional amendment and the abolition of practices of the occupation of civilian posts by military officers are of importance. While recent amendments of the Constitution were not satisfactorily, institutional reforms, particularly reforms over military’s occupation of local civilian institutions throughout the country, are less prepared. These should thus become Indonesia’s crucial agenda. The increase of military budget and systematic efforts to curb military business interests and activities are other important agenda. In addition, efforts to change the outlook of the military over threat would be the most significant one in the future. What is needed here is to shift the perception of the origins of threat, from internal to external. One instance might be by using the issues of fish stealing in the Indonesian oceans by foreign ships²⁹⁵ or illegal loggings in the Indonesian borders, such as in

²⁹⁵ Mochtar Mas’oed, “Militer dan Agenda Demokratisasi,” in *ABRI dan Kekerasan*, pp. 129-135.

Kalimantan.

Following the withdrawal, democratisation occurs. This does not only occur in South Korea and Thailand, but also in Indonesia. The case of Indonesia is interesting as even though the establishment of military withdrawal is less substantial compared to those countries, democratisation as a process is dramatic. This surprising process is however less secured. The military could not only (relatively) threaten such process but also (still) hinder the democratisation in all aspects of political and government affairs, particularly in establishing an accountable and responsive political institutions. Separatist movements, ethnic and religious tensions, political instability, and civilian conflicts also contribute to the fragility of the existing Indonesian democracy.

In the process of democratisation, the role of mezzanine regime is crucial. In South Korea, Roh Tae Woo played role as a mezzanine regime. In Thailand, those which functioned as mezzanine regimes were Kriangsak Chomanand', Prem Tinsulanond' and, particularly, Chatichai Choonhavan' regimes. In Indonesia, Habibie's regime truly positioned itself as a Mezzanine regime. The more interesting one so far is that Wahid's regime to some extent play both mezzanine regime (the latter phase of mezzanine regime) and democratic regime (initial phase of an established democratic regime). While the pendulum of Habibie regime swung to a *more* democratic regime, Wahid regime moves toward an *established* democratic regime. However, the rise of authoritarianism is still possible however little such a chance. The prospects of an established Indonesian democracy would lie on the reforms of military establishment (particularly its doctrine), the handling of disintegration issues, and the economic and political performance of civilian government, including its performance in managing the conflicts with civilian politicians.

In short, Indonesia still needs time to establish a more substantial withdrawal, more civilian control and an established democracy. The path taken to achieve such goals is already on the right track. Gradual withdrawal has occurred. Intensified pressures demanding the abolishment of the dual function of the military have been responded by military's approval to cut all of its seats in political institutions in ten years time. Efforts to strengthen civilian control and democracy are underway.

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